THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED.

Ἔνιοι φέγγοντες τὴν Δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς Ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδήσαντες ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν Εὐσέβειαν. Plut.

Χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν Ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. Plato.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

The RELIGION *of* NATURE *delineated.*

To *A. F.* Esq;

I WAS much surprised, *SIR*, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired *my Thoughts* upon these Questions, 1. *Is there really any such thing as Natural Religion, properly and truly so called?* 2. *If there is, what is it?* 3. *What method and rules ought one to observe in his Studies, who proposes so to qualify himself, that he may be able to judge, for himself, of the other Religions profest in the world; to settle his own Opinions in disputable matters; and then to injoy tranquillity of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?*

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kindness to amuse me at a time, when I wanted something to divert melancholy reflexions, I shall not venture to guess. I shall only say, that could I have foreseen in due time, that such a task was to be imposed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was suitable to my purpose in those books, which I have red, but shall scarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leisure nor patience to peruse: I might have noted what the various occurrences and cases, that happen in life, suggested: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on such parts of learning, as would have been directly serviceable to me on the present occasion.

However, as I have not spent my days without *thinking* and reflecting seriously within my self upon the articles and duties of Natural religion, and they are *my*

Thoughts which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and consulting a few scattered papers, in which I had formerly for my own use set down some of them (briefly and almost solecistically), to give an answer to the *two first* of your questions, *together*: though I must own, not without trouble in adjusting and compacting loose sentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the *chaos* into the shape of something like a system.

Notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise of *Natural religion*, a subject so beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many notions will inevitably occur that are no ones property, and so many things require to be proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find *much* that is new. Yet *something* perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following Papers, concerning the nature of Moral good and evil, and is the prevailing thought that runs through them all, I never met with any where. And even as to those matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they used to appear to me in my walks and solitudes. So that they are indeed *my Thoughts*, such as have been *long mine*, which I send you; without any regard to what others have, or have not said: as I persuade my self you will easily perceive. It is not hard to discern, whether a Work of this kind be all of a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an Author from the false wares and patch-work of a Plagiary. Though, after all, it would be madness in a man to go out of his right way, only because it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Sensible how unfinished this Performance is, I call it only a *Delineation* or Rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuse a Friend, who has now passed the threshold of old age; and is, upon that and other accounts, not able to bear much study or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows: which, for the sake of order and perspicuity, I have divided into Sections, and Propositions.

Sect. I. *Of Moral Good and Evil.*

THE Foundation of Religion lies in that difference between the Acts of men, which distinguishes them into *good, evil, indifferent*. For if there is such a difference, there must be Religion; *& contra*. Upon this account it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general *Idea*, (1) or some Rule, (2) by comparing the foresaid Acts with which it might appear, to which kind

(1) So in *Plato*, *Socrates* requires of *Euthyphro* not ὅν τι ὧν δύο διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστι, κτλ. And again, ταύτην τέχνην μοι αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων, καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ, ὧν ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ ἄλλός τις πράξῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι· ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον μὴ φῶ. *Posce* exemplar *honesti*. Luc. (2) Οἶδε τὸ γ' αἰσχρὸν, κανονι τῷ καλῷ μαθών. *Eurip.*

kind they reſpectively belong (3). And though men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there muſt be (4). That, which I am going to propoſe, has always ſeemd to me not only evidently true, but withal ſo obvious and plain, that perhaps for this very reaſon it hath not merited the notice of Authors: and the uſe and application of it is ſo eaſy, that if things are but fairly permitted to ſpeak for themſelves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found *themſelves* to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; *that is*, whether they are diſagreeable to it, or not. I ſhall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.

I. *That Act which may be denominated morally good or evil, muſt be the act of a Being capable of diſtinguiſhing, chooſing, and acting for himſelf* (5): or more briefly, *of an intelligent and free Agent.* Becauſe in proper ſpeaking no act at all can be aſcribed to that, which is not indued with theſe capacities. For that, which cannot diſtinguiſh, cannot chooſe: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of chooſing for itſelf, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a neceſſity incumbent *ab extra.* But that, which acts thus, is in reality only *an inſtrument* in the hand of ſomething which impoſes the neceſſity; and cannot properly be ſaid *to act*, but *to be acted.* The Act muſt be the act of an Agent: therefore not of his inſtrument.

A Being under the above mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the ſtate of inert and paſſive matter, and can be but a *machine*: to which no language or philoſophy ever aſcribed ἤθη or *Mores.*

II. *Thoſe Propoſitions are true, which expreſs things as they are: or, Truth is the conformity of thoſe words or ſigns, by which things are expreſt, to the things themſelves.* Defin.

III. *A true propoſition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by Deeds, as well as by expreſs words or another propoſition.* It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and geſtures. Every body underſtands weeping (6), laughing, ſhrugs, frowns, &c. theſe are a ſort of univerſal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by caſts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muſcles (7). And we read of feet, that *ſpeak* (8); of a philoſopher, who *anſwerd* an Argument by only getting up and walking (9): and of one, who pretended to *expreſs* the ſame ſentence as many ways by geſticulation, as even *Cicero* himſelf could by all his *copia* of words and eloquence (10). But theſe inſtances do not come up to my meaning. There are many Acts of *other* kinds, ſuch as conſtitute the character of a man's conduct in Life, which have *in Nature*, and would be taken by any indifferent judge *to have a ſignification*, and *to imply ſome propoſition*, as plainly to be underſtood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what ſuch acts declare to

(3) *Formula quædam conſtituenda eſt: quam ſi ſequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus.* Cic. (4) Πῶς δ᾽ οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα εἶναι ἃ ἀνέυρεσία τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; ἔστιν δ᾽ ἐν [κανών τις] Arrian. (5) *Ubi virtus, ſi nihil ſitum eſt in ipſis nobis?* Cic. רשות לכל אדם נתונה אם רצה להשות עצמו לרך טובה—הוא עמוד התורה והמצוה *Maim.* דרשות היא הבחירה *Nahh. Ab.* (6) *Lacrymæ pondera vocis habent.* Ov. (7) *Oculi, ſupercilia, frons, vultus deniq; totus, qui* ſermo *quidam tacitus mentis eſt*, &c. Cic. *Natu ſignifq;* loquuntur. Ov. *Eſt actio quaſi* ſermo *corporis.* Cic. & ſim. paſs. (8) איש אין מולל ברגליו Prov. (9) Τὸν καλὸν τῆς κινήσεως λέγον σιωπῶν, περιεπάτησε *Sext. Emp.* So *Menedemus* reproved Luxury by eating only olives. *Diog. L.* And others are mentiond by *Plutarch*, who did ἄνευ φωνῆς ἃ δεῖ φράζειν. (10) *Macrob.*

to be, is not, they must *contradict truth*, as much as any false proposition or assertion can.

If a Body of soldiers, seeing another approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were *not* enemies, would not this military language declare what was *false*? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happened to the *Athenians* in the attack of *Epipolæ* (11), or to the *Carthaginians* in their last incampment against *Agathocles* in *Africa* (12). Suppose then, instead of this firing, some Officer to have *said* they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? The truth or falsehood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a *certain* sense affixt to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The case is the very same still, if into the place of *words* be substituted *actions*. The salute here was *in nature* the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any *spectator* would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were Enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either *true* or *false*: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence.

When *Popilius Lænas* solicited to have *Cicero* proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner (13), would not his *carriage* have sufficiently *signified* to any one, who was ignorant of this case, that either *Tully* was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured him; or at least that *Tully* had not saved his Life, nor had as much reason to expect *his* service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect *Tully's*? And all these things being false, were not his Behaviour and actions *expressive* of that which was false, or *contradictions to truth*? It is certain he *acted as if* those things had been true, which were not true, and as if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had *said* they were true or not true, he had done no more than *talk as if* they were so: why then should not to *act* as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwise, contradict truth as much as to *say* they were so, when they were not so (14)?

A pertinacious *Objector* may perhaps still say, As it is the business of Soldiers to *defend* themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; so self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to *prosecute* such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: and therefore it is *natural* to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that those acts of defending and prosecuting *speak* or signify so much: but conjectures are raised upon the *common sense*, which mankind has of these things. *Ans.* If it be *natural* to conclude any thing from them, do they not *naturally* convey the notice of something to be

(11) Where we find φίλους τε φίλοις, καὶ πολίτας πολίταις εἰς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντας. *Thucyd.* (12) Τοὺς ὀσκείους ὡς πολεμίους ἠμύνοντο. *Diod. S.* (13) *Val. Max.* (14) Ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἐχρῆν ποτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰσχύειν πλέον. Eurip. *Quasi aversit, audiam, an videam.* Cic.

be concluded? And what is conveying the *notice* of any thing but *notifying* or ſignifying that thing? And then again, if this ſignification is *natural* and founded in the *common* principles and ſenſe of Mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning, which reſults only from the uſe of ſome *particular* place or country, as that of language doth?

If *A.* ſhould enter into a compact with *B.* by which he *promiſes* and ingages never to do ſome certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this caſe it muſt be granted, that his act *interferes* with his promiſe, and is *contrary* to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promiſe, but it muſt alſo interfere with the truth of that *propoſition*, which ſays there was ſuch a promiſe made, or that there is ſuch a compact ſubſiſting. If this propoſition be true, *A. made ſuch a certain agreement with B.* it would be denied by this, *A. never made any Agreement with B.* Why? Becauſe the truth of this latter is *inconſiſtent* with the agreement aſſerted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this *inconſiſtence.* If then the behaviour of *A.* be *inconſiſtent* with the agreement mentioned in the former propoſition, that propoſition is as much denied by *A's behaviour*, as it can be by the latter, or any other *propoſition.* Or thus, If one propoſition imports or contains that which is *contrary* to what is contained in another, it is ſaid to *contradict* this other, and denies the exiſtence of what is contained in it. Juſt ſo if one act imports that which is *contrary* to the import of another, it *contradicts* this other, and *denies its exiſtence.* In a word, if *A.* by his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath ſubjected himſelf, his actions deny them; juſt as we ſay, *Ptolemy* by his writings denies the motion of the Earth, or his writings deny it (15).

When the queſtion was asked, *Whoſe ſheep are theſe?* the anſwer was, *Ægon's: for he committed them to my care* (16), (he uſes and diſpoſes of them as his). By this act *Damætas* underſtood them to be *his*; and if they had *not* been his, but *Alphondas's* or *Meliboeus's*, *Ægon*, by an *act* very intelligible to *Damætas*, had expreſſed what was not true: What is ſaid here is the ſtronger, becauſe he who has the *uſe* and *diſpoſal* of any thing, has *all* that he can have of it; and *v. v.* he who has the *all* (or property) of any thing, muſt have all the *uſe* and *diſpoſal* of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be *his*, than by *uſing* it, *&c.* But of this ſomething more hereafter.

In the *Jewiſh* hiſtory we read, that when *Abimelek* ſaw *Iſaac* ſporting (17) with *Rebekah*, and taking conjugal liberties (18), he preſently knew her to be *Iſaac's* wife; and if ſhe had not been his wife, the caſe had been as in the preceding inſtance. If it be *objected*, that ſhe might have been his miſtreſs or a harlot; I *anſwer*, (after the ſame manner as before), that ſo ſhe might have been, tho' *Iſaac* had told him *by words* that ſhe was his wife. And it is ſufficient for my purpoſe, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allow'd *to expreſs things as plainly and determinately as words can.* Certainly *Abimelek* gave greater credit to that information, which paſſed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear; and to what

(15) Ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνύμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ὠνεῖσθαι φαμὲν Πλάτωνα, κλ. *Plut.* (16) *Virg. & Theocr.* (17) משחק מצחק *Raſbi.* (18) Only ענין נשוק וחיבוק according to *Alſhek.*

what *Isaac* did, than to what he *said*. For *Isaac* had told him, that she was not his Wife, but his Sister (19).

A certain Author (20) writes to this purpose, " If a Soldier, who had taken the " oath to *Cæsar*, should run over to the enemy, and serve him against *Cæsar*, and af- " ter that be taken; would he not be punished as a deserter, and a perjured vil- " lain? And if he should plead for himself, that he never denied *Cæsar*; would it not " be answer'd, *That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions* (or by facts) " *he did?*" And in another place, " Let us, *says he*, suppose some Tyrant command " a Christian to burn incense to *Jupiter*, without adding any thing of a verbal abnega- " tion of *Christ*: if the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, " that *by that very act he denied him*;" (and I may add, consequently denied those *propositions* which affirm him to be the *Christ*, a teacher of true religion, and the like)?

When a man lives, as if he had the Estate which he has not, or *was* in any other regard what he *is not*, what judgment is to be passed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breathe untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he *lives a lye*?

In common speech we say some actions are *insignificant*, which would not be sense, if there were not some that are *significant*, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either *significant* or *insignificant* (21).

It may not be improper by the way to observe, that the *significancy* here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people, as that of words and sounds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places, have different, or even contrary significations. The generality of *Christians*, when they pray, take off their hats: the *Jews*, when they pray (22) or say any of their *Berakoth*, put them on. The same thing which among Christians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the *Jews*. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is an *indifferent* thing, and people by usage or consent may *make* it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the former kind, such as I chiefly here intend, have an *unalterable* signification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. *Ægon*'s treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to signify, *that it was not his*. From whence it appears, that *facts* express more strongly, even than *words* themselves, or to contradict any proposition by facts, is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words only (23). *Words* are but *arbitrary signs* of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes *poverty* (24), in another denotes *riches* (25): but *facts* may be taken as the effects of them,

(19) That Instance of *Menelaus* and his guest *Alexander*, in *Arrian*, might be subjoind to this. Εἰ τὶς αὐτοὺς εἶδε φιλοφρονουμένους ἀλλήλους, ἠπίστησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς. (20) *De Dupl. mart.* (21) As that Βλίτρι *ap. Diog. L. in v. Zen.* (22) ——— המתפלל לא יעמוד בתפלה — בראש מגולה. *Maim. & al. pass.* (23) Λόγος ἔργου σκιή. Plut. *Res loquitur ipsa: quæ semper valet plurimum.* Cic. (24) ריש Hebr. (25) ריש *Arab.* So *Ab. Ezra* observes that אבה in *Heb.* is to will, in *Arab.* to nill (tho' in *Arab.* the Word is written אבי): and in another place, that the *same* word even in the *same* language, sometimes signifies דבר והפכו.

them, or rather as the *thoughts themſelves produced into act*; as the very conceptions of the mind brought forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the moſt natural and expreſs repreſentations of them. And, beſide this, they bear certain *reſpects* to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any *ratio's* are in Mathematics. For the facts and the things they reſpect, are *juſt what they are*, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the reſpects interceding between thoſe muſt be as *fixt*, as the *ratio* is which one of theſe bears to the other: that is, they muſt remain the ſame, and always ſpeak the ſame language, till things ceaſe to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, *That whoever acts as if things were ſo, or not ſo, doth by his acts declare, that they are ſo, or not ſo*; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwiſe, his acts contradict *thoſe propoſitions*, which aſſert them to be as they are (26).

IV. *No act* (whether word (*) or deed) *of any Being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true propoſition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* For,

1. If that propoſition, which is falſe, be wrong (27), that act which *implies* ſuch a propoſition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: becauſe it is the very propoſition itſelf in practice.

2. Thoſe propoſitions, which are true, and expreſs things as they are, expreſs the *relation* between the ſubject and the attribute as it is: that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of *that relation*. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determined and fixt by the natures of the things themſelves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any propoſition that is true, but it muſt likewiſe interfere with Nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themſelves too), and conſequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in nature*. So very much are thoſe Gentlemen miſtaken, who by *following nature* mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in oppoſition to truth, or at leaſt without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combate truth (28).

3. If there is a Supreme Being, upon whom the exiſtence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either cauſes, or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are*, is to own what He cauſes, or at leaſt permits, *to be thus cauſed or permitted*: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His conſtitution of the world, and to ſubmit to His will, reveald in the books of nature. To do this therefore muſt be agreeable to *His will*. And if ſo, the contrary muſt be diſagreeable to it; and ſince (as we ſhall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly *wrong*.

I deſire that I may not be miſunderſtood in reſpect to the actings of wicked men. I do not ſay, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is *ill* done by them, ſhould be *ſo* done; *i. e.* that they ſhould uſe their liberty ill: but I ſay, when they

 have

(26) This is ποιεῖν ψεῦδος. Apocal. *Plato* uſes the ſame way of ſpeaking. Ψεῦδος, ſays he, ωνδεὶς ωνδὲν — μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειε. The contrary to this is in *Ariſtotle*, ἀληθύειν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν; and ἐν ζίῳ ἀληθύειν. And *in S. B.* לכת באמת and דרך אמת (*) Actum *generale verbum eſt, ſive* verbis *ſive* re *quid agatur.* Juſtin. Dig. (27) As it muſt be, becauſe Ὀρθὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια ἀεί. *Soph.*

have done this and committed ſome evil, it is agreeable to his will, that I ſhould allow it to *have been* committed: or, it would be diſagreeable to his will, that I ſhould *deny* it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, *to be as they are*, is direct obedience (29): ſo the contrary, not to own things *to be* or *to have been* that are or have been, or not *to be what they are*, is direct rebellion againſt Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to ſay, "God indeed cauſes ſuch a thing to be, or at leaſt permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies between this and that, is of ſuch a nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, *&c.* this is true: but yet *to me* it ſhall *not* be ſo: I will not indure it, or act as if it were ſo: the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I *mind* them, or what follows from them: even exiſtence ſhall be non-exiſtence, when my pleaſures require." Such an impious declaration as this attends every *voluntary* infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in *any inſtance* or *manner whatſoever*, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For ſuch are theſe: *every thing is what it is*; *that which is done, cannot* be *undone*; and the like. And then if thoſe Truths be conſiderd as having always ſubſiſted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himſelf, to do this is to act not only in oppoſition to His *government* or *ſoveraignty*, but to His *nature* (30) alſo: which if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is moſt right, muſt alſo upon this account be moſt *wrong*.

Pardon theſe inadequate ways of ſpeaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better repreſented thus. If there are ſuch things as *axioms*, that are and always have been immutably true, and conſequently have been always *known to God to be ſo*, the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the *Divine knowledge* muſt be denied too.

5. Deſignedly to treat things as being what they are not, is the greateſt *poſſible* abſurdity. It is to put bitter for ſweet, darkneſs for light, crooked for ſtreight, *&c.* It is to ſubvert all ſcience, to renounce all ſenſe of truth, and flatly to deny the exiſtence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exiſt, *if things are not what they are.*

To talk to a Poſt, or otherwiſe treat it as if it was a *man*, would ſurely be reckond an abſurdity, if not *diſtraction* (31). Why? becauſe this is to treat it *as being what it is not.* And why ſhould not the converſe be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a poſt (32); as if he had no ſenſe, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if

(28) Τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καλὰ φύσιν ὅτι κ᾽ κατ᾽ λόγον (that is, according to truth, which it is the office of Reaſon to diſcover). *Anton.* *Nunquam aliud* natura, *aliud* ſapientia *dicit.* Juv. (29) What *Hierocles* ſays of his ἐγκόσμιοι Θεοὶ, is true in reſpect of every thing. Τῷ Θείῳ νόμῳ καλακολουθοῦντων ὅτι — τοῦτο αὐτὸς ἐβ πεῖναι, ὃ γενόμενοι. There is a paſſage ſomewhere in S. Jugar. much like this: where it is ſaid (as I remember) that he, who worſhips an Angel מצר מה הוא שליח ה' (*as being what he is, the meſſenger of God*) is not guilty of idolatry. (30) הקב"ה נקרא אמת וכו'. In *Reſp. hhokm.* & *al.* (31) Πάμφας — ὡς ἄνδρας — ἔχων is in *Soph.* the character of *Ajax*, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monſtrous and mad extravagances of C. Caligula one is, that he treated his horſe *Incitatus* as a man. *Suet.* (32) *Horace* argues after the ſame manner. *Si quis lectica nitidam geſtare amet* agnam; *Huic veſtem, ut* natæ, *paret*, &c. *interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prætor*, &c. *Quid, ſiquis* natam *pro mutâ devovet* agnâ, Integer eſt animi? ne dixeris.

if to him pain and ſorrow were not pain; happineſs not happineſs. This is what the cruel and unjuſt often do.

Laſtly, to deny things to be as they are, is a tranſgreſſion of the great *law of our nature*, the law of Reaſon. For truth cannot be oppoſed, but reaſon muſt be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

Much might be added here concerning the *amiable* nature (33) and great *force* (34) of Truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my ſelf, the leaſt truth cannot be contradicted without much reluctance: the diſregard of it even in others does ſomething more than diſpleaſe; it is *ſhocking*.

V. *What has been ſaid of Acts inconſiſtent with truth, may alſo be ſaid of many Omiſſions, or neglects to act: that is, by theſe alſo true propoſitions may be denied to be true; and then thoſe omiſſions, by which this is done, muſt be wrong for the ſame reaſons with thoſe aſſigned under the former propoſition.*

Nothing can be aſſerted or denied by any act with regard to thoſe things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts *do* bear ſuch relations to other things, as to be declaratory of ſomething concerning them, this commonly is viſible; and it is not difficult to determine, whether truth ſuffers by them, or not. Some things cannot poſſibly be done, but truth muſt be *directly* and poſitively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the caſes ariſing from omiſſions are not always ſo well determined, and plain: it is not always eaſie to know *when* or *how far* truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude muſt be allowd and much muſt be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be ſaid in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting (or not omitting to act), *ſuch omiſſion* can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth. And there may be omiſſions in other caſes, that are ſilent as to truth. But yet there are *ſome neglects* or refuſals to act, which are manifeſtly inconſiſtent with it (or, with ſome true propoſitions).

We before (35) ſuppoſed *A.* to have engaged *not to do* ſome certain thing, &c. if now, on the other ſide, he ſhould by ſome ſolemn promiſe, oath or other act undertake *to do* ſome certain thing before ſuch a time, and he *voluntarily* (36) omits to do it, he would behave himſelf as if there had been no ſuch promiſe or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former inſtance.

Again, there are ſome ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and which therefore if we do not aim at, *nature* and *truth* are denied. If a man does not deſire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his *own* nature and the nature and definition of *happineſs* to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglect the *means*, leading to any ſuch end, is the ſame as not to propoſe that end, and muſt fall under the ſame cenſure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and that may be conſiderd as

dixeris. If it be againſt truth and nature to uſe a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much againſt truth to uſe a daughter as a lamb. (33) Καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψευδὲς τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Ariſt. *Eſt quiddam, quod ſuâ vi nos alliciat ad ſeſe, non emolumento captans aliquo, ſed trahens ſuâ dignitate: quod genus virtus, ſcientia,* veritas *eſt.* Cic. Γλυκὺ ἡ ἀλήθεια. a feſtival ſaying in Plut. (34) *O magna vis veritatis,* &c. Cic. A good man עושה האמת מפני שהוא אמת. *Maim.* (35) p. 7. (36) *Oblivione voluntariâ.* Cic.

an act, many omiſſions of this kind may be turned over to the *other ſide*, (*) and brought under the foregoing propoſition.

It muſt be confeſt there is a *difficulty* as to the means, by which we are to conſult our own preſervation and happineſs; to know what thoſe are, and what they are with reſpect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: ſome labor under diſadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in ſuch an irregular diſtemperd world, and of thoſe many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our meaſures, deprive us of certainty in theſe matters. But ſtill we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can; and the neglect *to do this* will be an omiſſion within the reach of the propoſition.

There are Omiſſions of other kinds, which will deſerve to be annumerated to theſe by being either *total*, or *notorious*, or upon the ſcore of ſome other *circumſtance*. It is certain I ſhould not deny the *Phœniſſæ* of *Euripides* to be an excellent *drama* by not reading it: nor do I deny *Chibil-menâr* to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to ſee it. But ſhould I, having leiſure, health, and proper opportunities read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my *mind*, and attain ſuch knowledge as may be *uſeful* to me, I ſhould then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear preciſely, into what kind of ſtudies this reſpect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his purſuit after knowledge, and where the diſcontinuance begins to be no offence againſt truth, he muſt conſult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himſelf *as well as he can* (37). This is one of thoſe caſes which I ſaid before were not ſo well determined.

If I do not give to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I ſhould deny a man to have a ſqualid beard by not ſhaving him, to be naſty by not waſhing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

Many things are here to be taken into conſideration, as we ſhall ſee going along: perhaps I might intrench upon truth by *doing* this: and then I cannot by *not doing* it (38). But if I, being in circumſtances to afford now and then ſomething in charity to the poor, ſhould yet *never* give them any thing at all, I ſhould *then* certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is and thus truth would be injured. So again

If I ſhould not ſay my prayers at ſuch a certain *hour*, or in ſuch a certain *place* and *manner*, this would not imply a denial of the exiſtence of God, His providence, or my dependance upon Him: nay, there may be reaſons perhaps againſt *that particular* time, place, manner. But if I ſhould *never* pray to Him, or worſhip Him at all, ſuch a *total* omiſſion would be equivalent to this aſſertion, *There is no God, who governs the world to be adored:* which if there is ſuch a Being muſt be contrary to truth. Alſo *generally* and *notoriouſly* to neglect this duty (permit me to call it ſo), tho not quite always, will *favor*, if not directly proclaim the ſame untruth. For certainly to

(*) In the Civil Law he is ſaid to *act*, who *does* omit. *Qui* non facit *quod facere debet, videtur* facere *adverſus ea quæ non facit.* Dig. (37) *Diſces, quamdiu voles: tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit*, ſays *Cicero* to his Son. (38) *Nulla virtus virtuti contraria eſt.* Sen.

to worſhip God after this manner is only to worſhip Him *accidentally*, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worſhipd at all, and this approaches as near as is poſſible to a *total* neglect. Beſide, ſuch a ſparing and *infrequent* worſhiper of the Deity betrays ſuch an habitual diſregard of Him, as will render every religious act inſignificant and null.

Should I, in the laſt place, find a man grievouſly hurt by ſome accident, faln down, alone, and without *preſent* help like to periſh; or ſee his houſe on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: under ſuch circumſtances as theſe if I do not give him my aſſiſtance immediately, I do not do it *at all*: and by this refuſing to do it according to my ability, I deny his caſe to be what it is; humane nature to be what it is; and even thoſe deſires and expectations, which I am conſcious to my ſelf I ſhould have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it muſt be conſiderd not only what it is in itſelf, or in one reſpect, but alſo what it may be in any other reſpect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole deſcription of the thing ought to be taken in.*

If a man ſteals a horſe, and rides away upon him, he may be ſaid indeed by riding him to uſe him as a *horſe*, but not as *the horſe of another man*, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore conſider him as being what he is, unleſs he takes in the reſpect he bears to his true owner. But it is not neceſſary perhaps to conſider what he is in reſpect to his color, ſhape, or age: becauſe the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any color, &c. I ſay therefore, that thoſe, and *all* thoſe properties, reſpects, and circumſtances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into conſideration. For otherwiſe the thing to be conſiderd is but imperfectly ſurveyd; and the whole compaſs of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is *in part* only, and in other reſpects perhaps as being *what it is not*.

If a *rich* man, being upon a journey, ſhould be robbed and ſtript, it would be a ſecond robbery and injuſtice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to conſider him only as a rich man. His character compleated is *a rich man robbed and abuſed*, and indeed at that time a *poor* man (39) and diſtreſt, tho able to repay afterwards the aſſiſtance lent him.

Moreover a man in giving aſſiſtance of any kind to another ſhould conſider, what *his own* circumſtances are, as well as what the *other's* are (40). If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he ſhould give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumſtances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And ſince (as I have obſerved already) all truths are conſiſtent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a *right* light, and the caſe *fairly* ſtated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly ſaid to want aſſiſtance, but not the aſſiſtance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be ſaid to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what the latter is with reſpect to the former.

The

(39) עני באותה שעה: according to that determination in a caſe ſomething like this, which occurs in *Talm. Maſs. Pbe.* (40) *Utrique ſimul conſulendum eſt. Dabo egenti; ſed ut* ipſe *non egeam*, &c. Sen.

The caſe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under ſome *promiſe* or *compact* to aſſiſt another (B), and at the ſame time bound to conſult his own happineſs, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do theſe, if he does that, *effectually*. For what muſt A. do? Here are not indeed oppoſite *truths*, but there are truths on oppoſite *ſides*. I anſwer: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconſiſtent acts cannot be both A's duty at the ſame time (for then his duty would be an impoſſibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *Mixt*, may ariſe out of thoſe *differing* conſiderations. A ſhould aſſiſt B; but *ſo*, *as* not to neglect himſelf and family, &c. and *ſo* to take care of himſelf and family, *as* not to forget the other ingagement, *as well and honeſtly as he can*. Here the *importance* of the truths on this and that ſide ſhould be diligently obſerved: and there muſt in ſuch caſes be always ſome *exception* or *limitation* underſtood. It is not in man's power to promiſe *abſolutely*. He can only promiſe as one, who may be *diſabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then exiſting.

I could here inſert many inſtances of *partial* thinking, which occur in Authors: but I ſhall chooſe only to ſet down one in the margin (41).

In ſhort, when things are truly eſtimated, *perſons* concerned, *times*, *places* (42), *ends* intended (43), and *effects*, that naturally follow, muſt be added to them.

VII. *When any act would be wrong, the Forbearing that act muſt be right: likewiſe when the omiſſion of any thing would be wrong, the Doing of it* (*i. e.* not omitting it) *muſt be right.* Becauſe *contrariorum contraria eſt ratio.*

VIII. *Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong.* For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.

IX. *Every Act* therefore *of ſuch a Being, as is before deſcribed, and all thoſe Omiſſions, which interfere with truth* (*i. e.* deny any propoſition to be true, which is true; or ſuppoſe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) *are morally evil, in ſome degree or other: the forbearing ſuch acts, and the acting in oppoſition to ſuch omiſſions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.*

I would have it to be noted well, that when I ſpeak of acts inconſiſtent with truth, I mean any truth; any true propoſition whatſoever, whether containing matter of ſpeculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be *what in fact and truth it is.*

It

(41) *Sextus Emp.* ſeems to be fond of that filthy ſaying of *Zeno*, in relation to what is ſtoried of *Jocaſta* and *Oedipus*: ὡὶ ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ μοῖον τῆς μητρὸς τρίψας, κλ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only τρίψις is conſiderd; as if all was nothing more, but *barely* τρίψις: but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For τρίψις τῷ μοείῳ is more than τρίψις by itſelf: and τρίψις τῷ μοείῳ τῆς μητρὸς is ſtill more: and certainly τρίβειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ is a different thing from τρίβειν τὸ μοείον τῷ μοείῳ, &c. He might as well have ſaid, that to rub a *red hot* piece of iron with one's bare hand is the ſame as to rub one that is *cold*, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but τρίψις. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, ſhew themſelves to be but half-thinkers, or *leſs*: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be conſiderd. (42) *Sunt res quædam ex tempore, & ex conſilio, non ex ſua natura conſiderandæ.— Quid tempora petant, aut quid perſonis dignum ſit, conſiderandum eſt*, &c. Cic. (43) Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδισκάειον ἀγωνιῶντα. Arr. *Amico ægro aliquis aſſidet: probamus. at hoc ſi hæreditatis cauſa facit, vultur eſt, cadaver exſpectat.* Sen.

It may be of uſe alſo to obſerve, that I have added thoſe words *in ſome degree or other*. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal (44). Thoſe truths which they reſpect, tho they are equally true, may compriſe matters of very different importance (45); or more truths may be violated one way than another (46): and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) ſaid to be crimes, but not *equal crimes*. If A. ſteals a *book* from B. which was pleaſing and uſeful to him, it is true A. is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B. who is the proprietor of it, and one whoſe happineſs partly depends upon it: but ſtill if A. ſhould deprive B. of a *good Eſtate*, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we ſuppoſe the book to be worth to him one pound, and the eſtate 10000 *l.* that truth which, is violated by depriving B. of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his eſtate. It is the ſame as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 muſt be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, ſure. *Then*, tho the convenience and innocent pleaſure, that B. found in the uſe of the *book*, was a degree of happineſs: yet the happineſs accruing to him from the *eſtate*, by which he was ſupplied not only with neceſſaries, but alſo with many other comforts and and harmleſs injoyments, vaſtly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former caſe was, *B. had a property in that, which gave him ſuch a degree of happineſs*: that violated in the latter, *B. had a property in that, which gave him a happineſs vaſtly ſuperior to the other*. The violation therefore in the latter caſe is upon this account a vaſtly greater violation than in the former. *Laſtly*, the truths violated in the former caſe might end in B. thoſe in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who ſubſiſt alſo by the *eſtate*, and are to be provided for out of it. And theſe truths are very many in reſpect of every one of them, and all their deſcendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated. I ſhall only add, on the other ſide, that the value of good actions will riſe at leaſt in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omiſſion of them: and that therefore they cannot be *equal*, any more than the oppoſite evil omiſſions.

But let us return to that, which is our main ſubject, the *diſtinction* between moral good and evil. Some have been ſo wild as to deny there is any ſuch thing: but from what has been ſaid here, it is manifeſt, that there is as certainly Moral *good* and *evil* as there is *true* and *falſe*; and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between *thoſe* as between *theſe*, the difference at the bottom being indeed the ſame (47). Others acknowledge, that there is indeed Moral good and evil; but

(44) Notwithſtanding that paradox of the *Stoics*, Ὅπερ ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, *Ap. Cic. Plut. Diog.* L. & *al.* which might eaſily be confuted from their own words in *Cicero*. For if ſinning be like paſſing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, *to ſin* being equal to *going beyond that line*, to go more (or further) beyond that line muſt be to ſin more. Who ſees not the falſity of that, *nec bono viro meliorem, — nec forti fortiorem, nec ſapiente ſapientiorem poſſe fieri*? And ſo on. (45) Sure that Wiſeman was but a bad accountant, who reckond, τὴν μείζονα ἐνέαν ἀποβαλών, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι. *Ap. Plut.* (46) This is confeſt, in Cic. *Illud intereſt, quòd in ſervo necando, ſi adſit injuria, ſemel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur*, &c. *Multitudine peccatorum præſtat*, &c. (47) Therefore

but they *want* some *criterion*, or mark, by the help of which they might know them asunder. And others there are, who pretend to have *found* that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared, and may be discriminated; or that *ultimate end*, to which they ought all to be referred (48): but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough. For

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call *Honestum* (49), may denominate actions good or bad, as that is, or is not the end of them: but then what is *honestum* (50)? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the *honesta* from the *inhonesta*.

They who place all in *Following nature* (51), if they mean by that phrase acting according to the natures of things (*that is*, treating things as being what they in nature are, or according to truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature (52), since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they oppoint him a guide which I fear will mislead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose.

They who make *Right reason* (53) to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them *lawful* or *unlawful*, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that what is agreeable to right reason, is right; *& contra*. And moreover, if by right reason is meant that, which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have deliverd themselves, is not yet explicit *enough* (54). It leaves room for so many *disputes* and *opposite right-reasons*, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that *his* reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends further: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such *matters of fact*, as are fairly dicoverd to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them.

They

fore they, who denied there was either *good* or *evil* (φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to say there was nothing in nature either *true* or *false*. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L. (48) *Quod* [extremum, *s.* ultimum bonorum] *omnium philosophorum sententiâ tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri, oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam.* Cic. (49) *Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est.* Cato ap Cic. (50) To say, *Quod laudabile est, omne honestum est*, or any thing like that, is to say nothing. For how shall one know what is truly *laudabile*? (51) Τέλος εἶπε [Ζήνων] τὸ ὁμολογουμένως (al. ἀκολούθως) τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Diog. L. (52) *Vivere ex hominis naturâ.* Cic. It is true he adds, *undique perfectâ & nihil requirente*: but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is *natura undique perfecta & nihil requirens*? Beside, moral religion doth not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures. (53) Celebrated every where. (54) Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅυτω διορίσασθαι τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν γινομένας λόγον, καὶ τὰς πονηρὰς τοὐναντίον, ἀληθὲς μέν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημάναι. *Andr. Rh.*

They who contenting themſelves with ſuperficial and tranſient views deduce the difference between good and evil from the *common ſenſe* of mankind (55), and certain *Principles* (56) that are born with us, put the matter upon a very *infirm* foot. For it is much to be ſuſpected there are no ſuch *innate* maxims as they pretend, but that the impreſſions of education are miſtaken for them: and beſide that, the ſentiments of mankind are not ſo *uniform* and *conſtant*, as that we may ſafely truſt ſuch an important diſtinction upon them (57).

They who own nothing to be good but *Pleaſure*, or what they call *jucundum*, nothing evil but *Pain*, and diſtinguiſh things by their tendencies to *this* or *that* (58), do not agree in what this pleaſure is to be placed (59), or by what methods and actings the moſt of it may be obtained. Theſe are left to be queſtions ſtill. As men have different taſts, different degrees of ſenſe and philoſophy, the ſame thing cannot be pleaſant to *all*: and if particular actions are to be tried by this teſt, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the ſame act may be of *one* nature to one man and of *another* to another. Beſide, unleſs there be ſome ſtrong *limitation* added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to ſink into groſs voluptuouſneſs, as in fact the generality of *Epicurus*'s herd have done; and the reins will be uſurped by thoſe appetites, which it is a principal part of all religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and reſtrain. So theſe men ſay what is intelligible indeed: but what they ſay is falſe. For not all pleaſures, but only ſuch pleaſure as is *true*, or happineſs (of which afterwards) may be reckond among the *fines* or *ultima bonorum*.

He, who, having conſiderd the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *Middle*, and ſeems to raiſe an idea of it from its ſituation at an equal diſtance from the oppoſite *extremes* (60), could only deſign to be underſtood of ſuch virtues, as have extremes. It muſt be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward *either* extreme, muſt be ſo far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equal'y (or nearly) divides the diſtance, and declines *neither* way, *muſt be right*: *alſo*, *that this notion* ſupplies us with a good *direction* for common uſe in many caſes. But then there are ſeveral obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: ſcarce more than ſuch, as reſpect the virtues couched under the word *Moderation*. And even as to theſe, it is many times difficult to diſcern, which is the *middle point* (*). This the Author himſelf was ſenſible of (61).

(55) *Communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, eaſq; in animis noſtris inchoavit, ut honeſta in virtute ponantur, in vitijs turpia.* Cic. Κεῖσθαί φησιν [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶδη ἀγαθῶν καὶ πρόληψιν. Diog. L. (56) They are uſually called *principia naturæ*, *lex* (or *leges*) *naturæ*, προλήψεις &c. (57) *Unaquæq; gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit.* Hieron. (58) *Ad hæc* [*voluptatem, & dolorem*] *et quæ ſequamur, et quæ fugiamus, refert omnia* [*Ariſtippus*]. Cic. (59) *Velim definias, quid ſit voluptas: de quo omnis hæc quæſtio eſt.* Cic. The diſputes about Pleaſure between the *Cyrenaics*, *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, &c. are well known: whether the End was pleaſure of body, or mind: whether it was *voluptas in motu*, or *in ſtatu* (*ſtabilitate*); *quæ ſuavitate aliquâ naturam ipſam movet*, or *quæ percipitur, omni dolore detracto*; ἢ ἐν κινήσει, or ἢ καταστηματικὴ, &c. Cic. Diog. L. & al. (60) Η' μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται, καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται. — Ἐστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα, κτλ. Μεσότης δὲ, δύο κακιῶν· τῆς μὲν κατ' ὑπερβολὴν· τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν. Arift. Perhaps *Pythagoras* (and after him *Plato*, and others), when he ſaid (*ap. Diog. L.*) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, might have

Whether any of thoſe other *foundations,* upon which morality has been built, will hold better than theſe mentiond, I much queſtion. But if the *formal ratio* of moral good and evil be made to conſiſt in a conformity of mens acts to the *truth of the caſe,* or the contrary, as I have here explained it, the *diſtinction* ſeems to be ſettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by *a true propoſition* and *matter of fact* is perfectly underſtood by every body; ſo will it be eaſie for any one, ſo far at leaſt as he knows them, to compare not only *words,* but alſo *actions* with them. A very little skill and attention will ſerve to interpret even theſe, and diſcover, whether they *ſpeak truth,* or not (62).

X. *If there be Moral good and evil, diſtinguiſhed as before, there is Religion; and ſuch, as may moſt properly be ſtyled natural.* By *religion* I mean nothing elſe but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I ſay, *to do*) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be done. So that there muſt be religion, if there are things, of which ſome ought not to be done, ſome not to be omitted. But that there are ſuch, appears from what has been ſaid concerning moral good and evil: becauſe that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms *to be done*; and ſo that, which being done would be evil, and implies ſuch abſurdities and rebellion againſt the Supreme Being, as are mentiond under propoſition the IVth. ought moſt undoubtedly *not to be done.* And then ſince there is *religion,* which follows from the diſtinction between moral good and evil; ſince this diſtinction is founded in the reſpect, which mens acts bear to truth; and ſince no propoſition can be true, which expreſſes things otherwiſe than as they are in nature: ſince things are ſo, there muſt be religion, which is founded in Nature, and may upon that account be moſt properly and truly called the *Religion of nature* or *Natural religion*; the great *Law* of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we ſhall afterwards find reaſon to call it) of the Author of nature is.

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free Being ſhould ſo behave himſelf, as by no act to contradict Truth*; or, *that he ſhould treat every thing as being what it is* (63).

Objections I am ſenſible may be made to almoſt any thing; but I think none but ſuch as muſt be anſwerable, to what has been here advanced. For to conſider a thing as being *ſomething elſe* than what it is, or (which is the ſame) not to conſider it as being what it is, is an abſurdity indefenſible. However, for a *ſpecimen,* I will ſet down a few. Let us ſuppoſe ſome Gentleman who has not ſufficiently conſiderd theſe matters, amidſt his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after ſome ſuch manner as this. "If every thing muſt be treated as being what it is, what rare "work will follow? For, 1. To treat my *Enemy* as ſuch is to kill him or *revenge* "my

have ſome ſuch thought as this. (*) When he ſays, it muſt be taken ὅπως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προσάξῃ, it is not by that aſcertaind. See before. (61) Οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς, καὶ πότε, κτλ. Therefore *R. Alba* might have ſpared that cenſure, where he blames him for expreſſing himſelf too generally; when he ſays כמו שראוי ובעת הראוי ובמקום הראוי, without telling him what that *manner, time, place* is. (62) There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in Morality, which *Cicero* ſeems to ſuppoſe, when he ſays *Conſuetudo exercitatioq; capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum eſſe poſſimus.* (63) What it is in nature. כפי מה שהוא, to uſe Maim.'s words. And thus that in Arrianus is true; Νόμος διατακτικὸς ἐστιν ὄντος, τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πρᾶξαι. *Omni in re quid ſit veri, videre et tueri decet.* Cic. This is indeed the Way of truth.

" my ſelf ſoundly upon him. 2. To uſe a *Creditor*, who is a ſpend-thrift, or " one that knows not the uſe of money, or has no occaſion for it, as *ſuch*, is not " to pay him. Nay further, 3. If I *want money*, dont I act according to truth, if I " take it from ſome body elſe to ſupply my own wants? And more do not I act con- " trary to truth, if I do *not*? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a *Deſign* of " killing another, or doing him ſome great miſchief, if he can find him, ſhould ask me " where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to ſave Life, ſay I do not know, " tho that be falſe? 5. At this rate I may not, in a *frolick*, break a glaſs, or burn " a book: becauſe forſooth to uſe theſe things as being what they are, is to drink " out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not burn it. *Laſtly*, how " ſhall a man *know* what is true: and if he can find out truth, may he not want the " *power* of acting agreeably to it?"

To the *firſt* objection it is eaſy to reply from what has been already ſaid. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E was *nothing more* than his enemy, there might be ſome force in the objection: but ſince he may be conſiderd as ſomething elſe beſide that, he muſt be uſed according to what he is in other reſpects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the firſt place is a *man*; and as ſuch may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very ſenſible part. And then if O and E are *fellow-citizens*, living under the ſame government, and ſubject to laws, which are ſo many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eſtate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unleſs he treats him alſo as one, who by common conſent is under ſuch a protection. If he does otherwiſe, he denies the exiſtence of thoſe laws and public compacts, to which he is himſelf, *one way or other*, a party; contrary to truth. And beſide, O ſhould act with reſpect to *himſelf* as being what he is; a man himſelf, in ſuch or ſuch circumſtances, and one who has given up all right to *private revenge* (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be obſerved, the reſult will be this. O muſt treat E as *ſomething compounded* of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: *that is*, he muſt only proſecute him in ſuch a way, as is agreeable to the ſtatutes and methods, which the ſociety have obliged themſelves to obſerve. And even as to *Legal proſecutions*, there may be many things ſtill to be conſiderd. For E may ſhew himſelf an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are ſuch things, as really affect the *ſafety* or *happineſs* of O or his family, then he will find himſelf obliged, in compliance with truth, to take refuge in the laws; and to puniſh E or obtain ſatisfaction, and at leaſt ſecurity for the future, by the means there preſcribed. Becauſe if he does not, he denies the *nature* and *ſenſe* of happineſs to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we ſhall find hereafter he is under to his *family* (63), to be what they are; a *dangerous* and *wicked* enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the *end* of laws, and ſociety itſelf, to be the ſafety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, puniſhing offenders, &c. which they will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But

(64) *Conveniet cum in dando munificum eſſe, tum in exigendo non acerbum: — à litibus verò quantùm liceat, & neſcio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem. — Habenda eſt autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi ſinere flagitioſum eſt.* Cic.

if the enmity of E riſes not beyond *trifling* or *more tolerable* inſtances, then O might act againſt truth, if he ſhould be at more charge or hazard in proſecuting E than he can afford, or the thing loſt or in danger is worth; ſhould treat an enemy in little things, or a *little* enemy as a *great* one; or ſhould deny to make ſuch allowances and *forgive* ſuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it neceſſary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Laſtly*, in caſes, of which the Laws of the place take *no notice*, truth and nature would be ſufficiently obſerved, if O ſhould keep a vigilant eye upon the ſteps of his adverſary, and take the moſt *prudent* meaſures, that are compatible with the character of a private perſon, either to aſſwage the malice of E or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he ſhould only *not* uſe him as a friend (65). For this if he ſhould do, notwithſtanding the rants of ſome men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.

The Debtor in the *ſecond* objection, if he acts as he ſays there, does in the firſt *place* make himſelf the *judge* of his Creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy ſentence, an incapacity in effect of having any eſtate, or any more eſtate. In the *next* place he arrogates to himſelf more than can be true: that he perfectly *knows* not only what his Creditor and his circumſtances *are*, but alſo what they ever *will* be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwiſe. *And*, which is to be conſiderd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditors, to be the creditors. For it is *ſuppoſed* to be owing or due to him (otherwiſe he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it; and if he has a right to it, *of right* it is his (or, it is *his*). But the debtor by detaining it uſes it, as if it was his own, and therefore *not* the others; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is *due* to him, doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. nor any other truth: that act has no ſuch ſignification. It only ſignifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other, or that it is his: and *this* it naturally doth ſignify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not *without this*.

Anſ. to *Objection* the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phraſe is uſed in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, ſo to act that *no truth* may be *denied* by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not ſignify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it *denies* that to be his, which (by the ſuppoſition) *is his*. The former is only as it were ſilence, which denies nothing; the latter a direct and loud aſſertion of a falſity; the former what can contradict no truth, becauſe the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no *pretence* for making another man to pay for his wickedneſs or folly. We will ſuppoſe therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for *neceſſaries*, and to have incurred this want through ſome *misfortune*, which he could not prevent. In this caſe, which is put as ſtrong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expreſſing this want, or acting according to it, without treſpaſſing upon truth. The man may by honeſt *labor* and induſtry ſeek to ſupply his wants: or he may apply as a *ſupplicant*, not as an enemy or robber, to ſuch as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very preſſing, to the firſt perſons he meets, whom truth will oblige to aſſiſt him according

(65) Τὸν φιλέοντ' ἰσὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ'ἐχθρὸν ἰᾶσαι. *Heſ.*

cording to their abilities: or he may do *any thing but* violate truth; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as *this* is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural: but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate (66). Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, has a right to *defend* himself and his (as we may see in due time), and not suffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.

Ans. to *Obj.* the 4th. It is certain, in the *first* place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *murder*: whoever is accessary to that, offends against *many* truths of *great* weight. 2. You are not obliged to answer the *furioso's* question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may *truly* deny that you know, where the man is. *Lastly*, if by not discovering him you should indanger your life, (and this is the hardest circumstance, that *can* be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, "If you do not murder such an one, I will murder you." And then be sure you must not commit murder; but must defend your self against this, as against other dangers, against Banditi, &c. *as well as you can.* Tho merely to deny truth by *words* (I mean, when they are not productive of facts to follow, as in the administration of justice, and the like) is not equal to a denial by *facts*; tho an *abuse* of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any; tho all sins against truth, are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties (67), as *little* a one as any; and tho one might look on a man in such a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *man* but a *mad man*: yet truth is *sacred*, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or the like (68).

The 5th *objection* seems to respect *Inanimate* things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is insinuated we shall become obnoxious to many *trifling* obligations; such as are there mentiond. To this I *answer* thus. If the *Glass* be nothing else but an useful drinking-glass, and these words fully express what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to *break* it designedly is to do what is wrong (69). For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any *reason* for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glass be poisond: for then it becomes a *poisond drinking-glass*, and to break or destroy it is to use it according

(66) Suum cuiq; incommodum serendum est potiùs, quàm de alterius commodis detrahendum. *Cic.* (67) Οὕτω καὶ ἰατρὸς νοσοῦντα ἐξαπατᾷ, — καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν. *Max. Tyr.* (68) In such pressing cases, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγῇ δῆτα τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν; — Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναί γε τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει. *Soph.* Even they, who say השת שיחה בטלה עובר במעשה, and מ"ע לדבר אמת אפילו במילי דעלמא, and המשקר כאלו עובד ע"ז, say also אבל לשים שלום מותר *S. Hhared.* (& *al. pass*). And *Ab. Ezra* says of *Abraham*, דחה אבימלך בדברים כפי צורך השעה. (69) לשבר כליו בחמתו וכו' — אסור *S. Hhas.*

ing to this *true* deſcription of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtained, which more than countervails the loſs of it, it becomes a *glaſs with that circumſtance*: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to uſe it according to what it is. And if it ſhould become by ſome circumſtance *uſeleſs* only, tho there ſhould be no reaſon for breaking it, yet if there be none againſt it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This anſwer, *mutatis mutandis*, may be adapted to other things of this kind; *books*, or any thing elſe. As the uſefulneſs or excellence of ſome books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to ſecure them to poſterity; ſo ſome may be uſed more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, than by preſerving or reading them: the number of which, *large* enough already, I wiſh you may not think to be increaſed by this, which I here ſend you.

It cannot upon this occaſion be impertinent to obſerve, that tho to act againſt truth in any caſe is wrong, yet the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in ſome caſes the importance one way or t'other may be ſo little, as to render the crime *evaneſcent* or *almoſt* nothing. And to this muſt be added, that *inanimate* beings cannot be conſiderd as capable of wrong treatment, if the reſpect they bear to living beings is ſeparated from them. The drinking-glaſs before mentiond could not be conſiderd as ſuch, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking animal to own and uſe it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing itſelf, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what ſuch things are, we muſt take them as being what they are *in reference* to things that have life.

The laſt and moſt material *objection*, or *queſtion* rather, ſhall be *anſwerd* by and by. In the mean time I ſhall only ſay, that if in any particular caſe truth is inacceſſible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear *what*, or *how* things are, then this will be true, *that the caſe* or thing under conſideration is *doubtful*: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, or obſtinate, but modeſt, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the ſafer ſide*. Such behaviour ſhews the caſe to be as it is. And as to the want of *power* to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himſelf the ſatisfaction, which he will find in Sect. 4.

Sect. II. *Of Happineſs.*

THAT, which demands to be next conſiderd, is *Happineſs*; as being in itſelf moſt conſiderable; as abetting the cauſe of truth: and as being indeed ſo nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the reſpects due to one, unleſs we regard the other. Happineſs muſt not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at happineſs, which is true.

In the few following propoſitions I ſhall not only give you my *idea* of it, but alſo ſubjoin ſome *Obſervations*, which tho perhaps not neceſſary here, we may ſome time hereafter think no loſs of time or labor to have made *en paſſant*: ſuch as men of ſcience would call, ſome of them *Poriſmata* or corollaries, and ſome *Scholia*. I ſhall take them as they fall in my way promiſcuouſly.

I. *Plea-*

I. *Pleaſure is a conſciouſneſs of ſomething agreeable, Pain of the contrary:* & v. v. *the conſciouſneſs of any thing agreeable is pleaſure, of the contrary pain.* For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the ſame time, and as ſuch; nor any thing diſagreeable pleaſant, *by the terms*; ſo neither can any thing agreeable be *for that reaſon* (becauſe it is agreeable) not pleaſant, nor any thing diſagreeable not painful, in ſome meaſure or other.

Obſ. 1. *Pleaſures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and ſenſe of their ſubjects, or the perſons affected with them.* For conſciouſneſs and perception cannot be ſeparated: becauſe as I do not perceive what I am not conſcious to my ſelf I do perceive, ſo neither can I be conſcious of what I do not perceive, or of more or leſs than what I do perceive. And therefore, ſince the degrees of pleaſure or pain muſt be anſwerable to the conſciouſneſs, which the party affected has of them, they muſt likewiſe be as the degrees of perception are.

Obſ. 2. *Whatever increaſes the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more ſuſceptive of pleaſure or pain.* This is ſuch an immediate conſequence, that to add more is needleſs. Only, if you pleaſe, let us conſider *one* way, by which perceptions and the inward ſenſe of things may in many caſes be heightend and *increaſed*; and that is *reflexion*, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be conſcious of what I do not perceive: ſo I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every inſtance therefore of conſciouſneſs and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions; ſo *v. v.* the more frequent or intenſe the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more conſciouſneſs there is, and the ſtronger is the *perception.* Further, all perceptions are produced in time: time paſſes by moments: there can be but one moment preſent at once: and therefore all preſent perception conſiderd without any relation to what is paſt, or future, may be lookd upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is paſt, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a *connexion* of paſt and future, which by this means are brought into the ſum, and ſuperadded to the preſent or momentaneous perceptions. *Again*, by reflecting we practiſe our capacity of apprehending: and this practiſing will increaſe, and as it were *extend* that capacity, to a certain degree. *Laſtly*, reflexion doth not only accumulate moments paſt and future to thoſe, that are preſent, but even in their paſſage it ſeems to *multiply* them. For time, as well as ſpace, is capable of indefinite diviſion: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilſt the mind conſiders thoſe parts as ſo many ſeveral moments, is *in effect* renderd by this ſo much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obſ. 3. *The Cauſes of pleaſure and pain are relative things: and in order to eſtimate truly their effect upon any particular ſubject, they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in that ſubject.* When the cauſe is of the ſame kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one perſon be equal to that of another, what they perceive muſt needs be *equal.* And ſo it will be likewiſe, when the forces in the producing cauſes and the degrees of perception in the ſentients are *reciprocal.* For (which doth not ſeem to be conſiderd by the world, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cauſe of pleaſure or pain ſhould act but half as much upon A as it does upon B yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B the ſum of their

pleaſures

pleaſures or pains will be *equal*. In other caſes they will be *unequal*. As if the *cauſa dolorifica* ſhould act with the ſame *impetus* on C with which it acts upon D yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain ſuſtaind by D would be half as much more as that of C becauſe he would perceive or feel the acts and impreſſions of the cauſe more by ſo much. If it ſhould act with twice the force upon D which it acts with upon C then the pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: *i. e.* as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And ſo on.

Obſ. 4. *Mens reſpective happineſſes or pleaſures ought to be valued as they are to the perſons themſelves, whoſe they are; or according to the thoughts and ſenſe, which they have of them*: not according to the eſtimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor *can* know what they are; may compute by different rules; have leſs ſenſe; be in different circumſtances; or ſuch as guilt has renderd partial to themſelves. If that prince, who having plenty and flocks many, yet raviſhed the poor man's ſingle ewe-lamb out of his boſom, reckond the poor man's loſs to be not greater than the loſs of one of his lambs would have been to him, he muſt be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little underſtood the doctrine of proportion. Every man's happineſs is *His* happineſs, what it is to *him*; and the loſs of it is anſwerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumſtances.

5. *How judicious and wary ought princes, law givers, judges, juries, and even Maſters to be!* They ought not to conſider ſo much what a ſtout, reſolute, obſtinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker ſort, or at leaſt (if that can be known) the perſons immediately concerned can bear: *that is*, what any puniſhment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore ſhould not be uſed as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public juſtice, they ſcarce know how themſelves: ſome fall into them through neceſſity, ſtrength of temptation, diſpair, elaſticity of ſpirits and a ſudden eruption of paſſion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or ſome natural infirmity or propenſion: and ſome who are innocent, are oppreſt by the iniquity or miſtakes of judges, juries, witneſſes, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their ſenſe or their honeſty has not permitted them to join. What a difference muſt there be between the ſufferings of a poor wretch ſenſible of his crime or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and thoſe of a ſturdy *veteran* in roguery; between the apprehenſions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in ſhort, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obſ. 6. *In general, all perſons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concerned.* Otherwiſe they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himſelf, or any other way, how another may be affected.

Obſ. 7. *There cannot be an equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by any ſtated human laws* (70). Becauſe (among other reaſons) the ſame thing is rarely either the ſame gratification, or the ſame puniſhment to different perſons.

Obſ. 8. *The ſufferings of Brutes are not like the ſufferings of Men.* They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon paſt or future, upon cauſes, circumſtances, &c. (71).

Time

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-life (72). And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remainder of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to some animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the way here.

II. *Pain considerd in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good.* I take this as a *Postulatum*, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. *By the general idea of good and evil the one* [pleasure] *is in itself desirable, the other* [Pain] *to be avoided.* What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all circumstances, consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and which enter so deep into their nature, that unless these be *taken in*, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, I must proceed to some other propositions relating to this subject.

IV. *Pleasure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also pleasures may be compared with other pleasures* (74), *and pains with pains.* Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear some respect or be in some *ratio* to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiplied by the moments of duration, there must still be some *ratio* of the one product to the other.

That this proposition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this hurry of business, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain such advantages, as they think exceed all their trouble? What are all their abstinences and self denials for, if they do not think some pleasures less than the pain, that would suceeed them? Do not the various methods of life shew, that men prefer one sort of pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the pain with the pleasure obtaind by it, or miss the pleasure, being excused from the pain.

V. *When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain* For nine degrees of pleasure,

D less

(70) It is not possible (in *Albo*'s words) לתת לאיש כדרכיו שוה בשוה ולשער העונשים במדה. ובמשקל זרו'. (71) *Inter hominem & belluam hoc maximè interest, quòd hæc — ad id solum quod adest, quodq; præsens est, se accomodat, paululum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum*, Cic. *Nos et venturo torquemur et præterito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum præsentibus miser est.* Sen. (72) *Præsens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur*, &c. Sen. Ὅταν γὰρ αὐτοὶ μηθὲν μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι ὁ χρόνος. *Arist.* (73) אין השם תפץ שתמות בהמה חנם וכו'. *Ab. Ez.* בא לדין וכו' — עושה צער לבהמה חנם. *S. Hhas.* (74) The rants of those men, who assert, μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἡδεῖον τι ἔτι: nay, φύσει οὐδὲν ἡδὺ, ἢ ἀηδὲς, ap. *Diog. L.* can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Nor that of the *Stoics* in *Plut.* ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγινόμενος, κτλ. As if an Age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happiness more than a moment's.

leſs by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, leſs by three degrees of the other, give ſix of the former *neg* and *true*.

It may not be improper to note here, that as I believe in the ſenſe of moſt men a *little* pain will weigh againſt a *great deal* of pleaſure: ſo perhaps there may be ſome pains, which exceed all pleaſures; *that is*, ſuch pains as no man would chooſe to ſuffer for any pleaſure *whatever*, or at leaſt any that we know of in this world.

VI. *As therefore there may be true pleaſure and pain: ſo there may be ſome preſent pleaſures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vaniſh into nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckond as pains* (75); *and* v. v. *ſome pains, that may be annumerated to pleaſures.* Or in ſhort, *there may be a wide difference between Preſent pleaſure and True pleaſure.* For the *true quantity of pleaſure* differs not from that *quantity of true pleaſure*: or it is ſo much of that kind of pleaſure, which is *true*, clear of all diſcounts and future payments. But if a man ſhould injoy three degrees of ſuch pleaſure, as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are ſet off to balance the three of pleaſure, the clear quantity remaining is ſix degrees of pain. And ſo if a man indures three degrees of pain to obtain nine of pleaſure, he certainly gains ſix of the latter. By the ſame manner of computing ſome pleaſures will be found to be the loſs of pleaſure, compared with greater: and ſome pains the alleviation of pain, becauſe by undergoing them greater are evaded (76). Thus the natures of *preſent* pleaſures and pains are varied, and ſometimes tranſmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

VII. *Happineſs differs not from the true quantity of pleaſure, unhappineſs of pain.* Or, *any being may be ſaid to be ſo far happy, as his pleaſures are true*, &c. That cannot be the happineſs of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happineſs be diſagreeable. It muſt be ſomething therefore, that is both *agreeable* and *good* for the poſſeſſor. Now preſent pleaſure is for the preſent indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he, who injoys it, muſt pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his *happineſs*. Nor again, can that pleaſure be reckond happineſs, for which one pays the full price in pain: becauſe theſe are quantities, which mutually deſtroy each other. But yet ſince happineſs is ſomething, which, by the general idea of it, muſt be deſirable, and therefore agreeable, it muſt be ſome kind of pleaſure: and this, from what has been ſaid, can only be ſuch pleaſure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happineſs will be as his true quantity of pleaſure.

One, that loves to make *objections*, may demand here, whether there may not be happineſs without pleaſure: whether a man may not be ſaid to be happy in reſpect to thoſe evils, which he eſcapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be ſuch a thing as *negative* happineſs. I *anſwer*, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we ſhould not be ſenſible what thoſe misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger uſe of the word may be ſtyled a happineſs. Alſo, the abſence of pain or unhappineſs may perhaps be called negative happineſs, ſince the meaning of that phraſe is known. But in proper ſpeaking happineſs always includes ſomething poſitive. For *mere* indolence reſulting from

(75) *Nocet* (ſit noxa) *empta dolore voluptas.* Hor. And — *multo corrupta dolore voluptas.* Id. (76) As when that *Pompey* mentiond by *Val. Max.* by burning his finger eſcaped the torture.

from inſenſibility, or joined with it, if it be happineſs, is a happineſs infinitely diminiſhed: *that is*, it is no more a happineſs, than it is an unhappineſs; upon the confine of both, but neither. At beſt it is but the happineſs of ſtocks and ſtones (77): and to theſe I think happineſs can hardly be in ſtrictneſs allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a ſtock to be what it is, rather than to be a miſerable being: this we are ſenſible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own ſenſe of it, we call it happineſs; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the ſtock itſelf. A ſenſe indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happineſs: but then the happineſs flows from the *ſenſe* of the caſe, and is a *poſitive* happineſs. Whilſt a man reflects upon his negative happineſs, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it poſitive: and perhaps a ſenſe of immunity from the afflictions and miſeries every where ſo obvious to our obſervation is one of the *greateſt* pleaſures in this world.

VIII. *That being may be ſaid to be Ultimately happy, in ſome degree or other, the ſum total of whoſe pleaſures exceeds the ſum of all his pains*: or, *ultimate happineſs is the ſum of happineſs, or true pleaſure, at the foot of the account.* And ſo on the other ſide, *that being may be ſaid to be ultimately unhappy; the ſum of all whoſe pains exceeds that of all his pleaſures.*

IX. *To make itſelf happy is a duty, which every Being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itſelf; and that, which every intelligent being may be ſuppoſed to aim at, in general* (78). For happineſs is ſome quantity of true pleaſure: and that pleaſure, which I call true, may be conſiderd by itſelf, and ſo will be juſtly deſirable (according to Prop. II. and III. On the contrary, unhappineſs is certainly to be avoided: becauſe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be conſiderd by itſelf, as a real, mere evil, &c. and becauſe if I am obliged to purſue happineſs, I am at the ſame time obliged to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is ſelf-evident. And hence it follows, that,

X. *We cannot act with reſpect to either our ſelves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unleſs both are conſiderd as beings ſuſceptive of happineſs and unhappineſs, and naturally deſirous of the one and averſe to the other.* Other animals may be conſiderd after the ſame manner in proportion to their ſeveral degrees of apprehenſion.

But that the nature of Happineſs, and the road to it, which is ſo very apt to be miſtaken, may be better underſtood; and true pleaſures more certainly diſtinguiſhed from falſe; the following propoſitions muſt ſtill be added.

XI. *As the true and ultimate Happineſs of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: ſo neither can the practice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy.* For that, which contradicts nature and truth, oppoſes the will of the Author of nature (whoſe exiſtence, &c. I ſhall prove afterwards); and to ſuppoſe, that an inferior being may in oppoſition to His will *break through* the conſtitution of things, and by ſo doing make himſelf happy, is to ſuppoſe that being more potent than the Author of nature, and conſequently more potent than the Author of the nature and power of that very being himſelf, which is abſurd. And as to the other part of the propoſition, it is alſo abſurd to think, that, by the conſtitution

(77) Οι διονὲ ηδονὴν ὑπέθεσαν. *Ariſtip. ap. Diog. L.* (78) This is truly *Bonum ſummum, quò tendimus omnes.* Lucr. Ἀ παντα γὰρ ὡς ἐιπεῖν, ἐτέρα ἑχάεν αἱρόμεθα, πλὴν τῆς ἐυδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ ἀυτη. *Ariſt.*

of nature and will of its Author, any being ſhould be finally miſerable only for *conforming* himſelf to Truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the ſame as to ſay, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore puniſhable, to act according to nature and reality. If ſuch a blunder (excuſe the boldneſs of the word) could be, it muſt come either through a defect of *power* in Him to cauſe a better and more equitable ſcheme, or from ſome *delight*, which he finds in the miſery of His dependents. The former cannot be aſcribed to the Firſt cauſe, who is the fountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives ſo many proofs of His goodneſs and beneficence. Many beings may be ſaid to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many injoyments (79): whereas did He delight in the infelicity of thoſe beings, which depend upon Him, it muſt be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwiſe in any reſpect. The world in that caſe inſtead of being ſuch a beautiful, admirable ſyſtem, in which there is only a *mixture* of evils, could have been only a ſcene of *mere* miſery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (*wicked men*) ſhould be ultimately happy, or the religious obſervers of it (*good men*) ultimately unhappy, is ſuch injuſtice, and an evil ſo great, that ſure no *Manichean* will allow ſuch a *ſuperiority* of his Evil principle over the Good, as is requiſite to produce and maintain it.

XII. *The genuine Happineſs of every being muſt be ſomething, that is not incompatible with or deſtructive of its nature* (80), *or the ſuperior or better part of it, if it be mixt.* For inſtance, nothing can be the true happineſs of a *rational* being, that is inconſiſtent with *reaſon.* For all pleaſure, and therefore be ſure all clear pleaſure and true happineſs muſt be ſomething agreeable: and nothing can be agreeable to a reaſoning nature, or (which is the ſame) to the reaſon of that nature, which is repugnant and diſagreeable to reaſon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reaſon, it is plain his reaſon is loſt, his nature depreſt, and that he now liſts himſelf among *irrationals*, at leaſt as to that particular. If a being finds pleaſure in any thing *unreaſonable*, he has an *unreaſonable* pleaſure: but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itſelf. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Laſtly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with reaſon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the ſame thing; then what has been ſaid under the former propoſition, does alſo confirm this: as what has been ſaid in proof of this, does alſo confirm the former.

XIII. *Thoſe Pleaſures are true, and to be reckond into our happineſs, againſt which there lies no reaſon.* For when there is no reaſon againſt any Pleaſure, there is always one for it (81), included in the term. So when there is no reaſon for undergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one againſt it.

Obſ. There is therefore no neceſſity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to juſtify themſelves in the purſuits after worldly advantages and injoyments, provided that neither theſe injoyments, nor the means by which they are attaind,

(79) *Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo quæ poſſides? quæ* —. Sen. (80) Παντὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ κακὸν καὶ κακοδαιμονία ἐστί. Arr. (81) Τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἀφετὸν μεταλαμβάνομεν. Simpl. *Rectè facis, animo quando obſequitur ſuo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono.* Plaut.

attaind, contain the violation of any truth: *that is*, (as we may ſee hereafter) are not unjuſt, immoderate, or the like (82). For in this caſe there is no reaſon, why we ſhould not deſire them; and a direct one, why we ſhould, viz. becauſe they are injoyments.

XIV. To conclude this ſection, *The way to happineſs and the practice of truth incur the one into the other.* For no being can be ſtyled happy, that is not ultimately ſo: becauſe all his pains exceeding all his pleaſures, he is ſo far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miſerable, in proportion to that exceſs. Now by *prop.* XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happineſs of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore that, which doth produce it, muſt be ſomething that is conſiſtent and *coincident* with it.

Two things then (but ſuch as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiouſly regarded in all our conduct, are *Truth* (of which in the preceeding Sect.) and *Happineſs* (*that is*, ſuch pleaſures, as accompany, or follow the practice of truth, or are not inconſiſtent with it: of which I have been treating in this). And as that Religion, which ariſes from the diſtinction between moral good and evil was called *Natural*, becauſe grounded upon truth and the natures of things: ſo perhaps may that too, which propoſes happineſs for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleaſure and pain, which are Phyſical (or *Natural*) good and evil. And ſince both theſe unite ſo amicably, and are at laſt the ſame, here is *one* Religion which may be called Natural upon *two* accounts.

Sect. III. *Of* Reaſon, *and the* ways *of diſcovering truth.*

MY manner of thinking, and an *objection* formerly (83) made oblige me in the next place to ſay ſomething concerning the Means of knowing, what is *true*: whether there are any, that are *ſure*, and which one may *ſafely* rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amuſement to no purpoſe. Beſides, as this will lead me to ſpeak of *Reaſon*, &c. ſome truths may here (as ſome did in the former ſection) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occaſions; and what has been already aſſerted, will alſo be further confirmed.

I. *An Intelligent being, ſuch as is mentiond before* (84), *muſt have ſome immediate objects of his underſtanding; or at leaſt a capacity of having ſuch.* For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: becauſe every object muſt be ſuch (an object) either in itſelf immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate; or of ſeveral, one of which muſt at leaſt be immediate.

II. *An*

(82) *Habebit philoſophus amplas opes; ſed nulli detractas*, &c. Sen. (83) The laſt Obj. p. 19. (84) Sect. I. prop. I.

II. *An Intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have ſome, that are abſtract and general.* I ſhall not at preſent inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not *how*), ſince this muſt be true, if there is any ſuch thing as a rational being. For that reaſon is ſomething different from the knowledge of particulars, may appear from hence; becauſe it is not confined to particular things or caſes. What is reaſon in one inſtance, is ſo in another. What is reaſonable with reſpect to *Quinctius*, is ſo in reſpect of *Navius* (85). Reaſon is performed in *ſpecies*. A Rational being therefore muſt have ſome of theſe *Species* (I mean ſpecific and abſtract *ideas*) to work with; or ſome ſuperior method, ſuch as perhaps ſome higher Order of reaſoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular *idea* is only the particular knowledge of that *idea* or thing: there it ends. But *reaſon* is ſomething univerſal, a kind of general inſtrument, applicable to particular things and caſes as they occur. We reaſon about particulars, or from them; but not *by* them.

In fact we find within our ſelves many *logical*, *metaphyſical*, *mathematical*, *&c. ideas*, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they comprehend whole *claſſes* and kinds. And it is by the help of theſe that we reaſon, and demonſtrate. So that we know from within our ſelves, that Intelligent beings not only may have ſuch abſtract *ideas*, as are mentiond in the propoſition, but that ſome *actually have* them: which is enough for my purpoſe.

III. *Thoſe Ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whoſe ideas they are.* For *ideas* can be no further the *ideas* of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that mind muſt perceive the whole of them; which is to know them *adequately*.

Again, Theſe *ideas* being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increaſe, diminiſh, or any way alter them. And to ſay the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction: becauſe it is the ſame thing as to ſay, that they are miſrepreſented; *that is*, that there are other intervening and miſrepreſenting *ideas*.

And *laſtly*, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwiſe, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and miſperceptions of things: but then, theſe things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and *media*, which may be vitiated, or perhaps defective at beſt and incapable of tranſmitting things as they are in themſelves, and therefore occaſion imperfect and falſe images. But then, even in this caſe, thoſe images and *ideas*, that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reaſon, why the originals, which they ſhould exhibite truly, but do not, are not perceived as they are. In ſhort, I only ſay the mind muſt know its own *immediate ideas*.

IV. *What has been ſaid of thoſe ideas, which are immediate, may be ſaid alſo of thoſe relations or reſpects, which any of thoſe ideas bear immediately each to others: they muſt be known immediately and truly.* For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot ſubſiſt without it; it enters into their nature: and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this muſt be known too. They are in this reſpect like the *ideas* of Whole and Part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them not diſcover that relation, by which the one muſt be always bigger and the other leſs.

To

(85) *Quis hoc ſtatuit, quod æquum ſit in Quinctium, id iniquum eſſe in Navium.* Cic.

To ſay no more, we may ſatisfy our ſelves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propoſitions, from the experience of our own minds; where we find many relations, that are immediately ſeen, and of which it is *not in our power* to doubt. We are conſcious of a knowledge, that conſiſts in the *intuition* of theſe relations. Such is the evidence of thoſe truths, which are uſually called *axioms*, and perhaps of ſome ſhort demonſtrations.

V. *Thoſe Relations or reſpects, which are not immediate, or apparent at the firſt view, may many times be diſcoverd by the mediation of one or more interpoſed; and with equal certainty.* If the *ratio* of B to D does not inſtantly ſhew itſelf; yet if the *ratio* of B to C (86) does, and that of C to D (87), from hence the *ratio* of B to D (88) is known alſo. And if the mean quantities were ever ſo many, the ſame thing would follow; provided, the reaſon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the *ſeries*, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the *Mathematicians* (89): as I might all, that know any Science, for the truth of the propoſition in general. For thus *theorems* and derivative truths are obtaind.

VI. *If a Propoſition be true, it is always ſo in all the inſtances and uſes, to which it is applicable.* For otherwiſe it muſt be both true and falſe. Therefore

VII. *By the help of Truths already known more may be diſcoverd.* For,

1. Thoſe *Inferences*, which ariſe *preſently* from the application of general truths to the particular things and caſes containd under them, muſt be juſt. Ex. gr. *The whole is bigger than a part: therefore A* (ſome particular thing) *is more than half A.* For it is plain that A is containd in the *idea* of Whole, as half A is in that of Part. So that if the antecedent propoſition be true, the conſequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and muſt alſo be true. The former cannot be true, unleſs the other be ſo too. What agrees to the *genus*, *ſpecies*, *definition*, *whole*, muſt agree to the *ſpecies*, *individuals*, *thing defined*, *the part*. The exiſtence of an *effect* infers directly that of a *cauſe*; of one *correlate* that of the other; and ſo on. And what is ſaid here, holds true (by the preceeding propoſition) not only in reſpect of axioms and firſt truths, but alſo and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. Theſe may be capable of the like applications: and the truth of ſuch conſequences as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of thoſe theorems themſelves.

2. All thoſe *Concluſions*, which are derived through mean propoſitions, that are true, and by juſt inferences, will be as true as thoſe, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every juſt conſequence is *founded in ſome known truth*, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of ſteps in an *Algebraic* operation: and if inferences are ſo founded, and juſt, the things inferred muſt be true, if they are made from true premiſſes.

Let this be the form of an argument. M = P; S = M: *ergo* S = P. Here if S = M be falſe, nothing is concluded at all: becauſe the middle propoſition is in truth not S = M, but perhaps S = Ma, which is foreign to the purpoſe. If S = M be true, but M = P falſe, then the Concluſion will indeed be a right concluſion from thoſe premiſſes; but they cannot ſhew, that S = P, becauſe the firſt propoſition if it was expreſt according to truth would be Me = P, which is another thing, and has no place

(86) = a. (87) = e. (88) = ae. (89) V. *Yacq.* El. Geom. l. 5. p. 3. n. XII. But the thing appears from the bare inſpection of theſe quantities: *b*, *ab*, *aeb*, *aeib*, *aeiob*, *&c.*

place in the argument. But if these two propositions are both true, M = P, and S = M, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but also true, that S = P. For the second or middle proposition does so connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to speak with the *Logicians*, by separately comparing the predicate or *major* term of the conclusion with the *medium* in the first proposition, and the subject or *minor* term with it in the second), that if the first and second are true, the third must be so likewise; all being indeed no more than this, P = M = S. For here the inference is just by what goes before, being founded in some such truth as this, and resulting immediately from the application of it, *Quæ eidem æqualia sunt, et inter se sunt æqualia*; or *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter se conveniunt*; or the like (90). Now if an Inference thus made is justifyable, another made after the same manner, when the truth discoverd by it is made one of the premisses, must be so too; and so must another after that; and so on. And if the last, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the first is supposed to be, it is no matter to what length the process is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the last result is derived through such a succession of mean propositions, as renders its title to our assent not worse by being long.

Since all the forms of true *Syllogisms* may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the *syllogistic* method toward the discovery or confirmation of truth, are so many instances and proofs of what is here asserted. So also are the performances of the *Mathematicians*. From some self-evident truths, and a few easie theorems, which they set out with at first, to what immense lengths, and through what a train of propositions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their Theorems and discoveries now, so far once out of human ken!

I do not enter so far into the province of the *Logicians* as to take notice of the difference there is between the *analytic* and *synthetic* methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the disquisition from the subject, or from the attribute, &c. If by the use of proper *media* any thing can be shewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonstration or argument takes its rise. Either way propositions may beget their like, and new truth be brought into the world.

VIII. *That power, which any Intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as he can be sure of* (91); *and of making such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determin what is fit to be done upon occasion, &c. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of Reason, or what entitles him to the epithet Rational. Or in short, Reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are mentiond under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given.*

The

(90) If men in their illations, or in comparing their *idea's* do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims express, the mind sees without taking notice of the words. (91) Under the word *Reason* I comprehend the *intuition* of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition *necessarily* true, is an act of *reason*, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once.

The ſupreme Being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all below Him, and pervious to His eye: or at leaſt we may ſafely ſay, that He is not obliged to make uſe of our operoſe methods by *ideas* and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to ſuperior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumſtances. When reaſon is aſcribed to God, it muſt be underſtood to be the *Divine* reaſon; when to other beings above us, to be *their* reaſon; and in all of them to tranſcend *ours*, as much as their natures reſpectively do our nature.

It may not be amiſs to note *further*, that tho a man, who truly uſes his rational powers, has abſtract and univerſal ideas, obtaind by reflexion; out of theſe frames to himſelf general truths, or apprehends the ſtrength of ſuch, and admits them, when they occurr to him; by theſe, as by ſo many ſtandards, meaſures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes uſe of in reaſoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet by a *habit* of reaſoning he may come to ſerve himſelf of them and apply them ſo quick, that he himſelf ſhall ſcarce obſerve it. Nay, moſt men ſeem to reaſon by virtue of a habit acquired by converſation, practice in buſineſs, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the ſolidity even to their own juſt reaſonings: juſt as men uſually learn rules in Arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the uſe of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the *demonſtration* of any one of them. But ſtill tho this be ſo, and men reaſon without adverting upon general ideas and abſtract truths, or even being aware that there are any ſuch, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet ſuch there are, and upon *them* reſts the weight of reaſon as its foundation.

This, *by the way*, helps us to detect the cauſe, why the generality of people are ſo little under the *dominion* of Reaſon; why they ſacrifice it to their intereſts and paſſions ſo eaſily; are ſo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party; ſo apt to change, tho the caſe remains the very ſame; ſo unable to judge of things, that are ever ſo little out of the way; and ſo conceited and poſitive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to diſcerning perſons manifeſtly falſe. Their reaſoning proceeds in ſuch a track, as they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one ſtep, but all is to them *Terra incognita*; being ignorant of the ſcientific part, and thoſe univerſal, unalterable principles, upon which true reaſon depends, and to find which and the true uſe of them are required *cool* hours and an *honeſt* application, beſide many *preparatives*.

In the *next place* it muſt be noted, that one may reaſon truly from that, which is only probable, or even falſe (92). Becauſe juſt inferences may be made from propoſitions of theſe kinds: *that is*, ſuch inferences may be made as are founded in certain truths, tho thoſe propoſitions themſelves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or falſe, according to the quality of that propoſition, or thoſe propoſitions, from which the inference is made.

(92) Upon this account it is, that I add the word *given* at the end of my deſcription of Reaſon.

Again, it should be observed, that what I have said of reasoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an *internal* operation. When we are to represent our reasonings to others, we must transfer our thoughts to them by such ways as we can. The case is to be stated in a manner suitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of fact, and their circumstances, to be made; many times persons and things to be described by proper *diatyposes*, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in discourses and books, and are performed by different Authors, upon different subjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a necessity of some condescensions, ascititious advantages, and even applications to the Passions. But notwithstanding this, in strict reasoning nothing is required, but to lay steps in a due order, firmly connected, and exprest properly, without flourish; and to arrive at truth by the *shortest* and *clearest* gradation we are able.

Once more, perhaps disputacious men, who love to find faults, may say I ascribe the investigation of truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint business of several. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make use of subordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw *diagrams*, and put cases in our own imagination; to correct those images, compound them, divide them, abstract from them; to turn over our memory, and see what has been entred and remains in that register; even to consult books, and use pen and ink. In short, we assemble all such axioms, theorems, experiments and observations, as are already known, and appear capable of serving us, or that present themselves upon the opening and *analysis* of the question, or case before us. And when the mind has thus made its *Tour*, fetched in materials from every quarter, and set them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the second to that, and so on; and when trials do not succeed rightly, rejects some, adopts others, shifts their order, &c. till at last the *series* is so disposed, that the thing or proposition required comes up resolved, or proved, by a *just* conclusion from proper premisses. Now in this process there seem to be many faculties concerned; in these acts of circumspection, recollection, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging, &c. But what if all this be so? I do not *exclude* the use of such subservient powers, or other helps, as are necessary to the exerting this faculty of Reason; nor deny the mind matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reason to be what I have described it to be.

IX. *There is such a thing as Right reason*: or, *Truth may be discoverd by reasoning* (93). The word *reason* has several acceptations. *Sometimes* it is used for that power mentiond in the last proposition; as when we say, *Man is a being indued with reason*: And then the sense of this proposition must be this; that there is such a use to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifest truth. *Sometimes* it seems to be taken for those general truths of which the mind possesses itself from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and conclusions; as when we say, *Such a thing is agreeable to reason*: for that is as much as to say, it is agreeable to

(93) That way, which some *Sceptics* take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If any thing, *say they*, is demonstrated to be true, how shall it be known, that that demonstration is true? εἰ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς ὅτι; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. *Sext. Emp.*

to the ſaid general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the ſenſe of this propoſition is, that there are ſuch general truths, and ſuch a right way of inferring. Again, *ſometimes* it ſeems to ſtand only for ſome particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the cauſes, or (as I may ſay) reaſons of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: *that is*, it differs not from truth except in this one reſpect, that it is conſiderd not barely in itſelf, but as the effect and reſult of a proceſs of reaſoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our aſſent, and its evidences about it; as when it is ſaid, *that ſuch or ſuch an aſſertion is reaſon.* And then the ſenſe of the propoſition is, that there are truths ſo to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at laſt; Truth (or there are truths, that) may be diſcoverd, or found to be ſuch *by reaſoning.*

If it were not ſo, our rational faculties, the nobleſt we have, would be vain.

Beſide, that it is ſo, appears from the foregoing propoſitions and what we know within our ſelves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abſtract *ideas:* the relations of theſe are adequately known to the mind, whoſe *ideas* they are: the propoſitions expreſſing theſe relations are evidently known to be true: and theſe truths muſt have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uſes, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our ſenſes, or preſent themſelves by any other way or means, to which theſe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the manner already more than once mentiond, new truths may be thus brought forth. And ſince theſe new truths, and the numerous deſcendents, that may ſpring from their loins, may be uſed ſtill in the ſame manner, and be as it were the ſeed of more truth, who can tell at what undeſcried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At leaſt no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is moſt *uſeful* to us in our conduct here, is diſcoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reaſon, and treat *Right reaſon* as a *Chimæra*, muſt argue againſt reaſon either with reaſon, or without reaſon. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cauſe, and eſtabliſh that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no ſuch thing as *right reaſon* by any good argument, is indeed impoſſible: becauſe that would be to ſhew there is ſuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And *further*, if this propoſition be not true, there is no right reaſoning in *Euclid*; nor can we be ſure, that what is there demonſtrated, is true. But to ſay this I am ſure is abſurd. Nor do I deſire, that this propoſition, which I here maintain, ſhould be eſteemed more certain than thoſe demonſtrated by him: and ſo *certain* it muſt be, becauſe there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great *objection* againſt all this is taken from the many inſtances of falſe reaſoning and ignorance, with which the practices, diſcourſes, writings of mankind are too juſtly taxed. But, in *anſwer* to it, I would have it minded, that I do not ſay, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a ſufficient cognizance of things; that they may not be prepoſſeſſed with inveterate errors, biaſſed by intereſt, or carried violently down with a ſtream of a ſect or faction, or dazled by ſome darling notion; that they may not be unprovided of a competent ſtock of *præcognita* and preparative knowledge: that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reaſoning, and what it is that gives ſinews to an inference, and makes it juſt; that they may not

want philoſophy, hiſtory, or other learning requiſite to the underſtanding, and ſtating of the queſtion truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and miſrepreſent their own thoughts, by expreſſing themſelves ill, even when within themſelves they reaſon well; that many underſtandings may not be naturally groſs, good heads often indiſpoſed, and the ableſt judges ſometimes overſeen, through inadvertence or haſte: I ſay none of theſe things. The contrary I confeſs is manifeſt; and error, which muſt follow in theſe caſes, encounters one every where: and it is in oppoſition to the pretended or ill expreſt reaſon of ſuch men, as are above characterized, that we are forced to add the epithet *right*, and to ſay *right reaſon* inſtead of *reaſon* only; to diſtinguiſh it from that, which wrongfully uſurps the name. Nor, moreover, do I ſay, that by reaſoning the truth is to be diſcoverd in *every* caſe: that would imply ſuch an extent of knowledge, as we cannot pretend to. I only ſay, that there is ſuch a thing as Right reaſon, and truth diſcoverable by it.

I might add, that he, whoſe faculties are intire and ſound, and who by a proper exerciſe of his mind in ſcientific ſtudies firſt opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furniſh himſelf with ſuch leading truths (of that kind ſo often mentiond), as may be uſeful to him, and of which he is aſſured in his own breaſt; and in treating any ſubject keeps them ſtill in his eye, ſo that his diſcourſe may be agreeable to them: I ſay, ſuch a one is not in much danger of concluding falſely. He muſt either determin rightly, or ſoon find, that the ſubject lies out of his reach. However he will be ſenſible, that there are many things within his ſphere, concerning which he may reaſon; and that there are truths to be found by this uſe of his faculties, in which he may ſecurely acquieſce.

Thus that queſtion ſuppoſed to be asked p. 19. *How ſhall a man know, what is true?* is in part anſwerd. More ſhall be added by and by: only a propoſition or two, which ought not to be omitted, muſt be firſt inſerted.

X. *To act according to Right reaſon, and to act according to Truth are in effect the ſame thing.* For in which ever of the forementiond ſenſes the word *Reaſon* is taken, it will ſtand either for Truth itſelf, or for that, which is inſtrumental in diſcovering and proving it to be ſuch: and then, with reſpect to this latter ſenſe, whoever is guided by that faculty, whoſe office conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing and pointing out truth, muſt be a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to act according to the genuine deciſions and dictates of it.

That reaſon, which is *right* (by the meaning of the words) muſt conclude *rightly*: but this it cannot do, if its concluſions are not true, or truth.

Let it I pray be rememberd here, that the iſſue of all right reaſoning is, that ſuch or ſuch a thing is true, if the principles and premiſſes, from whence it reſults are true. Therefore if theſe are certainly known to be ſo, the concluſion may be taken as certain and abſolute truth: but otherwiſe the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that ſuch a thing is ſo, if ſuch another, or ſuch others are ſo or ſo.

XI. *To be governed by reaſon is the general Law impoſed by the Author of nature* (94) *upon them, whoſe uppermoſt faculty is reaſon: as the dictates of it in particular caſes are the particular*

(94) *Cujus* [*ſummi Rectoris & Domini*] *ad naturam apta Ratio vera illa & ſumma lex a philoſophis dicitur.* Cic.

ticular laws, to which they are ſubject. As there are beings, which have not ſo much as ſenſe, and others that have no faculty above it; ſo there may be ſome, who are indued with reaſon, but have nothing higher than that. It is ſufficient at preſent to ſuppoſe there may be ſuch. And then if reaſon be the *uppermoſt* faculty, it has a right to controll the reſt by being *ſuch.* As in ſenſitive animals Senſe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thoſe inſtances, for which their ſenſes are given, and carries them out into ſpontaneous acts: ſo in rational animals the gradation requires, that reaſon ſhould command ſenſe.

It is plain, that Reaſon is of a commanding nature: it injoins this, condemns that, only allows ſome other things, and will be, in a good old word, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν (*), if it is at all. Now a being, who has ſuch a determining and governing power ſo placed in his nature, as to be eſſential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It ſeems to be as much deſigned by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals ſhould uſe their reaſon, and ſteer by it; as it is by the ſhipwright, that the pilot ſhould direct the veſſel by the uſe of the helm he has fitted to it. The helm would not be there, if it was not to be uſed: nor would reaſon be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be uſed, but it muſt command: ſuch is its nature.

It is not in one's power deliberately to reſolve not to be governed by reaſon. For if he could do this, he muſt either have ſome reaſon for making that reſolution, or none. If he has none, it is a reſolution, that ſtands upon no foundation, and therefore in courſe falls: and if he has ſome reaſon for it, he is governed by reaſon. This *demonſtrates* that Reaſon muſt govern.

XII. *If a Rational being, as ſuch, is under an obligation to obey reaſon, and this obedience or practice of reaſon coincides with the obſervation of truth, theſe things plainly follow.* 1. That what is ſaid *ſect.* I. *prop.* IV. muſt be true with reſpect to ſuch a being for this further cauſe; becauſe to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reaſon, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it muſt interfere with reaſon. Such a harmony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reaſon either finds it, or allows it to be ſuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has a reaſon to the contrary. 2. That there is to a Rational being ſuch a thing as *religion,* which may alſo upon this further account properly be called *natural.* For certainly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and to obey the law, which He has given or revealed to him by making it to reſult from the right uſe of his own natural faculties, muſt be to him his *natural religion.* 3. A careful obſervation of truth, the way to happineſs, and the practice of reaſon are in the iſſue the ſame thing. For of the two laſt each falls in with the firſt, and therefore each with other. And ſo, at laſt, Natural religion is grounded upon this triple and ſtrict alliance or union of *Truth, Happineſs,* and *Reaſon*; all in the ſame intereſt, and conſpiring by the ſame methods to advance the perfection of human nature: and its trueſt definition is, *The purſuit of happineſs by the practice of reaſon and truth.*

Permit me here again to inſert an Obſervation *obiter.*

Obſ. The κεφάλαιον of right reaſon and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth, is *private: that is,* every one muſt judge for himſelf. For ſince all reaſoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private *ideas,* by

(*) Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. M. Anton.

by virtue of which he becomes conſcious of ſome firſt truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his ſteps in his purſuits after more truths, &c. the *criterion*, or that by which he tries his own reaſonings, and knows them to be right, muſt be the *internal* evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableneſs of his inferences to them. One man can no more diſcern the objects of his own underſtanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can ſee with another man's eyes, or one ſhip can be guided by the helm of another. They muſt be *his own* faculties and conſcience, that muſt determin him. Therefore to demand another man's aſſent to any thing without conveying into his mind ſuch reaſons, as may produce a ſenſe of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his underſtanding, and to demand a tribute which it is *not poſſible* for him to pay. It is true indeed, tho I cannot ſee with another man's eyes, yet I may be aſſiſted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumſtances of it; and ſo men may be *aſſiſted* in making their judgements of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among thoſe that are to be conſiderd: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to ſtate the queſtion; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general, how to reaſon: eſpecially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little converſant in cloſe reflexions, and doth not teach them to reaſon, or (as the caſe too often is) teaches them not to reaſon. But ſtill this is all in order to produce ſuch a light in them, that by it *they* may ſee and judge for themſelves. An opinion, tho never ſo true and certain to one man, cannot be transfuſed into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his underſtanding, and aſſiſting him ſo to order his conceptions, that he may find the reaſonableneſs of it *within himſelf*.

To prevent miſtakes let it be noted here, that, tho I ſay men muſt judge for themſelves, I do not ſay they muſt in all caſes *act* according to their private and ſingle judgements. In reſpect of ſuch things, as are private, and concern themſelves *only*, they may and ought; only preſerving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occaſions to have more knowledge and literature than themſelves: but where more are concerned, the Society may be conſiderd as one perſon, of which he is only perhaps a ſmall particle; and then his judgement will be in a manner abſorbed and drowned in that of the majority, or of them, to whom the power of judging is intruſted. But I muſt not digreſs too far from the main buſineſs, the ways of coming at *truth*.

XIII. *The reports of Senſe are not of equal authority with the clear demonſtrations of Reaſon, when they happen to differ.* It is true, the *ideas* cauſed by the impreſſion of ſenſible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themſelves; and the mind may uſe them, and reaſon truly upon them: *that is*, the mind may make a right uſe of the *ideas*, which it finds in itſelf. But then whether theſe are the true ectypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a queſtion; and many times it is evident, they are not. They are conveyed through *media* and by inſtruments ſuſceptive of different diſpoſitions and alterations, and may conſequently produce different repreſentations; and theſe cannot all be right. But ſuppoſe thoſe inſtruments and *media* to be as intire and pure, as when intireſt and pureſt; yet ſtill there may be in many reſpects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juſt as they are. How mightily does a viſible object vary upon us its ſhape and ſize according to its diſtance, and the ſituation of the place, from whence the

proſpect

proſpect is taken? Now theſe things cannot be ſaid of the reports, or rather determinations of reaſon. For in pure reaſoning we uſe our own *ideas* for themſelves, and ſuch as the mind knows them to be, not as repreſentatives of things, that may be falſly exhibited. This *internal* reaſoning may indeed be wrongly applied to *external* things, if we reaſon about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reaſon, but of ſenſe, which reports the caſe wrong; or perhaps of the perſon, who has not been ſufficiently induſtrious to inform himſelf.

That reaſon may be applied to overrule or correct ſenſe, appears from that familiar inſtance already mentiond. When the pictures of viſible objects are pricked out by the points of the ſeveral pencils of rays upon the *retina* of the eye, they do not always give the true figure of thoſe objects, being variouſly projected according to the rules of Perſpective: and yet this, tho it might impoſe upon a being, that has no faculty ſuperior to ſenſe, doth not impoſe upon reaſon, which knows how the appearance is alterd, and why. To think the Sun (95) is no bigger, than it appears to the eye to be (96), ſeems to be the laſt degree of ſtupidity. He muſt be a brute (ſo far from being a philoſopher), who does not know, that the ſame line (*v. g.* the diameter of the ſun) at different diſtances ſubtends different angles at the eye. A ſmall matter of reaſon may ſerve to confute ſenſe in this and the like caſes.

Obj. How can *reaſon* be more certain than *ſenſe*, ſince reaſon is founded in abſtractions, which are originally taken from ſenſible objects? *Anſ.* Perhaps the mind may by being exerciſed at firſt about particular objects by degrees find in itſelf this *capacity* of conſidering things by their *ſpecies*, making abſtractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of theſe particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itſelf, and attaind to the knowledge of abſtract and general *ideas*, I do not ſee why this capacity of reaſoning by the help of them may not be uſed, upon this proficience, to cenſure and correct the advices of ſenſe concerning even ſuch particulars, as firſt gave occaſion to the mind to exert this capacity and raiſe itſelf. Is it a new thing for a Scholar to make ſuch a progreſs in learning, as to be able *afterward* to teach the Maſter, from whom he received his firſt rudiments? May not the modern Philoſophers correct the Ancients, becauſe theſe firſt ſhewd them the way, and led them into the ſtudy of nature? If we look impartially into the hiſtory of Learning, and even of Religion, we ſhall find, that truth has generally advanced by degrees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) riſen out of *fable* and *error*, which gave occaſion to thoſe inquiries, by which *themſelves* were detected. Thus Barbariſm and the beſtial life were ſucceeded by a twilight of ſenſe: this brightendby degrees: at laſt the ſun as it were roſe upon ſome parts of the commonwealth of Learning, and cleard up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men think, are yet in their *dark* and *barbarous* eſtate. The underſtanding tho it ſtarts from *particulars*, grows up to *generals*, and ſuch notions Logical, Metaphyſical, &c. as never could poſſibly come in by the ſenſes. Beſide, further, the *capacity* itſelf of admitting and conſidering general *ideas* was originally in the mind, and

(95) *Tantulus ille — ſol.* Lucr. Poor creature! (96) *Nec nimio ſolis major rota — Eſſe poteſt, noſtris quàm ſenſibus eſſe videtur.* Lucr. *Epicurus autem poſſe putat etiam minorem eſſe, quam videatur*, &c Cic.

and is not derived from without. Notices of things communicated by ſenſe are only the occaſions of uſing what it had before (97). Juſt as a maſter may by the exerciſes he ſets, excite the ſuperior capacity of his ſcholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his ſenſes, when he has a reaſon againſt it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reaſon is above ſenſe and controlls it. But,

XIV. *The reports of Senſe may be taken for true, when there is no reaſon againſt it.* (98). Becauſe when there is *no* reaſon *not* to believe, that alone is a reaſon for believing them. And therefore,

XV. *In this caſe to act according to them* (*i. e.* as taking the Informations of ſenſe to be true) *is to act according to reaſon and the great law of our nature.*

Thus it appears that there are *two* ways, by which we may aſſure our ſelves of the truth of *many* things (99); or at leaſt may attain ſuch a degree of certainty, as will be ſufficient to determin our *practice*: by *reaſon*, and by *ſenſe under the government of reaſon*; *that is*, when reaſon ſupports it, or at leaſt doth not oppoſe it. By the former we diſcover ſpeculative truths; by the latter, or both together matters of fact.

XVI. *Where Certainty is not to be had* (1), *Probability muſt be ſubſtituted into the place of it:* that is, *it muſt be conſiderd, which ſide of the queſtion is the more probable.*

Probability, or that, which in this caſe may incline one to believe any propoſition to be true rather than falſe, or any thing *to be* rather than *not to be*, or the contrary, will generally ſhew itſelf upon the application of theſe rules. 1. That may be reckond probable, which, in the eſtimation of reaſon, appears to be more agreeable to the *Conſtitution* of nature. No body can certainly foretell, that *Sice-ace* will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before *Ambs-ace*: yet any one would chooſe to lay upon the former, becauſe in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a ſtrolling Wolf ſhould light upon a Lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the Lamb: but there is ſuch a natural propenſion in that kind to do it, that no body would much queſtion the event. (This inſtance might have been taken from amongſt men, who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a Parent cauſes his Child to be inſtructed in the foundation of uſeful learning, educates him virtuouſly, and gives him his firſt impulſe and direction in the way to true happineſs, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was turned adrift, to be carried away by his own paſſions, or the influence of thoſe people, into whoſe hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and miſery in the end, and the majority of the latter being either wicked or ignorant

(97) *Semina nobis ſcientiæ dedit* [*natura*], *ſcientiam non dedit.* Sen. (98) *Si ſani ſunt* [*ſenſus*], *& valentes, & omnia removentur, quæ obſtant & impediunt.* Cic. (99) *Socrates's* ſaying, ap. Cic. *nihil ſe ſcire, niſi id ipſum*, ſavours of an affected humility, and muſt not be underſtood ſtrictly. But they, who followed, went further (— *omnes pæne veteres: qui nihil cogniſci, nihil percipi, nihil ſciri poſſe dixerunt*): and particularly Arceſilas *negabat eſſe quidquam quod ſciri poſſet*, ne illud quidem ipſum, *quod Socrates ſibi reliquiſſet.* And thus the abſurdity grew to a ſize, that was monſtrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beſide, to know that one knows nothing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing, or not; and that is to know for ought he knows. (1) Nec ſcire fas eſt omnia. Hor.

ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on the ſide of good education. When *Herodotus* writes, that the *Egyptian* Prieſts reported the Sun had within the compaſs of 11340 years twice riſen where it now ſets, and ſet where it riſes (2), what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others), is eaſily diſcernible by this rule. *Herodotus*, poſſibly delighting in teratical ſtories, might tell what he never heard: or the paſſage may be an interpolation; or it may be alterd in tranſcribing: or the Prieſts, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to ſhew what children the *Greeks* were in reſpect of them, invent ſuch a monſtrous relation, and impoſe it upon them, whom they thought not to have much ſcience among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to *Herodotus*, and ſo paſs upon poſterity, as many other fictions and *legends* have done. Theſe are ſuch things, as are well known to have happend often. But that the diurnal rotation of the Earth about her axis ſhould be inverted, is a *phænomenon*, that has never been known to happen by any body elſe, either before or ſince; that is favourd by no obſervation; and that cannot be without great alteration in the mundane ſyſtem, or thoſe laws, by which the motions of the Planets, and of our Earth among the reſt are governed. That this account then may be falſe, is very conſiſtent with the humor and circumſtances of mankind: but that it ſhould be true, is very inconſiſtent with thoſe laws, by which the motions of the celeſtial bodies ſeem to be regulated, and tend to perſevere in their preſent courſes and directions. It is therefore *in nature* much more probable, that this account is falſe. The odds are on that ſide. 2. When any *Obſervation* hath hitherto *conſtantly* held true, or *moſt commonly* proved to be ſo, it has by this acquired an eſtabliſhed credit; the cauſe may be preſumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the caſe before us there doth not appear ſomething particular, ſome reaſon for exception. No man can demonſtrate, that the Sun will riſe again, yet every one doth, and muſt act, as if that was certain (3): becauſe we apprehend no decay in the cauſes, that bring about this appearance, or have any other reaſon to miſtruſt the event, or think it will be otherwiſe a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die; but yet he muſt be more than mad, who can preſume upon immortality here, when he finds ſo many generations all gone to a man, and the ſame *enemies* that have laid them proſtrate, ſtill purſuing their *victories*. Theſe and ſuch like, tho in ſtrictneſs perhaps not certainties, are juſtly current for ſuch. So great is their probability. There are other Obſervations, which, tho not ſo infallible as thoſe, deſerve yet to be thought of, and to have a ſhare in the direction of our judgements. *Ex. gr.* There have been men in the world and no doubt ſtill are, who, having had opportunities of impoſing falſities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedneſs, have yet in ſpite of temptation preſerved their integrity and virtue: but, ſince opportunity has ſo ſeldom faild to corrupt them, who have been in poſſeſſion of her, and men's intereſts and paſſions continue in general the ſame, it is more probable her charms will ſtill have the ſame power and effect, which they uſe to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully obnoxious to be abuſed by frauds *pious* and *impious*. Briefly; when there is no parti-

cular

(2) Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἀϑέων τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι· ἔνϑά τε νῦν καταδύεται ἐνϑεύτεν δὴς ἐπανατεῖλαι· καὶ ἔνϑεν νῦν ἀνατέλλει, ἐνϑαῦτα δὶς καταδῦναι. (3) עולם כמנהגו הולך.

cular reason for the contrary, what has oftnest happend, may from experience most reasonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other observations point out the probable conjecture to us, we must be determind (if it be necessary for us to be determind at all) by the *Opinions* and sense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best skill we have (4), to be most *knowing* and *honest* (5). Of all these rules the *first* is that, which deserves the principal regard: the other two are of use, when nature so utterly excludes us from her bosom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgement. *Lastly*, when nature, the frequent repetition of the same event, and the opinion of the best judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest degree.

It appears from what has been said concerning the nature and foundations of *Probability*, that the force of it results from observation and reason together. For here the one is not sufficient without the other. Reason without *observation* wants matter to work upon: and observations are neither to be made justly by our selves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the assistance of *reason*. Both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty. For those observations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made our selves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but arise in many cases an internal obligation to give our assent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the observations of others, they may be so cautiously and skilfully selected, as to become almost our own; since our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them. The remarks and advice of *Old men* who have gone through variety of scenes, lived long enough to see the consequences of their own and other peoples actings, and can now coolly look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily sure to be preferred to those of *young* and raw actors. The *gnomæ*, apologues, &c. of *wise men*, and such as have made it their business to be useful spies upon nature and mankind, national *proverbs*, and the like (6), may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their several professions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercised themselves all their days, must be supposed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can usually have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honesty they do not either lose, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in respect of those things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, lastly, *Histories* written by credible authors, and read with judgement, may supply us with examples, parallel cases, and general remarks, profitable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cases is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and tendency of their counsels, much of the course of Divine providence is visible in them.

To conclude; that we ought to follow *Probability*, when Certainty leaves us, is plain: because then it becomes the *only* light and guide we have. For unless it is better

(4) *Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis.* Cic. (5) *Aristotle's* known rule is Ἔνδοξα, τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· καὶ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. But it is not applicable to all cases. (6) Ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιέχοντα. *Plut.*

ter to wander and fluctuate in *abſolute* uncertainty than to follow ſuch a guide: unleſs it be reaſonable to put out our *candle*, becauſe we have not the light of the *Sun*, it muſt be reaſonable to direct our ſteps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reaſonable we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above Probability, it doth govern: when there is nothing in the oppoſite ſcale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the courſe of nature muſt turn the beam. Tho a man, to reſume the inſtance before, cannot demonſtrate that *ſice-ace* will come up before *ambs-ace*, he would find himſelf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that ſide: nor could he not chooſe to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which ſide it lay.

Here then is another way of diſcovering, if not *truth*, yet what in practice may be ſuppoſed to be truth. *That is*, we may by this way diſcover, whether ſuch propoſitions as theſe be true, *I ought to do this, rather than that*; or, *to think ſo, rather than the contrary*.

Obj. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almoſt from the premiſſes collect,

Firſt, The principal cauſes of *Error*, which I take to be ſuch as theſe. 1. Want of *faculties*; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As ſome (ſtraying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no *ideas* but their own dreams, come to) aſſert what they have no reaſon to aſſert: ſo others deny what there is the higheſt reaſon to believe, only becauſe they cannot *comprehend* it. 2. Want of due *reflexion* upon thoſe *ideas* we have, or may have, by which it comes to paſs, that men are deſtitute of that knowledge, which is gained by the contemplation of them, and their relations; miſapply names, confuſedly; and ſometimes deal in a ſet of words and phraſes, to which no *ideas* at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Next of kin to this is, 3. Want of *Præcognita* and qualifications requiſite. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of ſcholars; the half-letterd are forward, and arrogate to themſelves what a *modeſt*, *ſtudious* man dares not, tho he knows more; and ſcholars, that have confined themſelves to one *ſpecies* of literature, lanch out into another: unſucceſsfully all. 4. Not underſtanding in what the nature and force of a juſt *Conſequence* conſiſts. Nothing more common than to hear people aſſert, that ſuch a thing follows from ſuch a thing; when it doth not follow: *i. e.* when ſuch a conſequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of *Memory* and *Imagination*. For men in reaſoning make much uſe of theſe: memory is upon many occaſions conſulted, and ſometimes draughts made upon the *phantaſy*. If then they depend upon theſe, and theſe happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be miſrepreſented, and men led out of the way by miſ-ſhapen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little *diſtruſt* of theſe faculties, and ſuch proper helps ought to be uſed, as perhaps the *beſt judgements* want the moſt. 6. Attributing too much to *Senſe*. For as neceſſary as our ſenſes are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not under their cognizance; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of ſenſible objects, and, to which no images belong. Every one, who has but juſt ſaluted the Mathematics and philoſophy, muſt be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which ſeem abſurd to ſenſe, and yet muſt be admitted. 7. Want of *Retirement*, and the practice of thinking and reaſoning by our ſelves. A rambling and irregular life muſt be attended

with a looſe and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous concluſions. Truth is the offſpring of *ſilence*, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often reviſed and corrected. 8. The ſtrength of appetites, paſſions, prejudices. For by theſe the underſtanding may be corrupted, or overborn: or at leaſt the *operations* of the mind muſt be much obſtructed by the intruſion of ſuch ſolicitors, as are no members of the rational ſyſtem, and yet powerful, and turbulent. 9. Ill ſtating of a queſtion; when men either put it wrong themſelves, or accept it ſo put from others. A ſmall addition or falſity ſlipped into the caſe will ferment, and ſpread itſelf: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The queſtion ought to be preſented before its judge clean, and in its natural ſtate, without diſguiſe or diſtortion. To this laſt may be ſubjoind another cauſe, nearly allied to it: not fixing the ſenſe of *Terms*, and (which muſt often follow) not rightly underſtanding what it is, that is to be examind and reſolved.

Secondly, the reaſon why the *Many* are commonly in the wrong and ſo wretchedly miſjudge things. The generality of people are not ſufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reaſoning: and of them, who have liberal education, ſome are ſoon immerſed and loſt in pleaſures, or at leaſt in faſhionable methods of living, rolling from one viſit or company to another, and flying from nothing ſo much as from themſelves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reaſoning: others become involved in buſineſs and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingroſs their time: others fall into a ſlothful neglect of their ſtudies and diſuſe of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only deſign to deceive life and gratify themſelves with the amuſements and as it were ſenſual parts of learning: and others there are, whoſe misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the concluſion; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their ſituation in the world and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever conſiderd them; and then making the ſubſequent buſineſs of their lives to diſpute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If ſuch men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they ſtudy, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having ſet out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, ſo much worſe or leſs than no knowledge. Of this ſort there are many: and very few indeed (with reſpect to the bulk of mankind), whoſe determinations and *tenents* were ever in the form of queſtions: there could not otherwiſe be ſo many ſects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon the face of the earth. The ſum of all in a few words is this: many qualifications are requiſite in order to judge of ſome truths, and particularly thoſe, which are of *greateſt importance*: proper learning and a penetration, vacancy from buſineſs, a detachment from the intereſt of all parties, much ſincerity and a perfect *reſignation* to the government of Reaſon and force of truth; which are things not to be reconciled with the uſual ignorance, paſſions, tumultuary lives, and other circumſtances, which carry moſt men tranſverſe.

Sect.

Sect. IV. *Of the* Obligations *of imperfect Beings with reſpect to their* power of acting.

THere remains yet *another* Queſtion, ſuppoſed alſo to be propoſed by an Objector, which muſt not be forgot, and upon which I ſhall beſtow this very ſhort Section. The queſtion was this, *If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?*

I. *Nothing is capable of no obligation.* For to oblige *nothing* is the ſame as *not* to oblige.

II. *So far as any Being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, ſo far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it:* or, *no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do.* For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity neceſſary to the doing of any thing, is in reſpect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power ſuperior to the reſiſtence to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply ſuch a power is the ſame as to require that his power of ſuch a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no ſuch power, then his power of that kind and degree is *nothing:* and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is juſt the ſame, as if a man was commanded to do ſomething with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the ſame as to bid him to do it with *no* hand, or *not* bid him do it.

Without more adoe, it is a truth confeſt by every body, that no body is obliged to impoſſibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of *corollaries*, the two following propoſitions.

III. *Inanimate and unactive Beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely ſenſitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above ſenſe.*

IV. *The obligations of Beings intelligent and active muſt be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.*

V. *To Endeavour may fitly expreſs the uſe of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, Being hath to act,* For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every ſuch being may do, where ever he ſtands in the ſcale of Imperfects, ſo none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or ſucceſs, than another; yet ſtill they are but *Endeavours.*

VI. *The Imputations of moral good and evil to Beings capable of underſtanding and acting muſt be in proportion to their endeavours:* or, *their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may.* This follows again from what has been ſaid: and ſo does this,

VII. And laſtly, *They who are capable of diſcerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all caſes, are nevertheleſs obliged to do theſe, as far as they are able:* or, *it is the duty of ſuch a Being ſincerely to* endeavour *to practice* reaſon; *not to contradict any* truth, *by word or deed; and in ſhort, to treat every thing as being* what it is.

Thus

Thus the duties of Rational beings, mentiond in or resulting from the preceding sections, are brought together, and *finally* fixt under the *correction* or *limitation* in this last proposition. This is the sum of their Religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in *earnest*, and to exert himself *heartily*; not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now *needless* to me seem those Disputes about *human liberty*, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same, as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own *freedom*; whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chained to his seat, and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon himself. And I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves (7), they would find by experience, that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determined by what occurs, nor predestination and fate (8) so rigid, but that *much* is left to their own conduct (9). Up and try (10).

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is also in his power to forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from ill company and vicious places. And so on (11).

This suggests a very material thought: that *forbearances*, at least in all ordinary cases, are within our power; so that a man may if he will forbear to do that, which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and so may seem to contradict truth by his omission, which, if his infirmities and disadvantages were taken into the account, and the case rightly stated, he would be found not to do.

Sect.

(7) Τὰ χρηστ' ἐπιστάμεθα, καὶ γιγνώσκομεν, Οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ'. οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο, κλ. Eurip. (8) מאת in *Arabic* is *to die*: and from hence the word *fatum* seems to come (as many *Latin* words do from that and other *Eastern* languages), death, if any thing, being *fatal* and necessary. Yet it doth not follow, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Οὐ πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαῤῥήδην ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει, ἀλλ' ὅσα καθόλου. *Plut.* (9) What the *Pharisees* say, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοί τινα καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι. *Jos. R. Albo*, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus. מקצתן בחיריות ומקצתן מכרחות ומקצתן מעורבות מן ההכרח והבחירה וכו'. (10) *Est quodam prodire tenus.* Hor. (11) Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω κακῶς συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστε ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ προϊέναι πόδας, ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλῶτταν, κλ. *Plut.* That in *Tibullus*, *Cum bene juravi, pes tamen ipse redit*, is a little poetic sally.

Sect. V. *Truths relating to the Deity. Of his exiſtence, perfection, providence, &c.*

I Have ſhewn in what the nature of *Moral good* and *evil* conſiſts; *viz.* a conformity or diſagreement to *truth*, and thoſe things that are coincident with it, *reaſon* and *happineſs*: alſo, how truth is diſcoverd; by *ſenſe*, or *reaſon* or *both*. I ſhall now ſpecify ſome of thoſe *Truths*, which are of greateſt importance and influence, and require more reaſoning to diſcover them; leaving the reſt (common matters of fact) to the common ways of finding them. They reſpect principally either the *Deity*, or *our ſelves* or the *reſt of mankind*. The firſt ſort are the ſubject of *this* ſection.

I. *Where there is a ſubordination of cauſes and effects, there muſt neceſſarily be a Cauſe in nature prior to the reſt, uncauſed.* Or thus, *Where there is a ſeries, in which the exiſtence of one thing depends upon another, the exiſtence of this again upon ſome other, and ſo upwards, as the caſe ſhall be, there muſt be ſome Independent Being, upon whom the reſt do originally depend.*

If *Z* (ſome body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves *Z* only as they are firſt moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are *moveds*, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together (12), are *one moved*: that W ſtands here as the firſt mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a *moved* without a *mover*, which is abſurd (13): and laſtly, that of what length ſoever the *ſeries* may be, the caſe will be ever the ſame; *i. e.* if there be no *Firſt mover* (14) unmoved, there muſt be a *moved* without a *mover*.

Further, if W, whom we will ſuppoſe to be an intelligent Being, and to have a power of *beginning* motion, hath this power *originally* in himſelf and *independently* of all others, then here not only the firſt mover in this *ſeries*, but a *firſt Being* and original cauſe is found. Becauſe that, which has a power of begining motion *independent* of any other, is a *mover independent*; and therefore *is independent*, or has an independent exiſtence, ſince nothing can *be* a mover without *being*. But if W has not this power independently in himſelf, then he muſt receive it from ſome other, upon whom he depends and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of *conferring a faculty* of producing motion originally and independently in himſelf, here will be a *firſt, independent Cauſe*. And if it can be ſuppoſed, that he has it not thus, and that the *ſeries* ſhould riſe too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there *is* ſome ſuch *Cauſe*, upon whom this train of beings and powers muſt depend, if we reaſon as in the former paragraph. For,

Univerſally

(12) Z † Y † X. (13) One might with the Στατικοῖς (ſo called by *Ariſtotle*, *ap. S. Emp.* as well deny, that there is any ſuch thing as *motion*, as ſay there is *motion* without a *mover*; or, which is the ſame, a *firſt mover*. (14) Πρῶτον μεταβάλλον. *Plato.* Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἀπάσης. *Id.* Πρῶτον κινοῦν. *Ariſt.*

Universally if Z be *any effect whatsoever*, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the *cause* of its existence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifest that the existence of all, Z, Y, X does *originally* come from W, which stands here as the Supreme cause, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and consequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X *one effect*, without W there would be an effect without a cause. Lastly, let this retrogression from effects to their causes be continued ever so far, the same thing will still recur, and without such a cause as is before mentiond the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; *i. e. dependent, and not dependent.*

Obj. The *series* may ascend *infinitely* (15) and for that reason have no *first* mover or cause. *Ans.* If a *series* of bodies moved can be supposed to be *infinite*, then, taken together, it will be equal to an *infinite body* moved: and this *moved* will not less *require* a mover, than a finite body, but *infinitely more.* If I may not be permitted to place a first mover at the top of the *series*, because it is supposed to be infinite, and to have no begining; yet still there must of necessity be *some* cause or author of the motion (16), different from all these bodies, because there being (*by the supposition*) no one body in the *series*, that moves the next but only in consequence of its being moved first itself, there is no one of them that is not *moved*, and the whole can be considerd together but as an infinite body moved, and which must therefore be moved by *something.*

The same kind of answer holds good in respect of *all* effects and their causes in general. An *infinite* succession of effects will require an *Infinite* efficient, or a Cause *infinitely effective.* So far is it from requiring *none.*

Suppose a Chain (17) hung down out of the heavens from an *unknown* height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon, was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation; and upon this a question should arise, *What supported or kept up this chain:* would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the *first* (or lowest) link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the *second* or rather the *first and second together* upon the *third*, and so on *ad infinitum?* For what

(15) The greatest men among the Ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. Οὔτε γὰρ τόδ' ἐκ τοῦδε δυνατὸν ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον. *Arist.* If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be μέσα: and then εἴπερ μηδέν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστι, κλ. To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so ἐπ' ἄπειρον, is to suppose ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε κινοῦν ἔσται οὔτε κινούμενον, μὴ οὔσης ἀρχῆς τῆς κινούσης. *Simpl.* Not only those *Arabian* philosophers called *Hebr.* מדברים, *Arab.* אלמתכלמון, but many of the elder *Jews* have agreed with the *Greeks* in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see *Mor. nebok. & al.* particnlarly *S. Kozri:* where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fonrth in *S. Emunoth*). אם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף עד העת הזאת אין תכלית להם ומה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל. For tho, as *Muscatus* observes, these reasonings of the *Medabberim* לא לרצון היו לפניו [המורה]; yet most certainly let the *series* of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long *downward* as *upward*; and if they are infinite and inexhaustible one way, they must be so the other too: and then what *Saad. Ga.* says, takes place אם לאתגיע ההויה אלינו לא נהיה וכו'. (16) *Aristotle* himself, who asserts the eternity of *motion*, asserts also the necessity of a first and eternal *mover.* (17) Σειρὴν χρυσείην ἐξ οὐρανόθεν —. Hom. *Aurea de cælo — funis* is mentiond too by *Lucr.*

what holds up the *whole?* A *chain* of *ten* links would fall down, unleſs ſomething able to bear it hinderd: one of *twenty*, if not ſtaid by ſomething of a yet greater ſtrength, in proportion to the increaſe of weight: and therefore one of *infinite* links certainly, if not ſuſtaind by ſomething *infinitely* ſtrong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a *chain* of cauſes and effects (18) tending, or as it were *gravitating* towards ſome end. The laſt (or loweſt) depends, or (as one may ſay) is *ſuſpended* upon the cauſe above it: this again, if it be not the firſt cauſe, is ſuſpended as an effect upon ſomething above it, *&c.* (19) And if there be not ſome *firſt cauſe*, upon which all hang or depend, if they ſhould be *infinite*, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient (as has been ſaid): and to aſſert there is any ſuch thing, would be as great an *abſurdity*, as to ſay, that a finite or *little* weight wants ſomething to ſuſtain it, but an infinite one or the *greateſt* does not.

II. *A Cauſe or Being, that has in nature no ſuperior cauſe, and therefore* (by the terms) *is alſo unproduced, and independent, muſt be ſelf-exiſtent:* i. e. *exiſtence muſt be eſſential to Him*; or, *ſuch is his nature, that He cannot but be* (20). For every being muſt either exiſt *of itſelf*, or *not of itſelf:* that, which exiſts not of itſelf, muſt derive its exiſtence from ſome other, and ſo be *dependent:* but the Being mentiond in the propoſition is ſuppoſed to be *independent*, and *uncauſed*. Therefore He muſt exiſt, not *this* way, but the *other*. The root of His exiſtence can be ſought for no where, but in His own nature; to place it any where elſe is to make a cauſe *ſuperior* to the *Supreme*.

III. *There muſt be ſuch a Being.* For (beſide what has been ſaid already) if there was not at leaſt *one* ſuch Being, *nothing could be* at all (21). For the *Univerſe* could not *produce itſelf* (22); nor could any *part* of it produce itſelf, and then produce the *reſt:* becauſe this is ſuppoſing a thing to *act* before *it is*.

IV. *Such a Being, as is before deſcribed, muſt not only be eternal, but infinite. Eternal* He muſt be, becauſe there is no way, by which ſuch a Being can either *begin* or *ceaſe* to be, exiſtence being of His eſſence. And *infinite* He muſt be, becauſe He can be *limited*

(18) אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלה ועלול אל בלתי תכלית. *S. Iqqar.* Where more may be ſeen of this השתלשלות out of *Ibn. Sinai*, *Maim. &c.* (19) The Chain muſt be faſtend πρὸς βίον Οὐλύμποιο. *Invenietur*, ſays *Macrobius*, *preſſius intuenti à ſummo Deo uſq; ad ultimam rerum facem — connexio. et hæc eſt Homeri* catena aurea, *quam pendere de cælo in terras Deum juſſiſſe commemorat.* This matter might be illuſtrated by other ſimilitudes (even שלשלת הקבלה might ſerve for one): but I ſhall ſet down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the ſame taken either way. It occurs in *Hbob. halleb.* and afterward in *Reſh. hbokm.* Suppoſe a row of Blind Men, of which the laſt laid his hand upon the ſhoulder of the man next before him, he on the ſhoulder of the next before him, and ſo on till the foremoſt grew to be quite ought of ſight; and ſome body asking, what guide this ſtring of blind men had at the head of them, it ſhould be anſwerd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and ſo went on, *ad infin.* would any rational creature accept this for a juſt anſwer? Is it not to ſay, that infinite blindneſs (or blindneſs, if it be infinite) ſupplies the place of ſight, or of a guide? (21) Something muſt be מחוייב המציאות, otherwiſe לא יהיה רבר נמצא כלל: every thing cannot be אפשר מציאות, *&c. Mor. neb.* & *al.* (20) So *Ariſtotle* ſays of the Firſt mover, Οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα, κτλ. And after him the *Arabic* philoſophers, *Maimonides*, *Albo*, *& al. paſſ.* teach all that God exiſts *neceſſarily*. מן השקר העררי: to ſuppoſe him not to be implies a falſity; or, He cannot be ſuppoſed not to be. (22) This needs no demonſtration. But there is a very old one in *S. Emun.* and after in *Hbob. halleb*, עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחר משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם הויתו או אחר הויתו ושניהם אי אפשר וכו׳.

mited by no other as to his existence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He must be *inferior* to that being. He must also in that case be *dependent:* because He must be beholden to that being for his being *what He is*, and that He is not confined within *narrower* limits. Beside, if His *presence* (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be *there*: and if *not there*, He might be supposed to be *not elsewhere*: and thus he might be supposed *not to be at all*. But such a Being, as is described in the II. prop. cannot so much as be *supposed not to be*.

V. *Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and therefore his manner of existence is above all our conceptions.* For he exists *necessarily*, and (as has been said) cannot be *supposed not to be* without a contradiction: but nothing within our comprehension is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can *imagine not to be* without any repugnance to nature: nor do we know of any beside this Supreme Being himself. For of Him indeed we know *by reasoning*, that there *must be* One being, who cannot be supposed not to be, because (as before) otherwise nothing could be at all: tho we cannot know *Him*, and *how* He exists. Adequate ideas of eternity (23) and infinity are above us, us finites.

In inquiring after the causes of things, when we find (or suppose) this to be the cause of that, another thing to be the cause of this again, and so on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with respect to the last cause, that we can comprehend, *What is the cause of that?* So that it is not *possible* for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in something, which is to us *incomprehensible*. And therefore the Supreme Cause must certainly be such. But tho it is impossible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of existence yet we may be sure that,

VI. *He exists in a manner, which is perfect.* For He, who exists of himself, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cause) is the fountain of existence to other beings, must exist in the *uppermost* and *best* manner of existing. And not only so, but (since He is *infinite* and *illimited*) He must exist in the best manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exist thus is infinite goodness of existence; and to exist in a manner *infinitely good* is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but One such Being.* That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there must be at least *one* independent Being, such as is mentiond in prop. I. so now, that in

(23) What relation or analogy there is between *time* (a flux of moments) and *eternal* (unchangeable) existence; how any being should be not older *now*, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are speculations attended with insuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of Timæus ap. Plat. Ὡς ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανὸς ἐγεννάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιουργήθη. Many philosophers therefore have thought themselves obliged to deny, that God exists *in time*. Τό, τ' ἦν, τό, τ' ἔσται, χρόνου γεγονότος εἴδη, φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον οὐσίαν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κλ. Plato. Ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς, χρὴ φάναι, καὶ ὅστι κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἄχρονον, κλ. Plut. השם יתעלה אין יחס בינו ובין הזמן וכו'. *Maim.* אינו מצוי בזמן. *Id. Albo* has a whole chapter to shew, שה"י אינו נופל תחת הזמן. But then he owns, that their *Rabbi*'s do not mean הזמן בשלוח, or זמן סתם, or that בלתי נספר ומשוער והוא המשך שהיה קודם מציאות הגלגל וכו'; but הזמן המשוער בתנועת הגלגל נקרא סדר זמנים לא זמן בשלוח וכו'. In short, they reckon (to use *R. Gedal*'s words) שזמן האמתי הוא נברא והמשך אינו קרוי זמן. And so what they say, doth not include all the present difficulty, *time* in their use of the word being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet see b. 2. c. 19. הש"י א"א שיאמר עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי דויד וממה שהיה לו כשברא העולם.

in reality there is *but One* (24). Becauſe His manner of exiſtence being perfect and *illimited*, that manner of being (if I may ſpeak ſo) is *exhauſted* by Him, or belongs ſolely to Him. If any other could partake with Him in it, He muſt want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited incloſe all.

If there could be *two* Beings each by himſelf *abſolutely* perfect, they muſt be either of the *ſame*, or of *different* natures. Of the *ſame* they cannot be; becauſe thus, *both* being *infinite*, their exiſtences would be *coincident*: that is, they would be but the *ſame* or *One*. Nor can they be of *different* natures: becauſe if their natures were *oppoſite* or *contrary* the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one the other), the one would juſt *deſtroy* or be the *negation* of the other (25): and if they are ſuppoſed to be only different, not oppoſite, then if they differ as *diſparates*, there muſt be ſome *genus* above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be ſaid to be Beings perfect in their *reſpective kinds*. But this is not to be *abſolutely* perfect: it is only to be perfect in *this* or *that* reſpect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in *other* reſpects.

What has been here ſaid is methinks ſufficient to ruin the *Manichean* cauſe, and exclude the *independent principle of evil*. For if we cannot account for the exiſtence of that *evil*, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one inſtance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reaſons for it, tho we do not *know* them. And certainly no ſuch experience muſt make us deny *axioms* or *truths* equally certain (26). There are, beſide, ſome things relating to this ſubject, which deſerve our attention. For as to *Moral* good and evil, they ſeem to depend upon our ſelves. If we do but endeavour *the moſt* we can, to do what we ought, we ſhall not be guilty of *not doing* it: and therefore it is *our* fault, and not to be charged upon any other Being, if guilt and *evil* be introduced by *our* abuſe of our own liberty and powers (27). Then as to *Phyſical* evil; without it much phyſical *good* would be loſt, the one neceſſarily inferring the other (28). Some things *ſeem* to be evil, which would not appear to be ſuch, if we could ſee through the *whole* contexture of things (29). There are not *more* evils than good things in the world, but ſurely more of the *latter* (30). Many evils of *this* kind, as well as of the *former*, come by our own *fault*; ſome perhaps by way of *puniſhment*; ſome of *phyſic* (31); and ſome as the *means* to happineſs, not otherwiſe to be obtaind. And if there is a future ſtate, that, which ſeems to be wrong *now*, may be rectified *hereafter*. To all which more may yet be added. As, that *matter* is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concernd, there *muſt be* imperfections, and conſequently evils (32). So that to ask, why God permits evil,

(24) Ὁ εἷς. Pla. In *Mor. neb. Maimonides* having proved, that there muſt be ſome Being, who exiſts *neceſſarily*, or whoſe exiſtence is *neceſſary* מבחינת עצמו, proceeds from this neceſſity of exiſtence to derive *incorporeity*, abſolute *ſimplicity*, *perfection*, and particularly *unity*. המחוייב המציאות אי אפשר בו השניות כלל לא רומה ולא הפך וכו. (25) As light and darkneſs are. There can be no ſuch law between them, as is ſaid to be among the Heathen deities. Θεῖσι δ' ὅδ' ἔχει νόμος· Οὐδεὶς ἀπάντῶν ἕλκεται προθυμία Τῇ τοῦ θέλοντος, κλ. *Eurip.* (26) Ἀ'πόλωλεν ἢ ἀλήθει, ἐπεὶ σὺ δυσχερῆς; *Id.* (27) *Muſt God extinguiſh ſun, moon, and ſtars, becauſe ſome people worſhip them?* Miſhn. Ἀ'υτῷ τῷ ἅλομένῳ ἀιτία, Θεὸς ἀναίτιος. *Max. T.* (28) Η' δίψα μὲν σῶμα παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν ποτῷ, κλ. *Max. T.* (29) Τὰ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐι σύμφωνα ἢ ἀρμόττοντα ἀλλήλῳ (with more to this purpoſe). *Plot.* (30) V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12. (31) Πολυειδὴς ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἰατρική. *Simpl.* (32) Κακία ἕλκημα τῆς ὕλης. *Plut.*

is to ask, why He permits a *material* world, or ſuch a being as *man* is; indowed indeed with ſome noble faculties, but incumbred at the ſame time with *bodily* paſſions and propenſions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the anſwer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be deſigned for a *palæſtra*, where men are to *exerciſe* their faculties and their virtues, and by that *prepare* themſelves for a ſuperior ſtate (and who can ſay it is not?) there muſt be *difficulties* and *temptations*, occaſions and opportunities for this exerciſe. Laſtly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true *origin*; yet if they would but ſeriouſly reflect upon the many marks of *reaſon*, *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* every where to be obſerved in inſtances, which they *do* or *may* underſtand, they could ſcarce doubt but the ſame thing prevailed in thoſe, which they *do not* underſtand. If I ſhould meet with a *book*, the author of which I found has diſpoſed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his ſubjects with reaſon and exactneſs; but at laſt, as I red on, ſhould come to a *few* leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this caſe I ſhould cloſe the book with a full perſuaſion, that the ſame vein of good ſenſe, which ſhewd itſelf in the former and much greater part of it, ran through the other alſo; eſpecially having arguments *a priori*, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the ſame perſon. This I ſhould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thoſe arguments, in order to aſſert *two* authors of the *ſame* book. But the Evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return,

VIII. *All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propoſitions for their exiſtence.* For ſince there can be but One perfect and independent Being, the reſt muſt be imperfect and dependent: and ſince there is nothing elſe, upon which they can, *ultimately*, depend beſide Him, upon Him they *muſt* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either cauſes (immediately, or mediately), or permits:* All beings (by the laſt) depend upon Him, for their exiſtence: upon whom depends their exiſtence, upon Him alſo muſt depend the intrinſic manner of their exiſtence, or the *natures* of theſe beings: and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the *neceſſary effects* and *conſequences* of their being, and being ſuch as they are in themſelves. Then as to the *acts* of ſuch of them, as may be *free agents*, and the effects of them, He is indeed *not* the Author of thoſe; becauſe by the terms and ſuppoſition they proceed from agents, who have no neceſſity impoſed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however theſe *free agents* muſt depend upon Him *as ſuch*: from Him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to uſe their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they uſe it amiſs. And, laſtly, as to the nature of thoſe *relations*, which lie between ideas or things actually *exiſting*, or which ariſe from facts already *done and paſt*, theſe reſult from the natures of the *things* themſelves: all which the Supreme Being either cauſes, or permits (as before). For ſince things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratios, agreements, diſagreements, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with reſpect to each other, the natures of theſe *relations* will be determined by the natures of the *things*.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expreſſes the exiſtences or non-exiſtences of things, and their mutual relations *as they are*, is true by the *conſtitution* of nature: and if ſo, it muſt alſo be agreeable to His perfect *comprehenſion* of all truth:

and

and to His *will*, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (ſome free agent) is the effect of his *liberty*, and can only be ſaid to be *permitted* by the Supreme Being: yet when it is once *done*, the relation between the *doer* and the *deed*, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one, who has committed ſuch a fact, is a *fixt* relation. From thenceforward it will *always* be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one ſhould deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whoſe exiſtence is now proved, And thus thoſe arguments in Sect. I. prop. 4. which turned only upon a *ſuppoſition* that there was ſuch a Being, are here *confirmed* and *made abſolute*.

X. *The One Supreme and Perfect Being, upon whom the exiſtence of all other beings, and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the Word* GOD.

There are other *truths*, ſtill remaining in relation to the Deity, which we *may know*, and which are *neceſſary to be known* by us, if we would endeavour to demean our ſelves toward Him according to *truth*, and what He is. And they are ſuch, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but alſo may ſerve at the ſame time as *further proofs* of his exiſtence, and an amplification of ſome things touched perhaps too lightly. As,

XI. GOD *cannot be corporeal*: or, *there can be no corporeity in God.* There are many things in *matter* utterly inconſiſtent with the nature of ſuch a *Being*, as it has been demonſtrated God muſt be.

Matter exiſts in *parts*, every one of which, by the term, is *imperfect* (33): but in a Being abſolutely perfect there can be nothing, that is imperfect.

Theſe *parts*, tho they are many times kept cloſely united by ſome occult influence, are in truth ſo many *diſtinct* bodies, which may, at leaſt in our imagination, be diſjoined or placed otherwiſe: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural diſcerpibility and ſuſceptivity of various ſhapes and modifications: *i. e.* mutability ſeems to be *eſſential* to it. But God, exiſting in a manner, that is perfect, exiſts in a manner, that muſt be *uniform*, always one and the ſame, and in nature *unchangeable*.

Matter is incapable of *acting*, *paſſive* only, and *ſtupid*: which are defects, that can never be aſcribed to Him, who is the Firſt cauſe or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is *corporeal*, where ever there is a *vacuum*, He muſt be *excluded*, and ſo becomes a Being bounded, finite, and (if one may ſay ſo) a Being full of chaſms.

Laſtly, there is no *matter* or body, which may not be *ſuppoſed not to be*; whereas the idea of God, or that Being, upon whom all others depend, involves in it exiſtence.

XII. *Neither infinite Space, nor infinite Duration, nor Matter infinitely extended, or eternally exiſting, nor any, nor all of theſe taken together, can be God.* For,

Space taken ſeparately from the things, that poſſeſs and fill it, is but an empty ſcene or *vacuum*: and to ſay, that infinite ſpace is God, or that God is infinite ſpace, is to ſay that He is an infinite *vacuum*: than which nothing can be more *abſurd*, or *blaſphemous*. How can *ſpace*, which is but a vaſt void, rather the negation of all things, than poſitively any thing, a kind of *diffuſed nothing*; how can this, I ſay, be

(33) Εἰ σῶμα ὂν, φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζομένη εἰς πλείω, ἔκαστον τῶν μερῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσῃ (f. ἔσται) τῷ ὅλῳ, ſays *Plotinus* even of the Soul.

be the Firſt cauſe, &c. or indeed any cauſe? What attributes beſide penetrability and extenſion, what excellencies, what perfections is it capable of (34)?

As *infinite ſpace* cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or ſpace; ſo tho He is eternal, yet *eternity* or infinite duration itſelf is not God (35). For duration, abſtracted from all durables, is nothing actually exiſting by itſelf: it is the *duration of a being*, not *a being*.

Infinite ſpace and *duration*, taken together, cannot be God: becauſe an interminable ſpace of infinite duration is ſtill nothing but eternal ſpace; and that is at moſt but an *eternal vacuum*.

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconſiſtent with Divine perfection, tho *matter* ſhould be *infinitely extended*, or there ſhould be an infinite quantity of it, yet ſtill, where ever it is, it carries this *inconſiſtence* along with it.

If to *matter* be added *infinite duration* neither does this alter the nature of it. This only ſuppoſes it to be eternally what it is; *i. e*, *eternally incapable* of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of *both* infinite extenſion (or ſpace) and duration too; yet ſtill, ſo long as matter is matter, it muſt *always* and *every where* be incapable of Divinity.

Laſtly, not the *univerſe*, or ſum total of finite beings can be God. For if it is, then *every thing* is divine, *every thing* God, or of God; and ſo *all* things together muſt make but *one* being (*). But the contrary to this we ſee, there being evidently many beings diſtinct, and ſeparable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this diſtinction and ſeparation of exiſtence, beſide what we ſee without us, we may even *feel* within our ſelves. We are *ſeverally* conſcious to our ſelves of the individuation and diſtinction of our own minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of which we can be more certain. Were we all the *ſame* being, and had *one* mind, as in that caſe we muſt have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one perſon; but they muſt be *common* acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conſcience *common* to us all (36). Beſide, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of ſuch things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable inſtance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we ſhould *not know* even our ſelves, and what we are (†)? In ſhort,

(34) They, who call God מקום, do it לפי שהוא מקום הכל ואין הכל מקומו. *Thiſhbi*. Or, as *Phil. Aquin.* from the ancients, הקב"ה מקום של עולם ואין עולמו מקומו. By which ways of ſpeaking (tho there is a Cabbaliſtic reaſon aſſigned too) they intend chiefly to expreſs His omnipreſence and immenſity. That, *in Act. Ap.* ſeems to be of the ſame kind, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμεν. (35) Such things as theſe, how incongruous and wild ſoever they are, have bin affirmed; that God is infinite duration, ſpace, &c. What can be meant by that, Καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς, in *Plotinus*? (*) Were not they, who converſe with books, accuſtomed to ſuch trials, it would be ſhocking to find *Balbus* in *Cicero* aſſerting, *eſſe mundum deum*: and yet in another place, that it is *quaſi communis deorum, atq; hominum* domus, *aut* urbs *utrorumq;* and *deorum, hominumq; cauſa* factus: in another, *providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi* partes *& initio conſtitutas eſſe, & omni tempore adminiſtrari*: in another, *mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari*: with other like inconſiſtences. (36) Ἄτοπον εἰ μία ἡ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] καὶ ἡ ὑμετέρων ἄλλη ἐχρῆν καὶ ἐμοὶ αἰσθανομένῳ, καὶ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι, — καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. *Plot.* (†) *Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, ſi eſſet Deus?* Cic.

ſhort, no *collection* of beings can be *one* being; and therefore not God. And the univerſe itſelf is but a collection of diſtinct beings (37).

XIII. *It is ſo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no ſuch thing as either Matter or Motion, if there was not ſome Superior Being, upon whom they depended.* Or, *God is ſuch a Being, that without Him there could be neither matter nor motion.* This muſt be true of *matter*: becauſe it has been proved already, that there can be *but one* independent Being; that He is *incorporeal*; and that the exiſtence of all other beings muſt *depend upon Him.* But the ſame thing may be proved otherwiſe. If *matter* (I mean the exiſtence of it) does not depend upon ſomething above it, it muſt be an independent being; and if an independent being, a neceſſary being; and then there could be no ſuch thing as a *vacuum*: but all bodies muſt be *perfectly ſolid*; and, more than that, the whole world could be but *one ſuch* body, five times firmer than braſs, and incapable of all motion. For that being which *exiſts neceſſarily* does *neceſſarily exiſt*: that is, it cannot *not exiſt*. But in a *vacuum* it does not exiſt.

Moreover, if *matter* be an independent, neceſſary being, and exiſts of itſelf, this muſt be true of *every particle* of it: and if ſo, there could not only be no *vacuum*, but every particle muſt be *every where*. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of ſuch certain dimenſions by its *own nature*; ſince this confinement of exiſtence within certain bounds implies non-exiſtence in other places beyond thoſe bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiſtence; and when *exiſtence* is eſſential to any being, a *negation of exiſtence* cannot be ſo. Nor, in the next place, could its exiſtence be limited by *any thing elſe* becauſe it is ſuppoſed to have its exiſtence only of itſelf; *i. e.* to have a *principle* of exiſtence in itſelf, or to have an exiſtence, that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add ſtill, if *matter* be ſelf-exiſtent, I do not ſee, not only how it comes to be reſtraind to a place of ſome certain capacity, but alſo how it comes to be limited *in other reſpects*; or why it ſhould not exiſt in a manner, that is *in all reſpects* perfect. So that thus it appears, *matter* muſt derive its exiſtence from ſome other Being, who cauſes it to be juſt what it is. And the Being, who *can do this*, muſt be God.

It is to no purpoſe to object here, that one cannot *conceive*, how the exiſtence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being *above our conceptions*, the manner, in which He operates, and in which things depend upon Him, muſt alſo be *unconceivable*. We find by reaſoning, that this viſible world muſt owe its exiſtence to ſome invſible almighty Being; *i. e.* we diſcover this to be matter of fact, and we muſt not deny matters of fact, becauſe we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties ſhould diſcover to us the exiſtence of things, and then drop us in our inquiry *how* they are. Thus much for *matter*.

As

(37) The ſyſtem of *Spinoſa* is ſo *apparently* falſe, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be ſaid againſt it: tho much might be. What *Velleius* ſays in *Cicero*, is not only true, *Si mundus eſt deus, — dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicendæ ſunt*: but, if there is but one ſubſtance, one nature, *one being*, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneſſes, wickedneſſes, that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and ſufferd are both done and ſufferd by Him; He is both cauſe and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the ſame things at the ſame time, &c. That ſuch groſs atheiſm as this ſhould ever be faſhionable!

As for *motion*; without a Firſt cauſe, ſuch as has been deſcribed, there could be none: and much leſs *ſuch* motions, as we ſee in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if *matter* itſelf could not be without ſuch a Cauſe, it is certain *motion*, which is an affection of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no *motion*, unleſs either there be in matter itſelf a power of *begining* it; or it is communicated from body to body in an *infinite ſucceſſion*, or in a *circle*, and ſo has no begining; or elſe is *produced* by ſome incorporeal Being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions, that favor their vices, tho never ſo repugnant to reaſon, I can hardly believe any one will aſſert, that a parcel of *mere matter* (let it be great or ſmall, of any figure whatſoever, &c.) left altogether to itſelf, could ever of itſelf *begin* to move. If there is any ſuch bold aſſertor, let him fix his eyes upon ſome lump of matter, *ex. gr.* a *ſtone*, piece of *timber*, or a *clod*, (cleard of all animals), and peruſe it well; and then ask himſelf ſeriouſly, whether it is poſſible for him in earneſt to *believe*, that that *ſtone*, *log*, or *clod*, tho nothing corporeal or incorporeal ſhould excite or meddle with it, might ſome time or other of itſelf begin to *creep*. However, to be ſhort, a power of *begining* motion is not in the idea of matter. It is paſſive, as we ſee, to the impreſſions of motion, and ſuſceptive of it; but *cannot* produce it. On the contrary, it will always perſiſt uniformly in its *preſent ſtate*, either of reſt or motion, if nothing ſtirs, diverts, accelerates, or ſtops it. Nor is there any thing in all Phyſics better ſettled than that, which is called *vis inertiæ*, or the *inertia* of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, *without any Firſt mover*, or immaterial cauſe of motion, has been proved impoſſible, prop. I.

The ſuppoſition of a perpetual motion in a *circle* is begging the queſtion. For if A moves B, B moves C, and ſo on to *Z*, and then Z moves A; this is the ſame as to ſay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, - - - *Z*: that is, A *moves itſelf*, or can *begin* motion.

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from ſomething *incorporeal*. (Thus, by the way, it is as certain there are *incorporeal* ſubſtances, as that there is *motion*: which ought to be minded.) Now, as has been ſaid, if this mover has the power of creating motion, independently of all other beings, then we have found the *Independent ſelf-exiſting* Mover who is God. But if it hath not a power of producing motion from itſelf, independently, then muſt we *aſcend* a ſtep higher, and own a ſuperior Being, capable not only of *producing* motion, but of imparting a *faculty of producing* it, &c.

If we conſider *our ſelves*, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there find the thing exemplified. We move one thing, that another, and ſo on; and know our ſelves to be the *Authors* of theſe motions: but then we know alſo, that we have not an *independent power* of creating motion. If we had, it could not be ſo limited as it is, and confined to ſuch ſmall quantities, and certain circumſtances only: we ſhould have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it.

If the *petty* motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may thoſe *greater* motions we ſee in the world, and the *phænomena* attending them: I mean the motions of the *planets* and *heavenly bodies*. For theſe muſt be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by cauſes and laws of His appointment; or by their reſpective movers, who for

ſuch

ſuch reaſons as have been already aſſigned, muſt depend upon ſome *Superior*, who furniſhed them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done *either* of theſe ways, we can be at no great diſtance from a demonſtration of the *exiſtence* of a Deity.

It may perhaps be ſaid, that tho matter has not the power of moving itſelf, yet it hath an *attractive* force, by which it can move other parts of matter: ſo that all matter equally *moves* and *is moved*. But, allowing thoſe things, which are now uſually aſcribed to *attraction*, we ſhall ſtill be neceſſitated to own ſome Superior being, whoſe *influence* mixes itſelf with matter, and operates upon it; or at leaſt who, ſome way or other, *imparts* this force. For *attraction*, according to the true ſenſe of the word, ſuppoſes one body to act upon another at a diſtance, or where it is not; but nothing can *be* an agent, where it *is not* at all. Matter can act only by *contact*, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by ſomething elſe, or reſiſting thoſe, which ſtrike againſt it, when it is at reſt. And this it does *as matter*; *i. e.* by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called *attraction*, is ſo called only becauſe the ſame things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of ſomething, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter ſeem not only to gravitate *towards* each other, but many of them to *fly* each other. Now theſe two *contrary* motions and ſeeming qualities cannot *both* proceed from matter *qua* matter; cannot *both* be of the nature of it: and therefore they muſt be owing to ſome *external* cauſe, or to ſome *other* being, which excites in them theſe tendencies and averſions.

Beſide, as to the *revolution* of a planet about the Sun, *mere gravitation* is not ſufficient to produce that effect. It muſt be compounded with a motion of *projection*, to keep the planet from falling directly into the ſun, and bring it about: and from *what hand*, I deſire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)? Who impreſſed it?

What a vaſt field for *contemplation* is here opened! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the *leaſt particle*, that does not carry with it an argument of God's exiſtence; not the *leaſt* ſtick or ſtraw or other *trifle*, that falls to the ground, but ſhews it; not the ſlighteſt motion produced, the leaſt *whiſper* of the air, but tells it.

XIV. *The frame and conſtitution of the World, the aſtoniſhing magnificence of it, the various phænomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity obſerved in the productions of things, the uſes and ends for which they ſerve, &c. do all ſhew that there is ſome Almighty deſigner, an infinite wiſdom and power at the top of all theſe things: ſuch marks there are of both* (38). Or, *God is that Being, without whom ſuch a frame or conſtitution of the world, ſuch a magnificence in it, &c. could not be.* In order to prove to any one the *grandneſs* of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him conſider the *Sun* with that inſupportable glory and luſtre, that ſurrounds it: to demonſtrate the vaſt *diſtance*, *magnitude*, and *heat* of it: to repreſent to him the *chorus of planets* moving periodically, by uniform laws, in

 their

(38) So far is that from being true, *Nequaquam — divinitus eſſe creatam Naturam mundi, quæ tantâ eſt prædita culpâ.* Lucret. Men raſhly (impiouſly) cenſure what they do not underſtand. Like that king of *Caſtile*, who fancied himſelf able to have contrived a better ſyſtem of the world; becauſe he knew not what the true ſyſtem is, but took it to be as deſcribed to him by *R. Iſ. ab. Sid.* and other aſtronomers of thoſe times.

their ſeveral orbits about it ; affording a regular variety of aſpects ; guarded, ſome of them by *ſecondary* planets, and as it were emulating the ſtate of the Sun ; and probably all poſſeſt by proper *inhabitants :* to remind him of thoſe ſurpriſing viſits the *comets* make us : the large trains, or uncommon ſplendor, which attends them ; the far country they come from ; and the curioſity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who alſo may be up to ſee the entry and progreſs of theſe miniſters of fate (39): to direct his eye and contemplation, through thoſe azure fields and vaſt regions above him, up to the *fixt ſtars*, that radiant, numberleſs hoſt of heaven ; and to make him underſtand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they ſhould be placed there only to adorn and beſpangle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much leſs to ſupply the places of ſo many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets : to convince him, that they are rather ſo many *other Suns*, with their ſeveral regions and ſets of planets about them : to ſhew him, by the help of glaſſes, ſtill more and more of theſe fixt lights, and to beget in him an apprehenſion of their unaccountable *numbers*, and of thoſe *immenſe ſpaces*, that lie retired beyond our *utmoſt* reach and even imagination : I ſay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him ſuch things as are now known almoſt to every body ; and by it to ſhew, that if the world be not infinite, it is *infinito ſimilis* (40) ; and therefore ſure a *magnificent* ſtructure, and the work of an *infinite* Architect. But if we could take a view of all the *particulars* containd within that aſtoniſhing compaſs, which we have thus *haſtily* run over, how would wonders multiply upon us ? Every ſcene and part of the world is as it were made up of *other* worlds. If we conſider this *our ſeat* (I mean this earth), what ſcope is here for admiration ? What *variety* of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, ſeas, trees, plants ! The many tribes of different *animals*, with which it is ſtocked ! The multifarious *inventions* and *works* of one of theſe, that is, of us *men*, &c. And yet when theſe are all ſurveyd as *nicely* as they can be, by the help of onr unaſſiſted ſenſes, and even of teleſcopical glaſſes, by the aſſiſtance of good *microſcopes* in very *ſmall* parts of matter as many *new* wonders (41) may perhaps be diſcoverd, as thoſe already obſerved ; new *kingdoms* of animals ; new *architecture* and curioſity of work. So that as before our ſenſes and even conception fainted in thoſe *vaſt journeys* we were obliged to take, in conſidering the expanſion of the univerſe ; ſo here again they fail us in our reſearches into the *principles* and conſtituent parts of it. Both the *beginings* and the *ends* of things, the *leaſt* and the *greateſt* all conſpire to baffle us : and which way ever we proſecute our inquiries, we ſtill fall in with *freſh* ſubjects of amazement, and *freſh* reaſons to believe, that there are indefinitely ſtill *more* and *more* behind, that will for ever eſcape our eagereſt purſuits and deepeſt penetration.

This mighty *building* is not only thus grand, and the appearances ſtupendous in it, but the *manner*, in which things are effected, is commonly unintelligible, and their cauſes *too profound* for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know ; and ſome, of which we ſeem to know the *cauſes* : but, alas ! how *few* are theſe with reſpect

(39) Since they have, or may have great effects upon the ſeveral parts of the ſolar ſyſtem, one may ſpeak thus, without falling into the ſuperſtition of the Multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, *Nunquam cælo ſpectatum impune cometen* (in *Claud.*), or the like. (40) Finitus, et infinito ſimilis. *Plin.* (41) Ποικίλη θαυματοργία. Plot.

reſpect to the whole ſum? And the cauſes which we aſſign, what are they? Commonly ſuch, as can only be expreſſed in general terms, whilſt the *bottoms* of things lie undiſcovered. Such, as have been collected from *experience*, but could ſcarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments *a priori*, to be capable of producing ſuch effects: and yet till cauſes are known after that manner, they are not *thoroughly* underſtood. Such, as ſeem *too little* and diſproportionate to the effects, and would incline one to think, that ſomething *immaterial* and *inviſible* muſt be immediately concerned in the production of them. In ſhort, we know many times, that ſuch a thing will have ſuch an effect, or perhaps that ſuch an effect is produced by ſuch a cauſe, but the manner *how* we know not; or but grofly, and if ſuch an *Hypotheſis* be true. It is impoſſible for us to come at the true *principles* of things, or to ſee into the oeconomy of the *fineſt* part of nature and workings of the *firſt* ſprings. The *cauſes* that appear to us, are but *effects* of other cauſes: the *veſſels*, of which the bodies of plants and animals conſiſt, are made up of *other*, *ſmaller* veſſels: and the *ſubtileſt* parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal ſpirits, or particles of light), have *their parts*, and may for ought we know be *compound* bodies: and as to the *ſubſtances* themſelves of all theſe things, and their *internal conſtitution*, they are hid from our eyes. Our philoſophy dwells in the ſurface of nature.

In the next place, the *ſtated methods*, by which we ſee things effected, ſhew, that they are ſubject to *laws*. The ſame cauſes have always, in *like circumſtances*, the ſame ſucceſs: all the ſpecies of *animals* (among us) are formed according to *one idea*; and ſo are *plants* alſo, and even *minerals*: no *new* ſpecies of any of theſe are produced: and the old are preſerved and continued by the *old methods*.

Laſtly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a *contrivance* and a reſpect to certain reaſons and *ends*. How the *Sun* is poſited near the middle of our ſyſtem for the more *convenient* diſpenſing of his benign influences to the *planets* moving about him; how the plain of the earth's *æquator* interſects that of her *orbit*, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diverſify the *year*, and create a uſeful variety of *ſeaſons*, and many other things of this kind, tho a thouſand times repeated, will *always* be pleaſing obſervations to good men and true ſcholars. Who can obſerve the *vapors* to aſcend, eſpecially from the ſea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenſation, and not underſtand this to be a kind of *diſtillation* in order to clear the water of its groſſer ſalts, and then by rains and dews to ſupply the fountains and rivers with freſh and wholſom liquor; to nouriſh the vegetables below by ſhowers, which deſcend in drops as from a *watering-pot* upon a garden &c? Who can view the *ſtructure* of a plant or animal; the *indefinite* number of their fibres and fine veſſels, the apt *diſpoſition* of them, and the formation of larger veſſels and the ſeveral members out of them; the proviſion that is made for the reception and diſtribution of *nutriment*; the *effect* this nutriment has in extending the veſſels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanſion, continuing the *motion* of the ſeveral fluids, repairing the *decays* of the body, and preſerving *life*: who can take notice of the ſeveral *faculties* of animals, their *arts* of ſaving and providing for themſelves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the *uſes* of plants to animals, and of ſome animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken, that the ſeveral ſpecies ſhould be *propagated* out of their proper ſeeds (with-

out confuſion (42), the ſeed of one ſpecies never producing any other ſpecies), the ſtrong *inclinations* implanted in animals in order to it, their *love of their young*, and the like: I ſay, who can do this, and not ſee a *deſign*, in ſuch *regular* ſyſtems of *multifarious* organs, *ſo* propagated and *ſo* preſerved? If there was but *one* animal, and in that caſe it could not be doubted but that his *eyes* were made, that he might *ſee* with them, his *ears* that he might *hear* with them, and ſo on, through at leaſt the moſt conſiderable parts of him; if it can much leſs be doubted, when the ſame things are *repeated* in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like obſervations may be made with reſpect to *vegetables*, and other things; and if all theſe *kinds* of things, and therefore much more their *particulars*, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably *numerous* (as moſt evidently they are) one cannot but be convinced from that, which is ſo *very* obvious to every underſtanding, and *plainly* runs through the *nobler* parts of the viſible world, that other things, even thoſe that ſeem to be *leſs noble*, have their *ends* too, tho not ſo well underſtood.

And now ſince we cannot ſuppoſe the *parts* of matter to have *contrived* this wonderful form of a world among themſelves, and then by agreement to have taken their reſpective places, and purſued conſtant *ends* by certain methods and meaſures *concerted* (becauſe theſe are acts, of which they are not capable), there muſt be ſome other Being, whoſe wiſdom and power are equal to ſuch a mighty work, as is the *ſtructure* and *preſervation* of the world. There muſt be ſome almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the cauſes of things ſo deep; preſcribes them ſuch uniform and ſteady laws; deſtines and adapts them to certain purpoſes; and makes one thing to fit and anſwer to another (43).

That *ſuch* a beautiful ſcheme, *ſuch* an apt and geometrical diſpoſition of things, compoſed of *innumerable* parts, ranged as their ſeveral offices and uſes and wants *require*, through ſuch an *immenſe* extent, ſhould be the effect of *chance* only, is a conceit ſo prodigiouſly abſurd, that certainly no one can eſpouſe it heartily, who underſtands the *meaning* of that word. *Chance* ſeems to be only a term, by which we expreſs our *ignorance* of the cauſe of any thing. For when we ſay any thing comes *by chance*, we do not mean, that it had no other cauſe; but only, that we do *not know* the true cauſe, which produced it, or interpoſed in ſuch a manner, as to make that fall out, which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has ſuch an idea of *chance*, as to make it an *agent* or really exiſting and acting cauſe of any thing, and much leſs ſure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they muſt proceed from ſome agent or cauſe, which is either *free* or *not free* (that is, neceſſary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced, is produced with *deſign*, not by chance. If it acts neceſſarily, the event muſt *neceſſarily* be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident only, that it is. There can be therefore *no ſuch cauſe* as chance. And to omit a great deal that might be ſaid, becauſe it has been ſaid perhaps too often already, *matter* is *indefinitely* diviſible, and the chances,

(42) If any one, ſitting upon mount *Ida*, had ſeen the *Greek* army coming on in proper order [μετὰ πολλῆ κόσμε καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιοῦσαν], he ought moſt certainly, notwithſtanding what *Sext. Emper.* ſays, to have concluded, that there was ſome commander, under whoſe conduct they moved. (43) Τίς ὁ ἁρμόζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸν κολεὸν, καὶ τὸν κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ; *Arr.* Even ſuch a thing as this doth not come by accident.

chances, that muſt all hit to produce *one* individual of any ſpecies of material beings (if *only* chance was concerned), muſt therefore be *indefinitely many:* and if *ſpace* be alſo *indefinitely* extended, and the number of thoſe orderly ſyſtems of matter, that lie diſperſed in it, *indefinite*, the *chances* required to the production of them all, or of the univerſe, will be the rectangle of one *indefinite* quantity drawn into *another*. We may well call them *infinite*. And then to ſay, that any thing cannot happen, unleſs *infinite* chances coincide, is the ſame as to ſay, there are *infinite* chances againſt the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the ſame as to ſay, it is *impoſſible* to happen; ſince if there be a poſſibility, that it *may* happen, the hazard is *not* infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of *chance*. He muſt be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not ſenſible, how delicate and fine they are: and the *finer* they are, the *groſſer* is the hypotheſis of *Epicurus*.

If it ſhould be objected, that many things ſeem to be *uſeleſs*, many births are *monſtrous*, or the like, ſuch anſwers as theſe may be made. The *uſes* of ſome things are known to *ſome* men, and not to *others:* the uſes of ſome are known *now*, that were not known to any body *formerly:* the uſes of many may be diſcoverd *hereafter:* and thoſe of ſome other things may *for ever* remain unknown to all men, and yet *be in nature*, as much as thoſe diſcoverd were before their diſcovery, or are now in reſpect of them, who know them not. Things have not therefore no uſes, becauſe they are conceald from us Nor is *nature* irregular, or without method, becauſe there are ſome *ſeeming* deviations from the common rule. Theſe are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumſtances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external *impreſſions*, heterogeneous *matter* introduced, or diſagreeable and unnatural *motions* excited: and if the caſe could be *truly* put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as *regularly* (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a *monſter* is produced, as when the *uſual* iſſue in common caſes. Under theſe circumſtances the monſter is the *genuine* iſſue: that is, in the ſame circumſtances there would always be the ſame kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then miſ-ſhaped, this infers no unſteadineſs or miſtake in nature. Beſide the magnificence of the world admits of ſome *perturbations*; not to ſay, requires ſome *variety*. The queſtion is, Could all thoſe things, which we *do know* to have uſes and ends, and to the production of which ſuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of ſo many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preſerved *ſo far as it is*, if nothing but *blind* chance preſided over all? Are not the innumerable inſtances of things, which are *undeniably* made with reference to certain ends, and of others, which are propagated and repeated by the *ſame* conſtant methods, *enough* to convince us, that there are ends propoſed, and rules obſerved, even where we do not ſee them. And, laſtly, if we ſhould deſcend to particulars, what are thoſe ſeemingly uſeleſs or monſtrous productions in reſpect of the *reſt*, that *plainly* declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the *uſual* ways, with the *uſual* perfection of their ſeveral kinds? If the compariſon could be made, I verily believe theſe would be found to be almoſt infinituple of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as *nothing*.

They, who content themſelves with words, may aſcribe the formation of the world to *fate* or *nature*, as well as to *chance*, or better. And yet *fate*, in the firſt place, is nothing but a *ſeries* of events, conſiderd as neceſſarily following in ſome certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they *would be* in their determinate times

times and places. It is called indeed a *ſeries* of *cauſes* (44): but then they are ſuch cauſes, as are alſo *effects*, all of them, if there is no Firſt cauſe; and may be conſiderd as *ſuch*. So that in this deſcription is nothing like ſuch a *cauſe*, as is capable of giving this form to the world. A *ſeries* of events is the ſame with events happening *ſeriatim*: which words declare nothing concerning the *cauſe* of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, neceſſity are but *circumſtances* of things, that come to paſs; not cauſes of their exiſtence, or their being as they are. On the contrary, ſome external and ſuperior cauſe muſt be ſuppoſed to put the *ſeries* in motion, to project the order, to connect the cauſes and effects, and to *impoſe* the neceſſity (45).

Then for *nature*, 1. If it be uſed for the *intrinſic manner* of exiſting; that conſtitution, make, or diſpoſition, with which any thing is produced or *born*, and from which reſult thoſe properties, powers, inclinations, paſſions, qualities, and manners, which are called *natural* (and ſometimes *nature*), in oppoſition to ſuch as are *acquired*, adventitious, or forced (which uſe is common): then to ſay, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of exiſtence, is to ſay, that it formed itſelf, or that the *effect* is the *efficient*. Beſide, how can *manner* (manner of exiſting) be the cauſe of exiſting, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, ſome ſubſtance, not a *manner* of being. 2. If it be uſed in that other ſenſe, ſomething analogous to the former, by which it ſtands for the *ideas* of things, what they are in themſelves, and what in their circumſtances, cauſes, conſequences, reſpects; or, in ſhort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we ſay, the *nature* of juſtice (46) requires this or that; *i. e.* the idea of juſtice requires or ſuppoſes it: a crime is of ſuch a *nature*; that is, bears ſuch a reſpect to the law, and is attended with ſuch circumſtances, or the like): then none of *theſe* ſenſes can do an Atheiſt any ſervice. 3. If it be uſed for the *world* (47) (as, the laws of *nature* may be underſtood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the *phænomena* in it produced; after the ſame manner of ſpeaking as when we ſay, the laws of *England*, *France*, &c.) then it ſtands for *that very thing*, the form and architect of which is the ſubject of inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect *itſelf*. Under this ſenſe may be comprehended that, when it denotes *reality of exiſtence*, as when it is ſaid, that ſuch a thing is not in *nature* (not to be found in the *world*.) 4. If it ſignifies the formentiond *laws* themſelves; or that courſe, in which things by virtue of theſe laws proceed (as when the effects of theſe laws are ſtyled the works of *nature*): then, laws ſuppoſe ſome legiſlator, and are poſterior to that, of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are, of which that nation conſiſts. 5. If it be uſed after the ſame manner as the word *habit* frequently is; to which many things are aſcribed (juſt as they are to nature), though it be nothing exiſting diſtinct from the *habits*, which *particular* men or beings contract: then nature is a kind of *abſtract* notion, which can *do* nothing. Perhaps *nature* may be put for *natures*, all natures, after the manner of a collective noun: or it may be

(44) *Series implexa cauſarum.* Sen. (45) *Seneca* ſays himſelf, that in this ſeries God is *prima omnium cauſa, ex quâ cæteræ pendent.* (46) *Vis & natura juſtitiæ.* Cic. (47) Almoſt as if it ſtood for *nata*, or *res natæ*; all things, that are produced. (So *fœtura* ſeems to be put ſometimes for *fœtus*.) *Sunt, qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent; — corpora, & inane, quæq; his accidant.* Cic.

be mentiond as an *agent*, only as we perſonify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the ſhorter and more convenient expreſſing of things. Laſtly, If it denotes the *Author of nature*, or God (48) (the *effect* ſeeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this caſe, to be put for the *efficient*) ; then, to *Him* it is that I aſcribe the formation of the world, &c. To all which I muſt ſubjoin, that there is an unaccountable *liberty* taken in the uſe of this word : and that frequently it is uſed merely as a *word*, and nothing more, they, who uſe it, not knowing themſelves, what they mean by it (49). However in *no ſenſe* can it ſuperſede the Being of a Deity.

XV. *Life, ſenſe, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds ſhew the exiſtence of ſome ſuperior Being, from whom they are derived.* Or, *God is that Being, without whom neither could theſe be, any more than the things before mentiond.* That they cannot flow from the nature of any *matter* about us as matter, or from any modification, ſize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our *ſouls* themſelves are ſelf-exiſtent, or hold their faculties independently of all other beings, is diſproved by what has been ſaid before more than once. Therefore we muſt neceſſarily be indebted for what we have of this kind, to ſome great Benefactor, who is the *fountain* of them. For ſince we are conſcious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our ſelves we muſt have them from *ſome other*.

A man has little reaſon, God knows, to fancy the *ſuppoſitum* of his life, ſenſe, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he conſiders how *tranſitory* and *uncertain* at beſt his life and all his injoyments are ; *what* he is, *whence* he came, and and *whither* he is going (50). The mind acts not, or in a moſt imperceptible manner *in animalculo*, or the ſeminal ſtate of a man ; only as a principle of vegetation in the ſtate of an *embryon* ; and as a ſenſitive ſoul in the ſtate of *infancy*, at leaſt for ſome time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exerciſe and proper opportunities, it ſeems to *expand* itſelf, find its own *talents*, and *ripen* into a rational being. But then it reaſons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious ſteps in the purſuit of truth : finds all its powers ſubject to great *eclipſes* and diminutions, in the time of ſleep, indiſpoſition, ſickneſs, &c. and at beſt to reach but a *few* objects in reſpect of all, that are in the immenſity of the univerſe : and, laſtly, is obnoxious to many painful ſenſations and reflexions. Had the *ſoul* of man the principle of its own exiſtence and faculties *within itſelf*, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all theſe *limitations* and *defects*, to all theſe *alterations* and *removes* from one ſtate to another : it muſt certainly be conſtant to itſelf, and perſiſt in an *uniform* manner of being.

There may be perhaps, who will ſay, that the *ſoul*, together with life, ſenſe, &c. are propagated by *traduction* from parents to children, from them to their children again, and ſo from eternity : and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature

(48) *Natura, inquit, hæc mihi præſtat. Non intelligis te, cùm hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud eſt Natura, quàm Deus, & divina ratio*, &c? Sen. When it is ſaid, *Neceſſe eſt mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari, ap. Cic.* What ſenſe are thoſe words capable of, if by *nature* be not really meant *God*? For it muſt be ſomething different from the world, and ſomething able to govern it. (49) *Alij naturam cenſent eſſe vim quandam ſine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus neceſſarios*, &c. ſays *Balbus* in *Cic.* What can this *vis* be : *vis* by itſelf, without the mention of any ſubject, in which it inheres ; or of any cauſe, from whence it proceeds? A *Soul* of the world, *plaſtic* nature, *hylarchic* principle, שכל פועל, and the like, are more intelligible than that. (50) רע מאין באת ולאן אתה הולך וכו׳. *P. Ab.*

ture of them as to the exiſtence of a Deity. *Anſ.* If there could be ſuch a traduction, yet to ſuppoſe one *traduced* to come from another *traduced*, and ſo *ab æterno*, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this traductive power, is the ſame as to ſuppoſe an infinite ſeries of *moveds* without a *mover*, or of *effects* without a *cauſe*: the abſurdity of which is ſhewn already prop. 1. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by *tradux animæ* ought to be clearly explaind: for it is not eaſy to conceive, how thought, or thinking ſubſtances can be propagated after the manner of *branches*, or in any manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical* uſe of that phraſe (51). It ſhould alſo be told, whether this traduction be made from *one* or from *both* the parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the ſame *tradux* or branch muſt proceed from *two* ſtocks: which is a thing, I ſuppoſe, that can no where be found, nor has any reſemblance in nature. And yet ſuch a thing may much better be ſuppoſed of vines, or plants, than of *thinking* beings, who are ſimple and uncompounded ſubſtances (52).

This opinion of the *traduction* of ſouls ſeems to me to ſtand upon an unſound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on theſe two things: the *ſimilitude* there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and thoſe of their parents (53); and the difficulty men find in forming the *notion* of a *ſpirit* (54). For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other ſubſtance but *matter*: and that the *ſoul* reſulting from ſome diſpoſition of the body, or ſome part of it, or being ſome merely material appendix to it, muſt *attend* it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the *one*, ſo there muſt be alſo of the *other* at the ſame time.

Now the former of theſe is not always *true*; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to ſee children *differ* from their parents, in their underſtandings, inclinations, ſhapes, complexions, and *(I am ſure)* one from another. And this *diſſimilitude* has as much force to prove there is *not* a traduction, as *ſimilitude*, when ever that happens, can have to prove there is. Beſides, it ſeems to me not hard to account for *ſome* likeneſs without the help of traduction. It is plain the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objects they ſee, the ſounds

(51) What by *Tertullian* in one place is called *animæ ex Adam tradux*, in another is *velut ſurculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta*, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himſelf better, when he confeſſes there to be *duas ſpecies ſeminis, corporalem & animalem* (al. *corporis ſemen & animæ*): or more fully *ſemen animale ex animæ diſtillatione, ſicut et virus illud, corporale ſemen, ex carnis defæcatione.* (52) According to the fore-cited author the ſoul is derived from the *father* only, *et genitalibus ſeminæ foveis commendata:* and all ſouls from that of *Adam. Definimus animam*, ſays he, *Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem:* and in another place, *ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur.* But this doth not well conſiſt with his principal argument for traduction, *that children take after their Parents.* For beſide what will here be ſaid by and by, if there is a traduction of all men from one man, and traduction cauſes likeneſs; then every man muſt be like the firſt, and (conſequently) every other. (53) *Unde, oro te*, ſays the ſame author, *ſimilitudine animæ quoq; parentibus de ingenijs reſpondemus, — ſi non ex animæ ſemine educimur?* Then, to confirm this, he argues like a Father indeed, thus: *in illo ipſo voluptatis ultimo æſtu, quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoq; ſentimus exire?* I am aſhamed to tranſcribe more. (54) Therefore the ſaid Father makes the ſoul to be corporeal.

ſounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create *changes* in them, ſometimes with reſpect to their intellectuals, ſometimes to their paſſions and humors, and ſometimes to their health and other circumſtances of their bodies: and yet the *original ſtamina* and fundamental parts of the man remain ſtill the *ſame*. If then the *ſemina*, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) *animalcula* already formed (55); which, being diſperſed about, eſpecially in ſome opportune places, are *taken in* with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being ſeparated in the bodies of the *males* by ſtrainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in *their* ſeminal veſſels, do *there* receive ſome kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the *females*, are *there* nouriſhed more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big, to be longer confined. I ſay, if this be the caſe, why may not thoſe *additions* and the *nutriment* received from the parents, being prepared by their veſſels, and of the ſame kind with that, with which they themſelves are nouriſhed, be the ſame in great meaſure to the *animalcula* and *embrya*, that it is to *them*, and conſequently very much aſſimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing elſe from them? Many impreſſions may be made upon the *fœtus*, and tinctures given to the *fluids* communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the *animal itſelf*, may not be originally raiſed in them, or traduced from them. This hypotheſis (which has long been mine) ſuggeſts a reaſon, why the *child* is ſometimes more like the *father*, ſometimes the *mother*: viz. becauſe the veſſels of the *animalculum* are diſpoſed to receive a greater proportion of aliment ſometimes from the *one*, ſometimes from the *other*: or the fluids and ſpirits in one may ferment and operate *more ſtrongly* than in the other, and ſo have a *greater* and more ſignal effect. (By the way it muſt be noted, that, tho what the *animalculum* receives from the father, is in quantity little in reſpect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former being the firſt accretion to the original *ſtamina*, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect them more.)

Since there cannot be a proper *traduction* of the child (*one* mind, and *one* body) from both the *two* parents, all the ſimilitude it bears to *one* of them, muſt proceed from ſome ſuch cauſe as I have aſſigned, or at leaſt not from *traduction*. For the child being *ſometimes* like the father, and *ſometimes* the mother, and the traduction either *always* from the father, or *always* from the mother, there muſt ſometimes be *ſimilitude*, where there is no *traduction*: and then if the child may reſemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at leaſt, to be true in *plants*, which raiſed from the *ſame* ſeed, but in *different* beds and ſoil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces ſome diverſity into the ſeed or original plant, and aſſimilates it in ſome meaſure to the reſt raiſed in the ſame place.

The other thing, which I take to be one of the *principal* ſupports to this doctrine of *traduction* (a ſuppoſition, that the *ſoul* is merely material, or but the reſult of ſome diſpoſition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premiſe this here: tho we can have no *image* of a *ſpirit* (becauſe no being can be portraid or repreſented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reaſon to aſſert the exiſtence of *ſuch* a ſubſtance. *Matter* is a thing, which we converſe with, of which we know pretty well the nature and properties; and ſince we cannot find

(55) This ſeems to be favourd by them, who hold, that all ſouls were created in the beginning. An opinion mentiond in *Nahh. ab.* & *al.* often.

among them any *cogitative* faculties, or ſuch a thing as *life*, but ſeveral things *inconſiſtent* with them, we are under a neceſſity of confeſſing, that there is ſome *other* ſpecies of ſubſtance beſide that, which is corporeal, and that our *ſouls* are of that kind (or rather of one of thoſe kinds, which are not corporeal: for there muſt be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all ſurpriſing, that we ſhould not be able to do this, for how can the mind be the object of itſelf (56)? It may contemplate the body, which it inhabits, may be conſcious of its own acts, and reflect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own ſubſtance it can have no adequate notion, unleſs it could be as it were *object* and *ſpectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whoſe knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himſelf.

They, who found the *traduction* of the ſoul upon this preſumption, that it is *material*, and attends the body as ſome part or affection of it, ſeem further to be moſt wofully miſtaken upon this account; becauſe the body *itſelf* is not propagated by traduction. It paſſes indeed *through* the bodies of the parents, who afford a tranſitory habitation and ſubſiſtence to it: but it cannot be *formed by* the parents, or *grow out* of any part of them. For all the *vital* and *eſſential* parts muſt be one *coeval* ſyſtem, and formed *at once* in the firſt article of the naſcent *animalculum*; ſince no one of theſe could be *nouriſhed*, or ever come to any thing without the reſt: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the reſt, it would ſoon wither and decay again for lack of nouriſhment received by proper veſſels; as we ſee the limbs and organs of animals do, when the ſupply due from the animal oeconomy is any way intercepted or obſtructed. And ſince an organized body, which requires to be thus *ſimultaneouſly* made (faſhiond as it were at one ſtroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and *gradual* proceſs, I cannot but conclude, that there were *animalcula* of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the *ſeed* of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is uſually called *equivocal* or ſpontaneous generation, and with great reaſon now generally *exploded*. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other inſtances, and microſcopical obſervations do abet what I have ſaid *ſtrongly*.

Laſtly, to omit a great deal more, that I could add; if there is no *race* of men, that hath been from eternity, there is no man, who is not deſcended from two *firſt parents*: and then the ſouls of thoſe two firſt parents could be traduced from *no other*. And that there is no ſuch race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is plain to me from the face of earthly things, and the *hiſtory* of mankind (57), arts, and ſciences. What is objected againſt this argument from fancied *inundations*, *conflagrations*, *&c.* (58) has no weight with me. Let us ſuppoſe ſome ſuch great calamity to happen now. It muſt be either univerſal, or not. If *univerſal*, ſo that no body at all could be ſaved, then either there muſt never be any more men, or they muſt begin again in ſome *firſt parents*. If it was only *topical*, affecting ſome one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there were *any* natural means left, by which men might eſcape, conſiderable numbers muſt certainly *ſurvive*: and then it cannot be imagined, that they ſhould

(56) Οὐ γὰρ ὁν τῷ θεωρουμένῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν. *Plot.* (57) *Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrai & cæli — Cur ſupra bellum Thebanum et funera Trojæ Non alias alij quoq; res cecinere poetæ?* Lucr. (58) Πολλαὶ μὲν κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων, μεγάλαι δὲ ὑπὸ πυρὸς μέγεσαι. *Plato.*

ſhould all be ſo *abſolutely ignorant* of every thing, that no one ſhould be able to give an account of ſuch things as were *common*: no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect, that there were ſuch things as letters; none, that underſtood any trade; none, that could tell, what kind of habitations they had, how they uſed to be clothed, how their meat dreſt, or even what their food was: nor can it be thought, that *all* books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ſhips, buildings, and all the product of human skill and induſtry now extant in the world ſhould be ſo *univerſally* and *utterly* aboliſhed, that no part, no *veſtigium* of them ſhould remain; not ſo much, as to give a hint toward the ſpeedy reſtoration of neceſſary arts at leaſt. The people eſcaping muſt ſure have clothes on, and many neceſſaries about them, without which they could not eſcape, nor outlive ſuch a dreadful ſcene. In ſhort, no *conflagration*, no *flood*, no *deſtruction* can ſerve the objectors purpoſe, to reduce mankind to that ſtate, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable ſymptoms we find them to have been in *not many* thouſand of years ſince; I ſay, no deſtruction can ſerve his purpoſe, but ſuch an one as makes *thorough* work, only ſparing two or three couples, ſtript of every thing, and the moſt ſtupid and verieſt blocks (59) to be picked out of the whole ſpecies: natural fools, or mere *homines ſylveſtres* would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as ſoon as they had the opportunity to do it. And ſuppoſe they never ſhould have ſuch an opportunity; yet neither would *this* ſerve him effectually: ſince without ſome *ſupernatural* Power interpoſing ſuch a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preſerved, nor the earth reformed out of its aſhes and ruins after ſuch a calcination, or diſſolution, ſuch a *total* demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or teſtimony of any ſuch thing, that has ever been *univerſal*, except perhaps of one deluge: and as to that, if the *genius* of the language, in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing hiſtory in it were well underſtood, many forced *hypotheſes* and moliminous attempts to account for it had undoubtedly been prevented. And beſide that, the ſame *record*, which tells the thing was, tells alſo how immediately God was concernd in it; and that the people, who then periſhed as well as they who ſurvived, all deſcended from two *firſt parents*: and if that authority be a ſufficient proof of *one part* of the relation, it muſt be ſo of the *reſt*.

We may conclude then, that the *human ſoul* with its faculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a *Superior* being. And who can this be but the *Supreme* Being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. *Though His eſſence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenſible, yet we may ſay with aſſurance, that He is free from all defects; or One, from whom all defects muſt be removed.*

This propoſition hath in effect been proved already (60). However give me leave to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are *finite*, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. And if they were inlarged to ever ſo great a capacity, yet ſo long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the *ſame kind*, they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend *more* and *more finite* ideas; out of which, howſoever increaſed or exalted, no poſitive idea of the *perfection* of God can ever be formed. For a *Perfect* being muſt be *infinite*, and

 perfectly

(59) Τὺς ἀγραμμάτυς καὶ ἀμούσυς, as *Plato* ſpeaks. (60) Prop. V, VI.

perfectly *One*: and in ſuch a nature there can be nothing *finite*, nor any *compoſition* of finites.

How ſhould we comprehend the nature of the ſupreme incorporeal Being, or how He exiſts, when we comprehend not the nature of the moſt *inferior ſpirits*, nor have any conception even of matter itſelf deveſted of its accidents; I mean of that which is the *ſuppoſitum* of thoſe accidents? How ſhould we attain to an *adequate* knowledge of the Supreme Author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the *extent* of the world itſelf, and the numberleſs undeſcried regions, with their ſeveral ſtates and circumſtances, containd in it, never to be frequented or viſited by our philoſophy; nor can turn our ſelves any way, but we are ſtill accoſted with ſomething *above* our underſtanding? If we cannot penetrate ſo far into *effects*, as to diſcover them and their nature thoroughly, it is not to be expected, that we ſhould, that we *can* ever be admitted to ſee through the myſteries of His nature, who is the *Cauſe*, ſo far *above them a'l*. The Divine perfection then, and manner of being muſt be of a *kind* different from and above all, that we can conceive.

However, notwithſtanding our own defects, we may poſitively affirm there can be *none* in God, ſince He is *perfect*, as we have ſeen, He cannot be *defective* or *imperfect*. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well underſtood and rememberd: *viz.* that from Him muſt be removed *want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconſiſtently with reaſon and truth*, and the like. Becauſe theſe are *defects*; defect of knowledge, power, *&c.* Theſe are defects and blemiſhes even in *us*. And though His perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different *kind* from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in *them*, would be much more ſuch in *Him*, and can by no means be aſcribed to Him (*).

Though we underſtand not His manner of knowing things; yet *ignorance* being uniform and the *ſame* in every ſubject, we *underſtand* what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly *deny* that to belong to Him. The like may be ſaid with reſpect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we ſpeak of the *internal eſſential* attributes of God poſitively, as that He is omniſcient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the *intent is* only to ſay, that there is no object of knowledge, or power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exiſts without begining and end, &c. and thus we keep ſtill within the limits allowd by the propoſition (61). That is, we may ſpeak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* His nature. And ſo,

XVII. *We may conſider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw concluſions from His works, as they are called, notwithſtanding any thing, which has been ſaid* (62). Becauſe this we can do without comprehending the manner of His exiſtence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a neceſſity of owning, that there muſt be an incomprehenſible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the *mode*, in which the world depends upon Him, and He influences and diſpoſes things, becauſe this enters into His *nature*, and the one cannot be underſtood without the other: yet if I ſee things, which I know cannot be *ſelf-exiſtent*, and obſerve plainly an *oeconomy* and *deſign* in the diſpoſition of them,

(*) If that in *Terence* had been (not a queſtion, as it is there, but) an affirmation, *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the Heathen deity? (61) Λέγομεν ὁ μὴ ὄντι· ὁ δὲ ὄντι, ἃ λέγομεν. *Plotin.* (62) אין דרך להשיגן אלא ממעשיו. *Maim.*

them, I may conclude, that there is *ſome Being*, upon whom their exiſtence doth depend, and by whom they are modelled; may call this Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, &c. without *contradicting* my ſelf or truth; as I hope it will appear from what has been ſaid, and is going to be ſaid in the next propoſition.

XVIII. *God, who gives exiſtence to the world, does alſo govern it by His providence.* Concerning this grand queſtion, *Whether there is a Divine providence or not*, I uſed to think *for my ſelf* after the following manner.

Firſt, The world may be ſaid to be *governed* (at leaſt cannot be ſaid to be ἀνεπίτροπος, or left to fluctuate fortuitouſly), if there are *laws*, by which *natural cauſes* act, the ſeveral *phænomena* in it ſucceed regularly, and, in general, the conſtitution of things is preſerved: if there are *rules* obſerved in the production of *herbs*, *trees*, and the like: if the ſeveral kinds of *animals* are, in proportion to their ſeveral degrees and ſtations in the animal kingdom, furniſhed with *faculties proper to direct* and determine their actions; and when they act according to them, they may be ſaid to follow the *law* of their nature: if they are *placed* and *provided for* ſuitably to their reſpective natures and wants, or (which amounts to the ſame thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumſtances (63): if, laſtly, *particular caſes* relating to *rational beings* are taken care of in ſuch a manner, as will at laſt agree beſt with *reaſon*.

Secondly, If there are ſuch *laws* and *proviſions*, they can come originally from no other Being, but from Him, who is the *Author of nature*. For theſe laws, which reſult from the *natures* of things, their properties, and the uſe of their faculties, and may be ſaid to be written upon the things themſelves, can be the laws of no other: nor can thoſe things, whoſe very *being* depends upon God, exiſt under any condition *repugnant* to His will; and therefore can be ſubject to no laws or diſpoſitions, which He would not have them be ſubject to; that is, which are not *His*. Beſide, there is *no other* being capable of impoſing laws, or any ſcheme of government upon the world; becauſe there is no other, who is not himſelf *part* of the world, and whoſe own exiſtence doth not *depend* upon Him.

Thirdly, By the *providence of God* I mean His governing the world by *ſuch* laws, and making *ſuch* proviſions, as are before mentiond. So that if there are *ſuch*, there is a Divine providence.

Laſtly, It is not *impoſſible*, that there ſhould be *ſuch*: on the contrary, we have juſt reaſons to believe there are. It would be an abſurd aſſertion to ſay, that any thing is *impoſſible* to a Being, whoſe nature is infinitely above our comprehenſion, if the terms do not *imply a contradiction*: but on the other ſide, we may with confidence aſſert, that it is *impoſſible* for any thing, whoſe *exiſtence* flows from ſuch a Being, ever to grow ſo far out of His reach, or be ſo emancipated from under Him, as that He ſhould not for ever determine and govern the *manner* of its exiſtence.

As to *inanimate ſubſtances*, we ſee the caſe to be really juſt as it was ſuppoſed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their poſts, or perſevere to go the ſame circuits

(63) I ſhall not pretend here to meddle with particular caſes relating to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings; ſuch as are mentiond in *Mo. nebok.* (a leaf's falling from a tree, a ſpider's catching a flie, &c.) and which are there ſaid to be במקרה גמור. Tho it is hard to ſeparate theſe many times from the caſes of rational beings; as alſo to comprehend what מקרה גמור, *perfect accident*, is.

circuits over and over by a *certain law*. Little bodies or particles, of the ſame kind, obſerve continually the ſame *rules* of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any ſeeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumſtances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient *laws*. We are ſo far acquainted with the *laws* of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and ſerve our ſelves of them, ſupplying upon many occaſions the defect of faculties and powers in our ſelves by mechanical powers, which never fail to anſwer according to the *eſtabliſhment*. Briefly, we ſee it ſo far from being *impoſſible*, that the *inanimate* world ſhould be governed by *laws*, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to *laws* by them *inviolable*.

As to *vegetables*, we ſee alſo how they are determined by *certain methods* preſcribed them. Each ſort is produced from its *proper* ſeed; hath the *ſame* texture of fibres; is nouriſhed by the *ſame* kind of juices out of the earth, digeſted and prepared by the *ſame* kind of veſſels, *&c.* Trees receive annually their *peculiar* liveries, and bear their *proper* fruits: flowers are dreſt, each family, in the *ſame* colors, or diverſify their faſhions after a certain manner *proper* to the kind, and breath the *ſame* eſſences; and both theſe and all other kinds *obſerve* their ſeaſons: and ſeem to have their ſeveral profeſſions and trades *appointed them*, by which they produce ſuch food and manufactures (pardon the *catechreſis*), as may *ſupply the wants* of animals. Being ſo very neceſſary, they, or at leaſt the moſt uſeful, grow *eaſily*: being fixt in the earth, inſenſible, and not made for ſociety, they are generally ἀῤῥενοθήλεα: being liable to a great conſumption both of them and their ſeeds, they yield *great quantities* of theſe, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evidently a *regulation*, by which the ſeveral orders are preſerved, and the ends of them anſwered, according to their firſt *eſtabliſhment* too.

Then as to *animals*, there are *laws*, which *mut. mutand.* are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at leaſt analogous (64) to their laws. For to mention only two or three particulars; the individuals of the ſeveral kinds have the *ſame* (general) ſhape, and members, to be managed after the *ſame* manner: have the *ſame* veſſels repleniſhed with the *ſame* kinds of fluids, and furniſhed with *like* glands for the ſeparation and diſtribution of ſuch parts of them, as anſwer the *ſame* intentions in them all: are ſtimulated by the *ſame* appetites and uneaſineſſes to take in their food, propagate their ſpecies, *&c.* And whatever it is, that proceeds thus according to *ſtated* methods, and keeps in the *ſame* general track, may be ſaid to obſerve and be under ſome *rule* or *law*, which either operates upon and limits it *ab extra*, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations reſulting from the ſeveral degrees of reaſon and ſenſe, or ſenſe only, of which we cannot but be conſcious in our ſelves, and obſerve faint reſemblances in the kinds below us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing leſs than *laws*, by which animals are to ſteer and govern their motions: that is, otherwiſe expreſt, by which the Author of their natures *governs* them. Tho theſe *laws* may not impoſe an abſolute neceſſity, nor be of the ſame kind with thoſe of inanimate and merely paſſive beings, becauſe the beings, which are ſubject to theſe (men at leaſt) may be ſuppoſed in ſome meaſure free, and to act upon ſome kind of principles or motives: yet ſtill they may have the nature of *laws*, tho

(64) *Pliny* in his chapter *De ordine naturæ in ſatis*, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that *providence* by which God *adminiſters* the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right uſe of thoſe faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's *providence* and government, as if they were given me *immediately* by Him without my acting; ſince all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon *Him*, and are as it were *inſtruments* of His providence to me in reſpect of ſuch things, as may be procured by them.

To finiſh this head: it is ſo far from being *impoſſible*, that the ſeveral tribes of *animals* ſhould be ſo made and placed, as to find proper ways of ſupporting and defending themſelves (I mean, ſo far as it is conſiſtent with the general oeconomy of the world: for ſome cannot well ſubſiſt without the deſtruction of ſome others), that, on the contrary, we ſee men, beaſts, birds, fiſhes, inſects are furniſhed with organs and faculties adapted to their reſpective circumſtances and opportunities of finding their proper food, or prey, *&c.* even to the aſtoniſhment of them, who attend to the hiſtory of nature. If *men*, who ſeem to have more wants than any other kind, find difficulties in maintaining life, it is becauſe they themſelves, not contented with what is *decent* and *convenient* only, have by their luxuries and ſcandalous neglect of their reaſon *made* life expenſive.

The *world* then being not left in a ſtate of confuſion or as a chaos, but reduced into *order* and *methodized* for ages to come; the ſeveral ſpecies of beings having their offices and provinces *aſſigned* them; plants and animals ſubſiſtence *ſet out* for them; and as they go off, ſucceſſors *appointed* to relieve them, and carry on the *ſcheme*, &c. that the *poſſibility* only of a *general* providence ſhould be allowd, is certainly *too modeſt* a demand. We ſee, or may ſee, that *in fact* there is *ſuch* a providence.

The great difficulty is, how to account for that *providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which reſpects (principally) *particular* men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deſerving *well*, or *ill* Some *will* make a right uſe of their faculties and opportunities, ſome *will not*: the vicious may, or may not *repent*, or repent and *relapſe*: ſome fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any deſign; and theſe want to be reclaimd. Some may be ſuppoſed to worſhip God and to crave His protection and bleſſing &c. and then a proper anſwer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence great variety of *caſes* will ariſe, which will require from a Governor *ſuitable* incouragements, rewards, correptions, puniſhments; and that ſome ſhould be protected and fortunate, others not, or leſs. Now the *good* or *ill* ſtate of a man here, his ſafety or danger, happineſs or unhappineſs depend upon many things, which ſeem to be ſcarce *all capable* of being determind by providence. They depend upon what he does *himſelf*, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him immediately, or reach him afterward upon the *courſe* of nature, which muſt affect him: and, in fine, upon many *incidents*, of which no account is to be given (65). As to what *he does himſelf*, it is impoſſible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happineſs, and what not: or if he could know,

(65) Little things have many times unforeſeen and great effects: *& contra.* The bare ſight of a fig, ſhewn in the ſenate-houſe at *Rome*, occaſiond *Carthage* to be deſtroyd: *quod non Trebia, aut Traſymenus, non Cannæ buſto inſignes Romani nominis perficere potuere; non caſtra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portæq; Collinæ adequitans ipſe Hannibal.* Plin.

know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compass of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are *free*, how can they be determined to be only *such*, as may be either good or bad (as the *case requires*) for some other particular man; since such a determination seems inconsistent with liberty? Beside, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own *private* freedom, and the several *degrees* of sense and ability, which they *respectively* have, their acts, as they either conspire, or cross and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet and *oppose* each other, and have different effects upon men of different *makes*, or in different *circumstances*, must cause a strange embarras, and intangle the plot (66). And as to the *course of nature*, if a *good* man be passing by an infirm building, just in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God should *suspend* the force of gravitation, till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance: or can we think it would be increased, and the fall hastend, if a *bad* man was there, only that he might be caught, crushed, and made an example (67)? If a man's safety or prosperity should depend upon winds or rains, must *new* motions be imprest upon the atmosphere, and *new* directions given to the floating parts of it, by some *extraordinary* and *new* influence from God? Must clouds be so precipitated, or kept in suspense (67), as the *case* of a particular man or two requires? To which add, that the differing and many times contrary circumstances and interests of men are scarce to be *reconciled*. The wind, which carries one into the *port*, drives another out to *sea*: and the rains, that are but just sufficient upon the *hills*, may drown the inhabitants of the *valleys*. In short, may we expect *miracles* (68): or can there be a particular providence, a providence, that suits the *several cases* and prayers of individuals, without a continual *repetition* of them, and force frequently committed upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,

1. It seems to me not *impossible*, that God should know *what is to come*: on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that He does and must know things *future*. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from Him, must either be the effect of *mechanical* causes, or of the motions of living beings and *free* agents. For *chance* we have seen already is no cause. Now as to the former, it cannot be *impossible* for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore must *intimately* know all their powers, and what effects they will have, to see through the whole *train* of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in *that way* (69): nay, it is *impossible*, that He should *not* do it. We our selves if

(66) While every one pushes his own designs, they must interfere, and hinder one another. *Ad summum succedere honorem Certantes, iter infestum fecere viai.* Lucr. (67) Or is it not more likely, πιπτούσης οἰκοδομίας, τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀποθανεῖν, ὁ ποιὸς ποτ' ἂν ᾖ (in *Plotinus*'s words)? (67) Something more than this we meet with in *Onq.*'s paraphrase, where it is said, that upon *Moses*'s prayer מטרא דהוה נחית לא מטא על ארעא. Which same place *Rashi* explains after the same manner. [מטר] לא הגיע [ארצה] ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ. (68) Some have talked to this purpose. So *R. Albo* says of some prophets and *hhasidim*, שישנו הטבע או ישתנה בעבורם. *R. Is. Abuh.* that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or punishment, אין זה רק במעשה הנס· והוא נס נסתר יחשוב בו הרואה שהוא מנהגו של עולם. And *Abarb.* היסולת האלהי הוא משנה הטבעים בהשגחתו וכו'. (69) What *Seneca* says of the Gods (in the Heathen style), may be said of the true God. *Nota est illi operis sui series: omniumq; illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit*, &c.

if we are ſatisfied of the goodneſs of the materials, of which a machine is made, and underſtand the force and determination of thoſe powers, by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to thoſe things, which depend upon the *voluntary* motions of free agents as of *men*, (for inſtance), it muſt be obſerved, that they can only be free with reſpect to ſuch things, as are within their *power*, (not great, God knows): and their freedom with reſpect to theſe can only conſiſt in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent neceſſity, as their *own reaſon* and judgment ſhall determine them; or to *neglect* their rational faculties, and not uſe them at all, but ſuffer themſelves to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itſelf acts in a manner *mechanically*. Now He, who knows what *is* in men's power, what not: knows the make of their bodies, and all the *mechaniſm* and propenſions of them; knows the *nature* and *extent* of their underſtandings, and what will determine them this or that way; knows all the proceſs of natural (or ſecond) cauſes, and conſequently how theſe may work upon them: He, I ſay, who knows all this, may know, *what* men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, *viz.* whether they *will uſe* their rational faculties, or *not*. And ſince even we our ſelves, mean and defective as we are, can *in ſome meaſure* conceive, how ſo much as this may be done, and ſeem to want but one ſtep to finiſh the account, can we with any ſhew of reaſon deny to a *Perfect* being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; eſpecially if we conſider, that this very power of *uſing* our own faculties is held of Him.

Obſerve what a ſagacity there is in ſome *men*, not only in reſpect of phyſical cauſes and effects, but alſo of the future actings of mankind: and how very eaſie it is many times, if the perſons concerned, their characters, and circumſtances are given, to foreſee what they will do: as alſo to foretell many general events, tho the intermediate tranſactions, upon which they depend, are not known (70). Conſider how much more remarkable this penetration is in *ſome* men, than in *others*: conſider further, that if there be any *minds* more perfect than the human, (and who can be ſo conceited of himſelf as to queſtion this?) they muſt have it in a ſtill more eminent degree, *proportionable* to the excellence of their natures: in the laſt place, do but allow (as you muſt) this power of diſcerning to be in God *proportionable* to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to *theirs*, and then it becomes *infinite*; and then again, the *future* actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and expoſed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things *paſt* or *preſent* or which come to paſs *neceſſarily*.

After all, what has been ſaid, is only a feeble attempt to ſhew, how far *even we* can go toward a conception of the *manner*, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His *power of knowing*, muſt infinitely ſurpaſs all our notions. It muſt be ſomething different from and *infinitely* tranſcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of (71).

We indeed know matters of fact by the help of our *ſenſes*, the ſtrength of *memory*, impreſſions made upon *phanſy*, or the *report* of others (which laſt too falls in with

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(70) *Etſi quem exitum acies habitura ſit, divinare nemo poteſt; tamen belli exitum video,* &c. and after, *quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, qua oculis cernimus.* Cic. (71) אין זה ידיעה ממין ידיעתנו. *Maim.* It differs not ברב ובמעט לבר אבל במין המציאה. *Id.*

the former ways. For that, which we know only by report, in proper ſpeaking we only know the report of, or have heard); and all theſe ways do ſuppoſe thoſe matters either to be *preſent*, or once to *have been*: but is it therefore *impoſſible*, that there ſhould be any *other* ways of knowing? This is ſo far from being true, that, ſince God has no organs of ſenſation, nor ſuch mean faculties as the beſt of ours are, and conſequently cannot know things in the way, which we know them in, if He doth not know them by ſome *other* way, He cannot know them *at all*, even tho they were preſent: and therefore there muſt be *other* ways, or at leaſt *another* way of knowing even matters of fact. And ſince the difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* matters of fact may be known, ariſes chiefly from this, that we in reality conſider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our way* of knowing; the difficulty vaniſhes, when we recollect, that they are and muſt be known to God by ſome other way: and not only ſo, but this muſt be ſome way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as *preſent* is of ours: nor can we (72) tell, what reſpect *paſt*, *preſent*, *to come*, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no ſuch thing as *ſound*, to blind no ſuch thing as *light* or *color*: nor, when theſe things are defined and explained to them in the beſt manner, which their circumſtances admit, are they capable of knowing *how* they are apprehended. So here we cannot tell, *how* future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what ſounds or colors are, and *how* they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing *thoſe*, as well as there is of perceiving *theſe*. As they want a *fifth* ſenſe to perceive ſounds or colors, of which they have no notion: ſo perhaps we may want a *ſixth* ſenſe, or *ſome faculty*, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reaſon to deny, that there is in nature *ſuch* a ſenſe or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny there is ſuch a ſenſe as that of *hearing* or *ſeeing*.

We can never conclude, that it is *impoſſible* for an infinitely perfect Being to know what a free agent will *chooſe* to do, till we can comprehend *all* the powers of ſuch a Being, and that is till we our ſelves are infinite and perfect (73). So far are we from being able to pronounce with any ſhew of reaſon, that it is *impoſſible* there ſhould be ſuch knowledge in God.

In the laſt place, this knowledge is not only not *impoſſible*, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection, doth neceſſarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if *ignorance* be an imperfection, the ignorance of *future* acts and events muſt be ſo: and then if *all* imperfections are to be denied of Him, *this muſt*.

There is indeed a common prejudice againſt the *preſcience* (as it is called) of God; which ſuggeſts, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or *certainly*: and if ſo, then they are *certain*; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of *freedom*. And thus preſcience and freedom are inconſiſtent. *But ſure* the nature of a thing is not *changed* by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not alterd by this. The truth is, God foreſees, or rather ſees the actions of free agents, becauſe they *will be*; not

(72) *Ignari, quid queat eſſe, Quid nequeat*: to uſe *Lucretius*'s words more properly. (73) To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the ſame as to endeavour שנהיה אנחנו הוא. *Maim.*

not that they will be, becauſe He *foreſees* them (74). If I ſee an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties ſuppoſed, it is *certain* that object is there: but yet it cannot be ſaid, it is there *becauſe* I ſee it there, or that my ſeeing it there is the *cauſe* of its being there; but becauſe it *is there*, therefore I *ſee* it there. It is the object, that determines my ſenſation: and ſo in the other caſe, it is the future *choice* of the free agent, that determines the preſcience, which yet may be infallibly true.

Let us put theſe two contradictory propoſitions, *B* (ſome particular man) *will go to church next Sunday*, and *B will not go to church next Sunday*; and let us ſuppoſe withall, that B is *free*, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his *own will*. In this caſe he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but *one* of theſe two things, either *go*, or *not go*; and one he muſt do. One of theſe propoſitions therefore is now *true*; but yet it is not the truth of that propoſition, which forces him *to do* what is containd in it: on the contrary, the *truth* of the propoſition ariſes from what he ſhall *chooſe* to do. And if that truth doth not force him, the *foreknowledge* of truth will not. We may ſure ſuppoſe B himſelf to *know certainly* before hand, which of the two he will chooſe to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean ſo far as it depends upon his choice only): and if ſo, then here is B's own *foreknowledge* conſiſtent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, ſuppoſe God to know *as much* in this reſpect as B does, there will be God's *foreknowledge* conſiſtent with B's *freedom*.

In a word, it involves no *contradiction* to aſſert, that God certainly knows what any man will chooſe; and therefore that he ſhould do this, cannot be ſaid to be *impoſſible*.

2. It is not *impoſſible*, that ſuch *laws* of nature, and ſuch a *ſeries* of cauſes and effects may be *originally* deſigned, that not only general proviſions may be made for the ſeveral ſpecies of beings, but even *particular caſes*, at leaſt many of them, may alſo be provided for without any *innovation* or *alteration* in the courſe of nature (75). It is true this amounts to a prodigious ſcheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, eſtimated, and laid together: but when I conſider, what a maſs of *wonders* the univerſe is in other reſpects; what a Being God is, *incomprehenſibly* great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the *future* wants and deportments of *particular* men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firſt cauſe, muſt do this ſo as to be *conſiſtent* one with another, and in ſuch a manner, as to make *one compact* ſyſtem, befitting ſo great an Author: I ſay, when I conſider this, I cannot deny ſuch an *adjuſtment* of things to be within His power. The order of events, proceeding from the ſettlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reaſonable ſucceſs of *my* endeavours and prayers (as inconſiderable a part of the world as I am), as with any other thing or *phænomenon* how *great* ſoever.

Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppoſe M (ſome man certainly to *foreknow* ſome way or other that, when he ſhould come to be upon

(74) יריעתו במה שיהיה לא יוציא הדבר האפשר משבעו. *Maim.* Much might be inſerted upon this ſubject (out of *Abarb.* particularly) which I ſhall omit. (75) Things come to paſs κ᾽ κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας κ᾽ καλὰ λόγον· and even τὰ σμικρότερα δεῖ σωτεδέχθαι κ᾽ σωυφάνθαι νομίζειν. *Plot.* That in *Seneca* look's ſomething like this: Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove, ſed ſic omnia diſpoſita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non fiunt, tamen ſine ratione non fiant: quæ illius eſt. — Nam etſi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent.

his death-bed, L would *petition* him to leave him ſome *particular legacy*; in a manner ſo earneſt and humble, and with ſuch a good diſpoſition, as would render it proper to grant his requeſt: and upon this M makes his *laſt will*, by which he deviſes what was asked, to L, and then locks up the *will*; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilſt L had yet no expectation or thought of any ſuch thing. When the time comes, the *petition* is made, and *granted*; not by making any *new* will, but by the *old* one already made, and without *alteration*: which legacy had, notwithſtanding that, never been left, had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreſeen, that L would not *ſo much as ask*, and had therefore been left out of the will; this *preterition* would have been cauſed by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted; if M be allowd to *foreknow* the caſe. And thus the *prayers*, which good men offer to the *All-knowing* God, and their *neglects* may find fitting effects *already* forecaſted in the courſe of nature. Which *poſſibility* may be extended to the labors of men and their behaviour in general.

It is obvious to every one's obſervation, that in *fact* particular men are very commonly (at leaſt in ſome meaſure) rewarded or punithed by the *general* laws and methods of nature. The *natural* (tho not conſtant) attendents and conſequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice loſs of philoſophical pleaſures, a diſeaſed body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be *virtuous* and *happy*, C *vitious*, and at laſt *miſerable*, laboring under a fruitleſs and diſconſolate repentance; tho this comes to paſs through the *natural tendence* of things, yet theſe two caſes being ſuppoſed ſuch as require, the one that B ſhould be favored, the other that C ſhould ſuffer for his wickedneſs, are as effectually *provided for*, as if God exerted his power in ſome peculiar way on this occaſion.

3. It is not *impoſſible*, that men, whoſe natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in ſuch *times*, *places*, and other *circumſtances*, as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the *general* plan of things, but alſo anſwer many *private* caſes too. The *planets* and bigger parts of the world we cannot but ſee are diſpoſed into ſuch *places* and *order*, that they together make a noble *ſyſtem*, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that influence, which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion *reſtraind* or *alterd*. On the contrary, being *rightly placed*, they by the obſervation of *theſe* become ſubſervient to the main deſign. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind (to ſpeak after our manner) ſome projection of the *future hiſtory* of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aſpects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why ſhould it not be thought *poſſible* for *men*, as well as for *them*, by ſome ſecret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the preſidence and guidance of ſome unſeen governing Power, to be brought into their places in ſuch a manner as that by the *free* uſe of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppoſitions of their intereſts and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their ſeveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conſpire to make out the ſcheme? And then again, ſince generals conſiſt of particulars, and in this ſcheme are comprehended the actions and caſes of *particular* men, they cannot be ſo ſituated reſpectively among the reſt of their ſpecies as to be ſerviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the *general diagram* of affairs, unleſs they and their ſeveral actings and

caſes

caſes do in the main correſpond one to another, and fit among themſelves, or at leaſt are not *inconſiſtent*.

Here is no implication of any *contradiction* or *abſurdity* in all this: and therefore it may at leaſt be fairly *ſuppoſed*. And if ſo, it will follow, that a *particular providence* may be compatible with the natural *freedom* of mens actions. Such a ſuppoſition is certainly not beyond the power of an *almighty, perfect* Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon thoſe words, and take their import, muſt believe.

The Ancients I am perſuaded had ſome ſuch thoughts as theſe. For they were generally *fataliſts*, and yet do not ſeem to have thought, that they were *not maſters* of their own actions (76).

4. It is not *impoſſible* (for that is *all*, which I contend for here), that many things, ſuitable to ſeveral caſes, may be brought to paſs by means of *ſecret* and ſometimes *ſudden influences* on our minds (77), or the minds of other men, whoſe acts may affect us. For inſtance; if the caſe ſhould require, that N ſhould be deliverd from ſome threatening *ruin*, or from ſome *misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he ſhould go ſuch a way at ſuch a time, as he intended: upon this occaſion ſome *new* reaſons may be preſented to his mind, why he ſhould not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that road*. Or, if he is to be delivered from ſome dangerous *enemy*, either ſome new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the *enemy* will be, or the enemy may be after the ſame manner diverted from coming where *he* ſhall be, or his reſentment may be *qualified*, or ſome proper method of *defence* may be ſuggeſted. After the ſame manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and ſucceſſes may be conferred: or on the other ſide, men may by way of puniſhment for crimes committed incurr miſchiefs and calamities. I ſay, theſe things and ſuch like *may be*. For ſince the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do alſo depend upon their judgments or the *preſent appearances* of things in their minds, which determine them to will or nill; if a *new* proſpect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are ſeen *altered*, *new* forces and directions impreſt uponthe ſpirits, paſſions *exalted* or *abated*, and the very power of judging *inlivend* or *debilitated*, without any ſuſpenſion or alteration of the ſtanding laws of nature, then without that *new* volitions, deſigns, meaſures may alſo be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwiſe would have *been*, and many brought about, that would *not*. But that this is far from being *impoſſible*, ſeems plain to me. For the operations of the mind following in great meaſure the preſent diſpoſition of the *body*, ſome thoughts and deſigns may proceed from *corporeal* cauſes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themſelves; and ſo the caſe may fall in with n. 2. or new ones may be occaſioned by ſomething ſaid or done by *other men*; and then the caſe may de brought under n. 3. or an alteration of meaſures may be cauſed

(76) *Plato* and the *Stoics*, *ap. Plut.* make *fate* to be συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ὃν ἡ συμπλοκὴ καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς· ὥστε τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνειμάρθαι. (77) The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwiſe *Homer* could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δ' ἀρ' ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη· Ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας· and the like often. *Plutarch* explains theſe paſſages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιροῦντα ποιεῖ [Ὅμηρος] τὸν θεὸν, ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδ' ὁρμὰς ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγούς· and afterward the Gods are ſaid to help men, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς ποιαῖς καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ τοὐναντίον ἀποτρέποντες καὶ ἴσχοντες.

cauſed by the ſuggeſtion, the imperceptible communication, and impulſe of ſome *ſpiritual being*; perhaps the Deity himſelf. For that ſuch ſecret influences and whiſpers may be, none of us all can poſitively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no ſuch things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them, who have made obſervations upon themſelves and their affairs, but muſt, when they reflect on life paſt and the various adventures and events in it, find many inſtances, in which their uſual judgment and ſenſe of things cannot but ſeem to themſelves to have been *over-ruled* they knew not *by what*, nor *how*, nor *why*, i. e. they have done things, which afterwards they wonder how they came *to do*; and that theſe actions have had conſequences very *remarkable* in their hiſtory. I ſpeak not here of men dementated with wine, or whoſe reaſon is dazled or overborn by ſtrength of temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their ſober and more conſidering intervals.

That there may be *poſſibly* ſuch inſpirations of new thoughts and counſels, may perhaps further appear from this; that we ſo frequently find thoughts ariſing in our minds, into which we are led by *no* diſcourſe, *nothing* we read, *no* clue of reaſoning; but they ſurpriſe and come upon us from we *know not* what quarter. If they proceeded from the mobility of ſpirits, ſtraggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of *dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore ſeems to have *experienced* ſome aſſiſtance and directions, given, to good men, by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, &c. If any one ſhould object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actings, then they are deprived of their *liberty*, &c. the anſwer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to *every thing*. His freedom may be reſtraind, and he only *anſwerable* for thoſe acts, in reſpect of which he *is free*.

If this then be the caſe, as it ſeems to be, that men's minds are ſuſceptive of ſuch *inſinuations* and *impreſſions*, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination this or that way, how many things may be brought to paſs by theſe means without *fixing* and *refixing* the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpoſe, in his way? I ſay, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of *our ſelves*, but *other people*, who may be concerned in our actions, either *immediately* (78), or *in time* through perhaps many intermediate events? For the proſperity or improſperity of a man does not intirely depend upon his *own* prudence or imprudence, but in great meaſure upon his *ſituation* among the reſt of mankind, and what *they* do. The natural effect of his management meeting with ſuch things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the reſult may be ſomething not intended or foreſeen.

5. There *poſſibly* may be, and moſt probably are Beings *inviſible*, and *ſuperior* in nature to us, who may by other means be in many reſpects *miniſters* of God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without *altering* the laws of nature. For it implies no *contradiction* or *abſurdity* to ſay there are ſuch beings: on the contrary, we have, as has been ſaid (perhaps more than once) already, the greateſt

(78) They, who called *Simonides* out from *Scopas* and his company, as if it were to ſpeak with him, ſaved his life. The ſtory known.

eſt reaſon to think, that ſuch imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the *top* of the ſcale. Tho *pictures* of ſpiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reaſoning part of the mind the idea of *ſpiritual ſubſtance* may perhaps be as clear, as that of *corporeity*. For what *penetrability* is, muſt be known juſt as well as what *impenetrability* is: and ſo on.

Beſide, how can we tell but there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have *corporeal* vehicles, as we have, but *finer* and *inviſible*? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of theſe many *orders*, riſing in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the *philoſophy* of theſe times, which ſeems to delight in inlarging the capacities of matter to aſſert the *poſſibility* of this. But however, my own defects ſufficiently convince me, that I have no pretenſion to be one of the *firſt* rank, or that which is *next under* the All-perfect.

Now then, as *we our ſelves* by the uſe of our powers do many times interpoſe and alter the courſe of things within our ſphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being ſaid to alter thoſe *laws*; ſo may theſe *ſuperior* beings likewiſe in reſpect of things within their ſpheres, much larger be ſure, the leaſt of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extenſive, their intellects purer, their reaſon better, they may be much *properer* inſtruments of Divine providence with reſpect to *us*, than we can be with reſpect *one to another*, or to the *animals* below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of theſe beings is ſo large, as to alter or ſuſpend the *general laws* of the world, or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work which requires to be oft ſet backward or forward, and conſequently am not apt haſtily to credit ſtories of *portents*, &c ſuch as cannot be true, unleſs the natures of things and their manner of being be quite changed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be ſo placed as to become, even by the free exerciſe of their own natural powers, *inſtruments* of God's particular providence to other men (or animals below them); ſo may we well ſuppoſe, that theſe *higher* beings may be ſo *diſtributed* through the univerſe, and ſubject to ſuch an oeconomy, tho I pretend not to tell what that is, as may render *them alſo* inſtruments of the ſame providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, *conſiſtently with the laws of nature*, ſome way or other of influencing human affairs in proper places.

Laſtly, What I have here ventured to lay before you, I would not have to be ſo underſtood, as if I peremptorily *aſſerted* things to be juſt in this manner, or pretended to *impoſe* my thoughts upon any body elſe: my deſign is only to ſhew, how I *endeavour* to help my own narrow conceptions. There muſt be *other ways* above my underſtanding, by which ſuch a Being, as God is, may take care of *private caſes* without interrupting the order of the univerſe, or putting thoſe things, by which it is preſerved, out of their channels. We may be ſure He regards every thing *as being what it is*: and that therefore His *laws* muſt be accommodated to the natures of things concerned. The *purely material* part of the world is governd by ſuch, as are ſuited to the nature of a being, which is *inſenſible, paſſive only*, and every where and always *the ſame*: and theſe ſeem to be ſimple and few, and carry natural agents (as they are called) into one conſtant road. But *intelligent, active, free* beings muſt be under a government of another form. They muſt, truth requiring it, be conſiderd *as beings*, who may behave themſelves well or ill; *as beings* capable of pleaſure and pain; *as*

beings

beings, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) ſenſible of this, and to whom therefore it muſt be *natural* upon many occaſions to ſupplicate Him for mercy, protection, direction, aſſiſtance, bleſſing, &c. Laſtly, *as beings*, whoſe caſes admit great variety: and therefore that *influence*, by which He is preſent to them, muſt be different from that, by which gravitation and common *phænomena* are produced in matter; this ſeems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, anſwering private caſes, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more eſpecially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, &c. But I forbear, leſt I ſhould go too far out of my depth: only adding in general, that God cannot put things ſo far out of His own power, as that He ſhould not *for ever govern* tranſactions and events in His own world; nor can *perfect* knowledge of power ever want *proper* means to atchieve what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced, ſhould ſtand for nothing, there *may* ſtill be a *particular providence* notwithſtanding the forementiond difficulty. And then, if there *may be* one, it will unavoidably follow, that there *is* one: becauſe in the deſcription of providence p. 69, nothing is ſuppoſed with reſpect to *particular caſes*, but that they ſhould be provided for in ſuch a manner, as will at laſt *agree beſt with reaſon*; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet ſay, that it is not done, is to charge the *Perfect* being with one of the greateſt *imperfections*, and (the mention of which creates horror) to make Him not ſo much as a *reaſonable* being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a *particular providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect reaſon*. For if men are treated according to reaſon, they muſt be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the juſt, the compaſſionate, &c. *as ſuch*, and the vitious, unjuſt, cruel, &c. according to *what they are*: and their ſeveral caſes muſt be taken and conſiderd as *they are*: which cannot be done without *ſuch* a providence.

Againſt all this it has been, as one might well expect, *objected* of old, that things do not ſeem to be dealt according to *reaſon*, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adverſity, pains, perſecutions, whilſt vitious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flouriſh (79). But to this an *anſwer* is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the *Manichean* objection under prop. VII. But I ſhall here give one more direct: and let *that* and *this* be mutually aſſiſting and ſupplements each to the other. 1. We are not always certain, who are *good*, who *wicked* (80. If we truſt to fame and reports, theſe may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendſhip or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured ſurmiſes and conſtructions of things, envy, or malice; and either way, from ſmall matters aggrandized, from miſtake, or from the unskilful relation even of *truth* itſelf. Oppoſite parties make a merit of blackening

(79) *Si curent* [*Dij homines*], *benè bonis ſit, malè malis: quod nunc abeſt.* Ap. Cic. The *Jews*, who call this caſe צריק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו, have written many things about it, to be ſeen in their books; *Mo. nebok. S. Iqqar. Men. hamma. Nahh. ab.* &c. So have the Heathen philoſophers too; *Seneca, Plutarch, plotinus, Simplicius, al.* But the anſwers of neither are always juſt. God forbid that ſhould be thought true, which is aſſerted by *Glauco, ap. Plat.* that the juſt, if they had *Gyges's* ring, would do as the unjuſt, and ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἄδικος, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαζόμενος, κλ. Or that in *S. Hhaſid.* and *Men. hamma.* צריק ורע לו צריק בן רשע. The reaſon aſſigned for this caſe in another place is ſomething better: כדי שלא יאמרו אם לא היה בטובה לא חיה צריק. But the way of ſalving it in *Niſhm. hhaiy.* by גלגול הנשמות, or what the Cabbaliſts call עיבור, is worſt of all. (80) *Cadit et Ripheus*, juſtiſſimus *unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & ſervantiſſimus æqui. Dis* aliter *viſum.* Virg.

blackening their adverſaries, and brightening their friends, *undeſervedly* and *unmeaſurably*: and to idle companions and goſſips it is diverſion, and what makes the principal part of their converſation, to rehearſe the characters of men, dreſt up out of their own *dreams* and *inventions*: And beſide all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great meaſure upon *mean* people, who carry their ſtories from family to family, and propagate them very faſt: like little inſects, which lay apace, and the *leſs* the *faſter*. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to repreſent things *truly*. Beſide the matters of fact themſelves there are many *circumſtances*, which before ſentence is paſſed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet ſcarce ever can be known, but to the perſon *himſelf*, who is concerned. He may have other views, and an other ſenſe of things, than his judges have: and what he underſtands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a *ſecret* confined to his own breaſt. A man may through bodily indiſpoſitions and faults in his conſtitution, which it is not in his power to correct be ſubject to *ſtarts* and *inadvertencies*, or obnoxious to *ſnares*, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps, he may labor under *invincible* errors, and act as in the dark: in which caſes he may do things, which are in themſelves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at leaſt rather to be pitied, than cenſured with ſeverity. Or perhaps the *cenſurer*, notwithſtanding this kind of men talk, as if they were infallible, may be miſtaken himſelf in his opinion, and judge that to be *wrong*, which in truth is *right* (*). Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and ſuperſtitious wretches meaſure the actions of *letterd* and *philoſophical* men by the tattle of their nurſes or illiterate parents and companions, or by the faſhion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenents; when *both* of them cannot be in the right, and it is well if *either* of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of men muſt chiefly depend upon the *unſeen* part of their lives; ſince the trueſt and beſt religion is moſt private, and the greateſt wickedneſs endeavours to be ſo (81). Some are modeſt, and hide their virtues; others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under ſhews of ſanctity, good nature, or ſomething that is *ſpecious*. So that it is many times hard to diſcern, to which of the two ſorts, the *good* or the *bad*, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. We are not in all caſes competent judges of the *good* or *bad fortune* of other people (82). That, which is diſagreeable to one, is many times

(*) Or, *v. v.* he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This ſeems to be pretty much the caſe in that enumeration of good men, who ſufferd, *ap. Cic.* Cur duo Scipiones, fortiſſimos et optimos viros, in Hiſpania Pœnus oppreſſit? Cur Maximus extulit filium conſularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c? For here they are reckond *boni*, only becauſe they were *fortes*; that is, becauſe they had been zealous and ſucceſsful inſtruments in conquering and deſtroying them, who happend to be ſo unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to inlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good*? Doth it deſerve ſuch a particular obſervation, that *F. Maximus* buried a ſon, after he had been Conſul too? How doth it appear, that *Marcellus* was a better man than *Hannibal*? Is it ſuch a wonder, if they, who ſpend their lives in ſlaughter, ſhould at length be ſlain themſelves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue as alſo ſome upon that, which follows in the ſame place, of others, *quibus in probis optime evenit*. (81) *Vitæ poſtſcenia celant* (in Lucr.) may be aptly applied to the wicked. (82) *Neq; mala vel bona, quæ vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari adverſis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miſerrimi*, &c. Tacit.

agreeable to another or disagreeable in a less degree. The misery accruing from any infliction or bad circumstance of life is to be computed as in p. 23, 24: or according to the resistence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well, as another can the weight of one hundred, by these *different* weights they will be *equally* loaded. And so the same poverty or disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the *same pain* to all men. The apprehension of but a *vein* to be opend is worse to some, than the *apparatus* to an execution is to others: and a *word* may be more terrible and sensible to tender natures, than a *sword* is to the senseless, or intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to injoyments: men have different tasts, and the use of the same things does not beget *equal pleasure* in all. Beside, we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the *inward* stings and secret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose *external* splendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders (83): nor perhaps sufficiently consider the *silent* pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate desires, easy reflexions, a consciousness of knowledge and truth, with other pleasures of the *mind*, much greater many times than those of the *body* (84). Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwise, he should know all the others injoyments and all his sufferings (85). Many misfortunes are compensated (*) by other larger indowments or extraordinary felicities.

But suppose the pleasures of some, and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear: still we know not the *consequences* of them (86). The pleasures of those men may lead to miseries, greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and again the sufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call *happiness*, which the *contrary*: unless we knew the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their true circumstances, and what will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity. 3. Men ought to be considerd as *members* of families, nations, mankind, the universe, from which they cannot be separated: and then from the very *condition of their being* it will appear, that there must be great inequalities (87); that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities (88); and that the good of the *whole* society or kind is to be regarded preferably to the present pleasure of any *individual*, if they happen to clash (89). *Lastly*, if the *virtuous* man has undergone more in *this life*, than it would

(83) *Feliciorem tu Mecænatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, et morosæ uxoris quotidiana repudia deflenti, somnus per symphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo benè resonantium, quæritur? Mero se licet sopiat, — ; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille* [*Regulus*] *in cruce. — ut dubium* [*non*] *sit, an electione fati datâ, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecænates velint.* Sen. *Isti, quos pro felicibus aspicitis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt.* Id. (84) *Archimedes*, having found the way of solving a problem (*examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset*), ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying Εὕρηκα: but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying Βέβρωκα, or Πεφίληκα? *Plut.* (85) *Fatis contraria fata rependens.* Virg. (*) Ὀφθάλμων μὲν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν. *Hom.* (86) *Zeno* reckond he made a good voyage, when he was shipwracked. *Diog. L.* (87) Who blames a *drama*, because all the persons are not heroes? *Plot.* (88) העולם נידון אחר רובו. *Abarb.* & *pass.* (89) Μέρος μὲν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, κτλ. *Plato.*

would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was *no other*; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if *there is* another. For they may be made up to him by such injoyments, as it would be reasonable for him to *choose*, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the *loss of them*. And moreover, sometimes the *only* way to the felicities of a better state may lie through dark and difficult passes, discipline to some men being necessary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into such *methods*, as may produce in them proper improvements; such, as otherwise and of themselves they would never have come into. On the other side, if *vitious* and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereafter may be such, as that the *excess* of them above their past injoyments may be equal to the *just mulct* of their villanies and wickedness. And further, their worldly pleasures (which must be supposed to be such as are not philosophical, or moderated and governed by reason and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingross the whole man, and by that means to exclude almost all right reflexions, and proper applications of them, may be the causes of their ruin, whilst they leave them under such defects *at the end of their days*, as we shall see afterward tend to unhappiness.

If what is objected, be in many instances true, this only inferrs the *necessity* of a future state: that is, if good and bad men are not respectively treated according to reason in *this life*, they may yet be so treated, if *this* and *another* to follow be taken together into the account (90). And perhaps it is (as I have always been apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, that instances of that kind have been so *numerous*. For he must not only be guilty of blasphemy, but reduced to the greatest absurdity, who, rather than he will own there is such a state, is forced to make God an *unreasonable* Being (91): which I think amounts to a strong demonstration, that *there is one*. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. *If we would behave our selves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD as being what He is, according to the foregoing propositions*; or, *if we would endeavour to behave our selves towards Him according to truth, we must observe these following and the like particulars.*

1. *We must not pretend to represent Him by any picture or image whatsoever* (92). Because this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehensible nature, &c.

2. *We ought to be so far from doing this, that even the language we use, when we speak of Him, and especially of His positive nature and essential properties, ought not only to be chosen with the utmost care, but also to be understood in the sublimest sense: and the same is true with respect to our thoughts, mut. mutand.* Or thus: we must endeavour to *think* and *speak* of Him in the most *reverent* terms and most proper manner *we are able*; keeping withall this general conclusion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we

 do

(90) Divine providence and immortality of the soul must stand and fall together. Θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον. *Plut.* (91) Τοῦτο ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι Θεόν. ἢ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖν· ἢ προνοοῦντα μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον. *Hierocl.* (92) Sure no body ever did *in reality* pretend to do this. According to *Diog. L.* the Egyptians set up ἀγάλματα in their temples τῷ μὴ εἰδέναι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ μορφήν: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him. For, as *Maimonides* observes, no man ever did, or ever will worship an idol, made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being, who made heaven and earth.

do the beſt we can, He is ſtill Something *above all our conceptions*; and deſiring, that our faint expreſſions may be taken as aiming at a *higher* and more *proportionable* meaning. To do otherwiſe implies not only, that His mode of exiſtence and eſſential attributes are comprehenſible by us, but alſo (which is more) that our words and phraſes, taken from among our ſelves (93) and the objects of our faculties, are adequate expreſſions of them: *contrary to truth.*

To explain my ſelf by a few inſtances. When we aſcribe *Mercy* to God, or implore His *mercy*, it muſt not be underſtood to be *mercy* like that, which is called *compaſſion* in us. For tho this be a very diſtinguiſhing affection in human nature (94), to which we are made ſubject for good reaſons, the conſtitution of the world, and circumſtances of our preſent ſtate making it neceſſary for us to *compaſſionate* each the ſufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with *uneaſineſs*, and muſt therefore not be aſcribed ſtrictly to God in that *ſenſe*, in which it is uſed, when aſcribed to our ſelves. It perhaps may not be amiſs to call it *Divine mercy*, or the like; to diſtinguiſh it, and to ſhew, that we mean ſomething, which, tho in our low way of ſpeaking, and by *way* of analogy we call it by the ſame name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may conſider it in general as the manner, in which God *reſpects* poor ſuppliants and proper objects *for their good.* For certainly the *reſpect* or relation, which lies between God, conſiderd as an *unchangeable* Being, and *one*, that is humble and ſupplicates and endeavours to qualify himſelf for mercy, cannot be the *ſame* with that, which lies between the ſame *unchangeable* God and *one*, that is obſtinate, will not ſupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himſelf (95): that is, the ſame Thing or Being cannot reſpect *oppoſite* and *contradictory* caſes in the *ſame* manner; him, who does behave himſelf as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of Him to pity our infirmities and wants, the deſign is not to move His *affections*, as good ſpeakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to expreſs our own ſenſe of our ſelves and circumſtances in ſuch a manner, as may render us more *capable* of the emanations of Divine goodneſs, and *fit* to receive ſuch inſtances of His beneficence, as to us may ſeem to be the effects of *compaſſion*, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reaſon *always* and *without alteration*, that he, who labors under a ſenſe of his own defects, honeſtly uſes his beſt endeavours to mend what is amiſs, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being, and all that he has, do depend, ſhould have many things granted *him*, which are not given to the careleſs, obdurate, *unaſking* (96) part of mankind; tho his expreſſions and manner of addreſs, with all his *care* are ſtill *inadequate*, and below the Divine nature. In ſhort, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our ſelves we may alter the relation or reſpect lying between Him and us.

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(93) We uſe them (and ſpeak, as the Jews every where inculcate, כלשון בני אדם) only ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείας προσηγορίας· — τὰ ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες. *Plot.* (94) *Molliſſima corda* Humano *generi dare ſe natura fatetur, Quæ lacrymas dedit. hæc noſtri pars optima ſenſûs.* — *ſeparat hoc nos à grege* mutorum, &c. Juv. (95) The *ratio* of G to M † q is different from that of G to M — q: and yet G remains unalterd. (96) Πῶς ἂν δόιη τῷ πρὸς τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτεξουσίῳ μὴ αἰτοῦντι ὁ διδόναι πεφυκὼς Θεός; *Hierocl.*

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of *mercy*, *juſtice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: becauſe in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly be called together *Divine reaſon*: which, as it exerts itſelf in this or that manner, is by us *variouſly* denominated.

Here it muſt not be forgot, that *mercy* or *mercies* are many times taken for advantages or benefits injoyed by us: and then they are *properly* aſcribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.

When we ſpeak of the *Knowledge* of God, we muſt not mean, that He knows things *in the way that we do*: that any intention or operation of His mind (if I may ſpeak thus of him, who is all mind) is requiſite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impreſſions made upon Him: that He reaſons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is moſt *intuitive* and *immediate*, does in any degree come up to the mode, in which He knows things. We muſt rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be *ignorant*: which has been ſaid already; and is, I am afraid, as much as we can *ſafely* ſay.

When *Glory*, *honor*, *praiſe* (97) are given to God; or He is ſaid to do any thing for His own *glory*, or we propoſe the *glory* of His name in what we do; thoſe words ſhould not be taken as ſtanding for *that kind* of glory and applauſe, which is ſo induſtriouſly ſought, and capriciouſly diſtributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more *largely*, in order to give here a ſpecimen of the the world, and ſave that trouble in another place. Among us ſome are celebrated for ſmall matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendſhips, the uſual deference paid to men in eminent ſtations, or mere good luck (98); and others for atchieving *ſuch things*, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not impoſed upon by *falſe notions*, firſt introduced in barbarous times, and ſince poliſhed and brought into faſhion by hiſtorians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a diſgrace to *ſavages* than any recommendation of rational and *civilized* natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followd with *encomiums* and honors, which, tho they may be the felicities and *privileges* of the poſſeſſors, cannot be their *merit*, who received them *gratis*, and contributed nothing (99) themſelves toward the acquiſition of them: whilſt real virtue and induſtry (which, even when unſucceſsful, or oppreſt by ill circumſtances of health or fortune, give the *trueſt title* to praiſe) lie diſregarded. Thirſt after glory, when that is deſired merely for its own ſake, is founded in *ambition* and *vanity* (*): the thing itſelf is but a *dream*, and imagination; ſince, according to the differing humors and ſentiments of nations and ages, the ſame thing may be either *glorious* or *inglorious*: the *effect* of it, conſiderd ſtill by itſelf, is neither more health, nor eſtate, nor knowledge, nor virtue; or if it be any thing, it is but *what muſt ceaſe* as to him, when the man (1) dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the *breath* of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguiſhes it. Men pleaſe themſelves

(97) Τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον. Therefore ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ὑπεράνω are above praiſe. *Ariſt.* Οἱ τὺς θεὺς ἐπαινοῦντες γελοῖόι εἰσιν, ἡμῶν αὐτὺς ἐξισοῦντες. *Andron. Rh.* (98) What *Seneca* ſays of *Alexander*, is true of many an other heroe: *pro virtute erat felix temeritas.* (99) *Tumes alto Druſorum ſanguine, tanquam Feceris ipſe aliquid, &c.* Juv. (*) *Gloria quantalibet quid erit, ſi gloria tantum eſt?* Juv. (1) המת כאן ומחר בקבר היום חי ומחר ירמה. S. Hhaſ.

themſelves with notions of *immortality*, and fancy a perpetuity of fame ſecured to themſelves by books and teſtimonies of hiſtorians: but, alas! it is a ſtupid deluſion, when they imagine themſelves *preſent*, and *injoying* that fame at the reading of their ſtory after their death. And, beſide, *in reality* the man is not known ever the more to poſterity, becauſe his name is tranſmitted to them: *he* doth not live, becauſe his *name* does. When it is ſaid. *J. Cæſar* ſubdued *Gall*, beat *Pompey*, changed the *Roman* commonwealth into a monarchy, *&c.* it is the ſame thing as to ſay, the conqueror of *Pompey*, *&c.* was *Cæſar*: that is, *Cæſar* and the Conqueror of *Pompey* are the ſame thing; and *Cæſar* is as much known by the one deſignation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the Conqueror of *Pompey* conquerd *Pompey*; or ſome body conquerd *Pompey*; or rather, ſince *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæſar*, *ſome body* conquerd *ſome body* (2). Such a *poor buſineſs* is this boaſted immortality (3): and ſuch, as has been here deſcribed, is the thing called *glory* among us! The notion of it may ſerve to excite them, who having abilities to ſerve their countrey in time of real danger, or want, or to do ſome other good, have yet not *philoſophy* enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to ſee through the glories of the world (juſt as we excite children by *praiſing* them; and as we ſee many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to diſcerning men this *fame* is mere air, and nearly allied to nothing (*); what they deſpiſe, if not ſhun. I think there are two conſiderations, which may juſtify a deſire of *ſome* glory or honor: and ſcarce more. When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or ſuch as ſit well within themſelves, it is a *reaſonable pleaſure* to have the teſtimony of the world added to that of their own conſciences, that they have done well: and more than that, if the *reputation* acquired by any qualification or action may produce to a man any *real* comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the inſolencies and injuſtice of mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege muſt be a great ſatisfaction, and what a *wiſe* and *good* man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propoſe to himſelf. But then he propoſes it no further than it may be *uſeful*: and it can be no further uſeful than he *wants* it. So that, upon the whole, *glory*, *praiſe*, and the like, are either mere *vanity*, or only valuable in proportion to our *defects* and *wants*. If then thoſe words are underſtood according to the import and value they have *among men*, how dares any one think, that the Supreme Being can propoſe ſuch a *mean* end to Himſelf as our praiſes? He can neither *want*, nor *value* them. *Alexander*, according to his taſt of things, it may well be ſuppoſed would have been proud to have been told that he ſhould be the ſubject of *ſome Homer*, in whoſe ſheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at *Athens*, the mother of ſo many wits and captains: but ſure *even he*, with all his vanity, could not propoſe to himſelf as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praiſed by *children*, or rather by *worms* and *inſects*, if they were capable of ſhewing ſome faint ſenſe of his *greatneſs* (4). And yet how far ſhort is this compariſon! In ſum therefore, tho' men have been accuſtomed to ſpeak of the *Deity* in terms taken from *princes*, and ſuch things as they have, in their

(2) Τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυυμνήτων νῦν τρόπον τινα γλωσσήματά ἐστι. *M. Anton.* (3) Μικρὸν ἢ μηκίστη ὑστεροφημία, καὶ αὐτὴ δὲ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπαρίων τάχιστα τεθνηξομένων, καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων οὐδὲ ἑαυτοὺς, οὔτε γε τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα. *Id.* (*) *Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in duce ſummo Invenies?* Juv. (4) As *Pſaphon* was celebrated by the *birds*, ſinging Μέγας θεὸς ψάφων. *M. Tyr.*

their weakneſs, admired; tho theſe are now incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, conſidering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and ſpeaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we muſt remember to *exalt* the ſenſe of them, or annex ſome *mental* qualification to the uſe of them. As, if God be ſaid to do things for His own glory, the meaning I *humbly* conceive muſt be, that the tranſcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and adminiſtration of things in it; where there occurr ſuch *marks* of inexpreſſible wiſdom and power, that He needed not to have given us *greater*, had He only intended His own *glory*: or ſomething to this purpoſe. Or if the glory of what *we* do, be aſcribed to *Him*; by this muſt be ſignified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we deſire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is *laudable* in us (*).

When we *thank God* for any deliverance or injoyment, this muſt not be ſo underſtood, as if He could value Himſelf upon our *ceremonious acknowledgments*, or wanted complements, or any return from us. *It is* rather a profeſſion of the *ſenſe we have* of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatneſs or ſeaſonableneſs of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who deſires to own things, as far as he is able, to be *what they are*; and eſpecially to beget in himſelf ſuch a diſpoſition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty *benefactor*.

When we are ſaid to be *Servants of God*, or to *ſerve* Him, or do Him *ſervice*, theſe phraſes are not to be taken as when *one* man is ſaid to be ſervant of *another*, or to do him ſervice. For here it implies the doing of ſomething, which is uſeful and beneficial to the man, who is ſerved, and what he *wants*, or fancies he wants: but nothing of *want* can be ſuppoſed in God, nor can we any way be *profitable* or ſerviceable to Him. To *ſerve Him* therefore muſt rather be *to worſhip* or adore Him (of which ſomething by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our *ſerve* is but the tranſlation, is frequently uſed: as *to ſerve a graven image* (5) is *to worſhip the image*; but cannot ſignify the doing of any thing, which may be ſerviceable or uſeful to the dead ſtone. Or *to ſerve God* may be underſtood in a ſenſe ſomething like that: *Serve the king of Babylon* (6). For they were ſaid to ſerve the king of *Babylon*, who owned his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly *ſerviceable* to him: and ſo they may be ſaid to *ſerve God*, or be His *ſervants*, who live in a continual ſenſe of His ſoveraign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themſelves to the *laws* He has impoſed upon them. In theſe ſenſes we pray, that we may live *to ſerve Him*: that is, we pray, that we may live to worſhip Him, and practice thoſe *laws* of reaſon and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him ſubjected.

Many more reflexions might be made upon *epithets* and *ways of ſpeaking*, introduced by cuſtom, from rude antiquity, or by neceſſity following from the narrowneſs either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that *love*, *anger*, *hands*, *eyes*, *&c.* when aſcribed to God, cannot import ſuch *bodily* parts or paſſions, as are found in us.

Even

(*) *Honoribus auctî — cum diis gratias agimus, tum nihil noſtræ laudi aſſumptum arbitramur.* Cic. (5) את פסיליהם היו עוברים : כל עובדי פסל, *& ſim. paſs.* Deut. 12. mention is made of the places, אשר עברו שם הגוים וגו׳ : in *Chald. par.* פלחו, *Sept.* ἐλάτρευσαν (in the eccleſiaſtical ſenſe), *vulg. v.* coluerunt. (6) עברו את מלך בבל.

Even the pronouns *my*, *thy*, *his* (as His people, His house, *&c.*) require much *temper* in the use of them (7).

3. *We shall find our selves bound to worship Him, in the best manner we can.* For by worshiping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be *what He is*, and our selves to be *what we are*, by some more *solemn* and proper act: that is, by addressing our selves *as His dependents* to Him *as the Supreme cause*, and *Governor of the world*, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us (8), and the like. As if, *ex. gr.* I should in some humble and composed manner (9) pray to *that Almighty Being, upon whom depends the existence of the world, and by whose providence I have been preserved to this moment, and injoyed many undeserved advantages, that He would graciously accept my grateful sense and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that He would deliver me from the evil consequences of all my transgressions and follies: that He would indue me with such dispositions and powers, as may carry me innocently and safely through all future trials; and may inable me upon all occasions to behave my self conformably to the laws of reason, piously, and wisely: that He would suffer no being to injure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt my self by any error or misconduct of my own: that He would vouchsafe me clear and distinct perceptions of things; with so much health and prosperity, as may be good for me: that I may at least pass my time in peace, with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully discharged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve my self in virtuous habits and useful knowledge, I may at last make a decent, and happy exit, and then find my self in some better state.* Not to do this, or something like it, will certainly fall among those criminal *omissions* mentiond Sect. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of Him, is in effect to *deny*, that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for a supply of our wants is to *deny*, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and so on: all contrary to truth (10).

It must be rememberd, that no worship can be proportionable to the nature and perfections of God; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: and therefore I added those words *in the best manner we can.* And it must be observed further, that those words do not oblige us to be *always* at our devotions neither. For as in the worship of God we own Him to be *what He is*, so must we do this as not denying our selves to be *what we are*: beings not capable of bearing continual *intention* of mind; beings, that are incompassed with many *wants*, which by the constitution of our nature require to be supplied, not without *care* and *activity*; beings, that are made for many *harmless injoyments*; beings, that have *many offices* to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things considerd, it would be *less respect* to be constantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to address our selves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occasions. To be *always* thus ingaged, if it could be, would be to make God *what He is not*: since it seems to suppose, that He wants

(7) משכיל יבין. (8) Care must be taken how we pray, lest we should ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσῃ τις αὐτὸν εὐχόνος μεγάλα κακὰ, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά. Plato. *Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles*, &c. is a poet's observation. The author of *S. Hhaf* addes, that we should not pray for that שאי אפשר לעשות, or שאין נעשה כפי הטבע, or שאינו ראוי, or שיעשה קב"ה נס בשנוי עולם. (9) עיני למטה לבי למעלה. (10) ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה — התפלה. *Albo.* כל מאמין בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכ׳. *Id.*

wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at leaſt, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teaſing. For [theſe reaſons I have in the explication of my meaning inſerted that limitation, *by ſome ſolemn and proper act.*

Tho every man knows beſt his own opportunities and circumſtances, and therefore may be moſt able to judge for himſelf, how he may *beſt* perform this duty; yet in general it may be ſaid, that to the doing of it *ſolemnly* and in the beſt manner we can, theſe things are required: an intent *mind* (11) proper *times* and *places*, a proper *form* of words, and a proper *poſture*. For if the *mind* be abſent, or attends not to what is ſaid, it is not the *man*, that prays: this is only as it were the noiſe of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any conſciouſneſs of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving *lips*, but alienated *thoughts*, is not to pray in the *beſt* manner we can: becauſe it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to *truth*. For this is to do it only as *ſpeaking*, and not as *thinking* beings.

Upon this account it will be certain, that *all* times and places cannot be equally proper. Some times are ingroſſed by the buſineſs of life, and ſome places lie expoſed to interruptions. Thoſe of *retreat* and *ſilence* ought to be ſought, and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reaſon, becauſe the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we ſtand of all *oſtentation:* that is, the more we do it upon the ſcore of *truth* and *duty*; and this is again, the more *truly* and *dutifully* we do it.

Our next care is a proper *form* of words. All prayer muſt either be vocal, or mental. Now even that, which is called *mental*, can ſcarce be made without words, or ſomething equivalent (12). (I believe, that even the *deaf* and *dumb* form to themſelves ſome kind of language: I mean ſomething, which ſupplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked ſtate, deveſted of all words, and taken *merely by themſelves* are ſuch ſubtle and fleeting things, as are ſcarce capable of making any *appearance* in the mind; at leaſt of being detaind, compared together, and ranged into *ſentences*. If a ſentence may be ſo made up of ſenſible ideas as to ſubſiſt in the mind by the help of thoſe images, which remain in the phantaſy, after the manner of a ſentence expreſt in *pictures*, or by *hieroglyphics*: yet ſuch a ſentence muſt be very imperfect, through the *want* of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions neceſſary to modify and connect the ideas, of which particles &c. there can be no images (13); and indeed little more than a ſet of *disjointed* conceptions, ſcarce exhibiting *any ſenſe* without the aſſiſtance of language to fill up the blanks: and beſide that a *prayer* cannot be made out of ſuch ſentences as thoſe. It is by the help of *words*, at leaſt in great meaſure, that we reaſon and diſcourſe within our ſelves, as well as communicate our thoughts and diſcourſe with others: and if any one obſerves himſelf well, he will find, that he *thinks*, as well as *ſpeaks* in ſome language, and that in thinking he ſuppoſes and runs over ſilently and habitually thoſe ſounds, which in ſpeak-

(11) כל תפלה שאינה בכוונה אינה תפלה. *Maim.* התפלה תלויה בלב. *S. Hhaſ.* and the like every where. (12) Cogitation itſelf, according to *Plato*, is a kind of ſpeech: ſpeech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διανοεῖσθαι (cogitation) λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται, καὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. And ſo *Plotinus*, Ὁ' ὂν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τῆς ὂν ψυχῇ. (13) *Multa ſunt verba, quæ, quaſi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari ſimilitudine nulla poſſunt*, Cic.

ing he actually makes. This is the cauſe, why men can ſcarce write *well* in any language but *their own*: for whilſt they think in their own, their ſtyle and ſpeech, which is but the portraiture of their thoughts, muſt have the *turn* and *genius* of their own language, to what language ſoever the particular words belong. In ſhort, *words* ſeem to be as it were *bodies* or *vehicles* to the ſenſe or meaning, which is the *ſpiritual part* (14), and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingeniouſly, whether he can think over but that ſhort prayer in *Plato*, Τὰ μὲν ἐνθάδε, κτλ (15), abſtracted quite from thoſe and all other *words*. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by *another*, and by taking them in make them *his own*: or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them *himſelf*; or he may lay before him a prayer in *writing*, and ſo carry his eyes and his mind together through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his *memory*; or he may put words together in his mind *ex tempore*: but ſtill in all theſe ways *words* and language are uſed. And ſince to *think* over a ſet of words cannot be a more adequate manner of addreſſing to God (who neither ſpeaks, nor thinks like us) than to *ſpeak* it over and *think* too; and moreover, ſince the very *ſound* of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of compoſing, doth really help *attention* (16): I ſay, ſince this is the caſe, it muſt be better, when we have opportunity, to *pronounce* a prayer (*), than only to *think* it over. But then it ſhould be ſpoken no louder (I mean when we pray privately), than juſt to make it audible to *our ſelves* (17). It is not upon God's account that we ſpeak, ſince He would know even our thoughts: but it is upon *our own* account, and to make our *adorations*, tho imperfect at the beſt, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an anſwer to them, who object againſt prayer the *impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premiſed, and it being found, that we muſt make uſe of *words*, it cannot be denied, that we ought to uſe the *beſt* and *propereſt* we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* effuſions: and therefore there muſt be forms *premeditated*; the *beſt*, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worſhip God to the *beſt* of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of ſerioufneſs and being in earneſt, it ought to be the *plaineſt*, and at the ſame time is perhaps the *hardeſt* of all compoſitions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have *injoyd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, *&c.* and every thing ought to be expreſt with *method*, in phraſes that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with ſuch a *true* eloquence, as ingages all our attention, and repreſents our *deepeſt* ſenſe, without *affectation* or *needleſs repetitions*. Theſe conſiderations have cauſed me many times to wonder at thoſe men, who diſpute againſt pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk ſo much of the *ſpirit* of prayer, ſeem to know but little of it.

As

(14) תפלה בלא כוונה כגוף בלא נשמה. *Nahh. ab.* (15) *Alcib.* 2. (16) רבור אדם הוא ירקדק בכל מלה בכוונה וכו׳. *Abarb.* That in *S. Hhnred.* quoted out of סמ״ק explains this thus: ומלה כאלו מונה והובים הברכות. (17) This we find often among the *Dinim* of the *Jews*. כולן צ ריך שישמיע לאזניו מה שהוא אומר. *Maim.* And *R. Elaz. Azqari*, having cited this paſſage, adds המכוונו רוב הפוסקים שאם לא השמיע לאזניו לא יצא וכו׳. *Maimonides* in another place expreſſes himſelf thus: לא יתפלל בלבו [לבד] אלא מחתך הדברים בשפתיו ומשמיע לאזניו בלחש. (That לבד I inſerted from *Shulhh. aruk.*) The ſame occurrs in *Or hhadaſh*, *paſs.* (*) — *Ut eos* [*deos*, in the ſtyle of the Heathens] *ſemper pura — mente et voce veneremur.* Cic.

As to the *posture*, that is best, which best *expresses* our humility, reverence (18), and earnestness, and affects us most. Tho perhaps some regard is to be paid to the customs of the *place*, where we are: or of our own *country*, to which we have been most used. Several nations may denote the same thing by different gestures: and we may take these, as we do their words; *i. e.* as having that signification, which they put upon them.

Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be also a *public worship* of the Deity. For a man may be considerd as a member of a *society*, and *as such* he ought to worship God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are proper prayers used publicly, which he may resort to; and his health, *&c.* permit). Or the *society* may be considerd as *one body*, that has common interests and concerns, and *as such* is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, *how* to pray; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken *as they are*, and consequently some time and place *appointed*, where they may have suitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *necessary* there should be some religion profest, and even established; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is *principally* preserved (so far as it is preserved, by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would soon lose it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do.

But how does this *public* worship, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and *privacy* recommended above? *Ans.* I spoke there of prayer *in general*, to which those circumstances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. And moreover, tho he, who reads the form of prayer, reads it to *all* at the same time, that *all* may unite in one common act, which otherwise they could not do: yet still every *particular* person, who minds the prayers at all, has a separate perception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he offers them, or the sense containd under them, with more or less application and ardor. And since no man can be said *to pray* any further, than he *does this*; and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beside himself, how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality as *private*, as if he was inclosed within a thousand walls. So that, though there are reasons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all *true* prayer is *private*: and the true seat of it being in the *mind*, toward the interesting of whose powers all the circumstances of worship are mainly designed to contribute, it may be said upon that account to be always made in the most retired and *undiscerned* of all retreats (19): nor can more be said in respect of a worship, which by the terms is in other respects *public*. A man may be present in a congregation, and either pray the same prayer, in which others seem to join, or some other, or none at all, for ought any body there can tell besides himself.

I am not insensible how much I may expose my self by these things to the laughter of some Gentlemen, to whom this is all strange language. What a stir is here, *say they* about *praying*? Who ever observed, that they, who pray, are more *successful* or happy than they, who do not? *Ans.* All observations of this kind must be very

 lubricous

(18) המתפלל — יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגדו וכו׳. *Or hhaiy.* (19) Ἐν τῷ εἴσω οἷον νεῷ. *Plotin.*

lubricous and uncertain. We neither *know* what other men are inwardly and really, nor how they pray, nor what to call ſucceſs. That, which is *good* for one, may be *bad* for another: and that, which ſeems good at preſent, may at length be evil, or introduce ſomething, which is ſo. And as to the *proſperity* of them, who endeavour to worſhip God in a proper and reaſonable manner, *what ever it is*, perhaps it might be *leſs*, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be *greater*: who can be certain of the contrary? If theſe Gentlemen have any way of diſcovering it, I wiſh they would impart their *ſecret*. In the mean time ſure they cannot expect that even in the moſt imperfect sketch of *Natural religion* the *worſhip of the Deity* ſhould be omitted: that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word *religion* (20).

4. And laſtly, To deliver what remains, ſummarily; *Rational beings, or they, to whom reaſon is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themſelves as above, ſhould conſider in earneſt, what a mighty Being He is, who by the conſtitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and whoſe laws the dictates of right reaſon may be ſaid to be.* They ought to keep it well impreſt upon their minds, that He is the Being, upon whom their very *exiſtence* depends: that it is He, who ſuperintends and adminiſters the affairs of the world by His *providence*: that the effects of His *power* and *influence* are viſible before their faces, and round about them, in all the *phænomena* of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His *preſence*: that He is a Being of *perfect reaſon*: that, if it be *reaſonable*, that the tranſgreſſors of *reaſon* ſhould be puniſhed, they will moſt certainly, *one time or other*, be puniſhed, *&c.* And then, if they do this, it is eaſy to ſee what effect it muſt have, upon all their *thoughts*, *words*, and *actions*.

By what is ſaid here, no *ſuperſtition* is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of *reaſon* and *truth*, which is required: and any thing, that is *not inconſiſtent with them*, may be freely done, tho under the inſpection of our great Lawgiver himſelf.

Sect. VI. *Truths reſpecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human Laws.*

IN this and the following ſections I ſhall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. *Every man hath in himſelf a principle of Individuation, which diſtinguiſhes and ſeparates him from all other men in ſuch a manner, as may render him and them capable of Diſtinct properties, in things* (or, *diſtinct ſubjects of property*). That is, B and C are ſo diſtinguiſhed, or exiſt ſo *diſtinctly*, that if there be any thing, which B can call *his*, it will be for that reaſon *not* C's: and *v. v.* what is C's, will for that reaſon not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conſcience. Let us ſee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. *There*

(20) *Religio deorum cultu pio continetur.* Cic. *Qui omnia, quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent; diligenter retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, ſunt dicti religioſi,* &c. Id.

II. *There are ſomethings, to which (at leaſt before the caſe is alterd by voluntary ſubjection, compact, or the like) every Individual man has, or may have ſuch a natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.*

The *life*, *limbs*, *&c.* of B are as much *his*, as B is *himſelf* (21). It is impoſſible for C, or any other to ſee with the *eyes* of B: therefore they are *eyes* only to B: and when they ceaſe to be *his eyes*, they ceaſe to be *eyes at all*. He then has the ſole *property* in them, it being impoſſible in nature, that the eyes of B ſhould ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the *labor* of B cannot be the labor of C: becauſe it is the application of the organs and powers of B not of C, to the effecting of ſomething; and therefore the *labor* is as much B's, as the *limbs* and *faculties* made uſe of are his.

Again, the *effect* or *produce* of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C: and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the *labor* was B's, and not C's. Becauſe, what the labor of B cauſes or produces, B produces by his labor; or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product not C's, or any other's. And if C ſhould pretend to any *property* in that, which B only can truly call *his*, he would act contrary to truth (22).

Laſtly, there may be *many* things, which B may truly call *his* in ſome ſuch *ſenſe*, or upon ſome ſuch account, as *no other* can; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the *property* of which will therefore be in B. Becauſe C has no more than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one *beſides B* has an *equal* title, no one beſides B can have *any title* to at all, their pretences mutually balancing and *deſtroying* each other, whilſt his only *remains*. And in this caſe a ſmall matter, being oppoſed to nothing, will be ſtrong enough to maintain the claim of B.

III. *Whatever is inconſiſtent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconſiſtent with the laws of humane nature, wrong, intolerable.* Thoſe maxims may be eſteemed the natural and true laws of any particular ſociety, which are moſt proper to produce the *happineſs* of it. Becauſe *happineſs* is the end of ſociety and laws: otherwiſe we might ſuppoſe *unhappineſs* to be propoſed as the right end of them; that is, unhappineſs to be deſirable contrary to nature and truth. And what is ſaid of a *particular* ſociety is not leſs true, when applied to the *univerſal* ſociety of mankind. Now thoſe things are *moſt apt* to produce happineſs, which make the *moſt men* happy. And therefore thoſe maxims, which promote the general *tranquillity* and *well-being* of mankind, if thoſe words expreſs the *happineſs* of mankind, muſt be the *true* laws of humanity: and all ſuch practices, as interfere with theſe, muſt alſo interfere with thoſe. It is contradictory to ſay, that any thing can be a *general* law of *human* nature, which tends only to favor the pleaſures of *ſome particulars* to the prejudice of the reſt, who partake of the ſame common nature: and eſpecially if theſe pleaſures are of the lower and *brutal* kind. As a *million* of men are more than *one*; ſo in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they muſt in reaſon be more regarded by a *million of times*: for here we conſider men only as men.

It

(21) Οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμῖς ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς. *Xen.* (22) If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the caſe. He may commute them for money, becauſe they are *his*.

It will be easy now to shew, that the *transgression* of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is *wrong* and *morally evil*. For if mankind may be said in general to be a *rational animal*, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a *rational nature*: and therefore it, and the laws, which advance it, must be founded in *reason*; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is opposite to *reason*, and consequently to *truth*.

Let us suppose *some rule*, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would be agreeable to the *nature* and *circumstances* of mankind. If *all* men should transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an *universal* revolt? A general *evil*, or something disagreeable to our *nature* and the *truth* of our circumstances: for of contrary practices there must be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the same thing. This then would be *wrong* by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any *one* man: because all the individuals have *equal* right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore *all* as much as any *one*. At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that *rule*, would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal *disorder* aud *misery*; and would for his part *deny* human circumstances to be what they are, public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness.

With what face can any *particular* man put his own humor or unreasonable pleasure into the balance against such a weight of happiness as that of *all the world*? Does not he, who thus centers in *himself*, disregards the good of *every body else*, and intirely separates his injoyments and interests from those of the *public*; does not he, I say, strike himself out of the roll of *mankind*? Ought he to be owned as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an *alien* and *enemy* to the common happiness and tranquillity of our *species*?

IV. *Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be just the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted* (23). Because reason is universal, and respects cases (24), not persons.

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to *other men*, is to consider what we should take things to be, were *we* in their circumstances (25).

V. *In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion* (26). I except for the present the case of *parents* and their *children*, and perhaps of some few other near relations. Here let me be understood to mean only those, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vanished).

In a state, where no *laws* of society make any subordination or distinction, *men* can only be considerd *as men*, or only as individuals of the same *species*, and equally sharing in one common definition (*). And since by virtue of this *same* definition B is

(23) *Nec enim æquus judex aliam de suâ, aliam de alienâ causâ, sententiam fert.* Sen. (24) Α'εὶ ταυτὰ πεῖ γε τῶν αὐτῶν γίνωσκε. *Isocr.* (25) אל תרין חברך עד שתגיע למקומו. P. Aboth. *Eo loco nos constituamus, quo ille est, cui irascimur.* Sen. (26) He was a mere flatterer, who told *Cyrus*, Βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοι γε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φυόμενος τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμών. *Xen.* (*) *Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus.* — *Quacunq; est hominis* definitio, *una in omnes valet.* Cic.

is the *ſame* to C, that C is to B; B has no more *dominion* over C, than C *reciprocally* has over B: that is, they are in this regard *equal*.

Perſonal excellencies or defects can make no difference in this caſe: becauſe, 1. Who muſt *judge*, on which ſide the advantage lies? To ſay B (or D, or any body elſe) has a right to judge to the diſadvantage of C, is to *ſuppoſe* what is in queſtion, a dominion over him; not to *prove* it. 2. Great natural or acquired *indowments* may be privileges to them, who have them: but this does not deprive thoſe, who have leſs, of *their title* to what they have; or, which is the ſame, give any one, who has greater abilities, a *right* to take it, or the uſe of it from them. If B has better *eyes* than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C ſhould not therefore ſee for himſelf, and uſe *his eyes*, as freely as B may *his*. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his uſe, and ſo are B's to his; and each has the ſole property in his own: ſo their reſpective properties are *equal*. The caſe would be parallel to this, if B ſhould happen to have better *intellectual faculties* than C. And further, if B ſhould be *ſtronger* than C, he would not yet for that reaſon have any right to be his *lord*. For C's leſs degree of ſtrength is *as much his*, as B's greater is *his*: therefore C has as much *right* to his, and (which is the natural conſequence) to uſe his, as B has to uſe his: that is, C has as much right to *reſiſt*, as B has to impoſe or *command*, by virtue of his ſtrength: and where the *right* (tho not the power) of reſiſting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or *dominion* is nothing. 3. Since ſtrength and power are moſt apt to pretend a title to dominion, it may be added further, that *power* and *right*, or a power of doing any thing and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be ſeparated, nor does one inferr the other. Laſtly, if *power*, quà power gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to *every thing*, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done, that is wrong. For no body can do any thing, which he has not the *power* to do. But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in Sect. I. but to aſſert it would be to advance a plain *abſurdity* or *contradiction* rather. For then to oppoſe the man, who has this *power*, as far as one can, or (which is the ſame) as far as one has the *power* to do it, would not be wrong: and yet ſo it muſt be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not oppoſed. Moreover, that a man ſhould have a *right* to any thing, merely becauſe he has the *power* to take it, is a doctrine indeed, which may ſerve a few tyrants, or ſome banditi and rogues, but is directly oppoſite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is alſo what the powerful themſelves could not allow, if they would but imagine themſelves in the ſituation of the *weak* and more *defenceleſs*; and therefore unreaſonable, by prop. IV.

VI. *No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happineſs of another.* Becauſe, in the firſt place, this ſuppoſes a dominion over him, and the moſt *abſolute* too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to diſturb the peace and happineſs of C is what B would think *unreaſonable*, if he was in C's caſe. In the laſt, ſince it is ſuppoſed, that C has never invaded the happineſs of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the *whole tranſaction* begins originally from B (for all this is couched in the word *begin*), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at leaſt *as good a title* as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to *keep* as B to *claim*. Theſe two rights being then *at leaſt* equal, and balancing each other, no alteration in the preſent ſtate of things can follow from any ſuperiority of right in B: and therefore it muſt of right remain as

it

it is; and what C has, muſt for any right, that B has to oppoſe this ſettlement, remain with C in his *undiſturbed* poſſeſſion. But the caſe is ſtill ſtronger on the ſide of C: becauſe he ſeems to have ſuch a *property* in his own happineſs, as is mentiond in prop II. ſuch a one as no other can have.

VII. *Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happineſs, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himſelf and his againſt violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make repriſals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit* (27). We have ſeen already, that there are ſome things, which a man may truly call *his*; and let us for the preſent only ſuppoſe, that there may be *more*. This premiſed, I proceed to prove the propoſition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to aſſert, contrary to truth, either that he *has not* the faculties and powers, which he *has*; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not *uſe* them? And how may he uſe them, if not for his own *preſervation*, when he is attacked, and like to be abuſed, or perhaps deſtroyd.

All *animals* have a principle of *ſelf-preſervation*, which exerts itſelf many times with an uncontroulable elaſticity. Nature is *uniform* in this, and every where conſtant to itſelf. Even *inanimate* bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be ſure, that no poſition can have any foundation *in nature*, or be conſiſtent with *it* and *truth* (thoſe inſeparable companions), which turns upon nature itſelf, and tends to *its deſtruction*.

Great part of the general happineſs of mankind depends upon thoſe *means*, by which the innocent may be ſaved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have, of *defending* themſelves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the uſe of theſe opportunities, and the right of defending themſelves againſt injurious treatment and violence muſt be inconſiſtent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to *defend* himſelf and what is his, he can have no right to *any thing* (contrary to what has been in part proved already); ſince that cannot be his right, which he may not *maintain* to be his right.

If a man has no right to *defend* himſelf againſt inſults, &c. it muſt be becauſe the aggreſſor has a right to *aſſail* the other, and *uſurp* what is his: but this has been diſproved already in the foregoing propoſition. And beſide, ſuch a pretenſion includes a great abſurdity, to *commence* an injury, or to *begin* the violence being in nature more than only to *repell* it. He, who begins, is the true cauſe of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the oppoſition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act; or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, *reflected* back upon himſelf. It is as when a man ſpits at heaven, and the ſpittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happineſs of another, does what is *wrong*, he, who endeavours to prevent or put a ſtop to that violence, does in that reſpect what is *right*, by the terms.

Laſtly, ſince every man is obliged to conſult his own happineſs, there can be no doubt but that he not only *may*, but even ought to defend it; in ſuch a manner I mean,

(27) All this is ſuppoſed to be in a ſtate of nature and the abſence of human laws.

mean, as does not interfere with truth (28), or his own design of being happy. He ought indeed not to act *rashly*, or do *more* than the end proposed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up, *if he can*, the avenues, by which he may be invaded; and when that *cannot be done*, to use arguments and persuasives, or perhaps retreat out of the way of harm: bnt when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take such other as he can, and confront *force* with *force*. Otherwise he will fail in his duty to himself, and deny happiness to be happiness.

By the same means, that a man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been shewn already, that the *power* to take any thing from another gives no *right* to it. The *right* then to that, which has been taken from its owner against his will, remains still where it was: he may still truly call it his. And if it be *his*, he may use it as *his*: which if he, who took it away or any other shall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggressor, and the other does but *defend* himself and what is his. Besides, he, who uses any thing as *his*, when it is *his*, acts *on the side* of truth: but that man, who opposes him in this, and consequently asserts a right to that, which is not his, acts *contrary* to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiss: but what the latter does, is wrong by the fundamental proposition.

Then further, if a man hath still a *right* to what is forceably or without his consent taken from him, he must have a right to the *value* of it. For the thing is to him what it is *in value* to him: and the right he has to it, may be considered as a right to a thing of *such a value*. So that if the very thing, which was taken, be destroyd, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of *such a value to him*; and something must be had *in lieu* of it: that is, he has a right to make *reprisals*. Since every thing is to every man what it is *in value* to him, things of the same *value* to any one may be reckond as to him *the same*, and to recover the *equivalent* the same as to recover the *thing itself*: for otherwise it is not an equivalent. If the thing taken by way of reprisal should be *to the man* from whom it is taken of *greater* value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he must charge himself with that loss. If injustice be done him, it is done by himself: the other has no more than what he hath a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover *what is his*, or *the equivalent* from an invader; so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the *expense* he is at in recovering his own, for the loss of *time* and *quiet*, and for the *trouble*, *hazards*, and *dangers* undergone: because all these are the effects of the invasion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. *The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct.* For, 1. till then no other man can be the *first possessor* again: which is more than *nothing*: since he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were *donation*. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to (29), the finder comes into without the violation of *any truth*.

(28) For εἰ ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς οὐδὲν ἧττον ποιεῖ κακῶς, κἂν ἀμύνηται. *Max. T.* (29) *Nam propria telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenquam statuit.* Hor.

He doth not *deny* that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth not *begin* to interrupt the happineſs of any body, &c. Therefore to take poſſeſſion of it is *not wrong*. But ſince every man is *obliged* to conſult his own happineſs (that is, his own intereſt and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to act conſonantly to this *obligation* is an omiſſion, that would be *wrong*. What he does, therefore is *right*. And then if he does right in taking poſſeſſion of it, he muſt from thence be the *rightful poſſeſſor*; or, it becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be poſſeſt without *cultivation* and the contrivance and labor of the firſt poſſeſſor. This has generally been the caſe of *lands*: and theſe are indeed more eminently meant by the word *poſſeſſions*. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of *his own* cares and ſweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the *intruder's* pains and travel, is a moſt manifeſt violation of *truth*. It is aſſerting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doctrine, *viz.* that *prime occupancy* gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muſt certainly be inconſiſtent with the *peace* and *happineſs* of mankind in general to be left in endleſs wars and ſtruggles for that, which *no man* can ever have any right to. And yet this would be the caſe, if that doctrine was true: becauſe we have ſhewn already, that *power* confers no right; and therefore the *firſt right* to many things can only accrue from the firſt poſſeſſion of them. 5. If B ſhould endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the poſſeſſion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind without *expelling* or *diſturbing* any body, he would certainly do that, which he himſelf would judge *unreaſonable*, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reaſon with reſpect to C, which would be reaſon in reſpect of B; contrary to the nature of *reaſon*, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his poſſeſſions is the ſame as to *command* him to leave them, upon pain of ſuffering for non-obedience. But this is uſurping a *dominion*, which he has no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his poſſeſſion without *begining* to interrupt his happineſs: nor can any one do this without controvening the *truth* containd in prop. VI. This therefore ſecures the poſſeſſor in his poſſeſſion for ever: that is, it confirms his *right* to the thing poſſeſt. Laſtly, the *firſt poſſeſſor*, of whom I have been ſpeaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend *his perſon*, and ſuch other things as can *only be his*, againſt the attempts of any aggreſſor (ſee prop. II): therefore theſe no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably diſpoſſeſt without violence offered to *theſe*, no one has any right to diſpoſſeſs him. But this muſt be the caſe, where the poſſeſſor does not quit his poſſeſſion *willingly*. The *right* conſequently muſt remain ſolely in him, till he *agrees* to quit it.

N. The *ſucceſſors* of an invader, got into poſſeſſion wrongfully, may acquire a right *in time* (30), by the failure of ſuch, as might claim under him, who had the right. For he, who happens to be in poſſeſſion, when all theſe are extinct, is in the place of a *prime occupant*.

IX. *A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation.* If B has the ſole right in lands, goods or chattels, (as they are called), no body has any right to the the diſpoſal of them beſides B: and he has a right. For diſpoſing of them is but uſing them as *his*. Therefore the act of B in *exchanging* them for ſomething elſe, or *beſtowing*

(30) Τὰς κλήσεις, καὶ τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τὰς κοινὰς, ἂν ἐπιγένηται πολὺς χρόνος, κωλύειν καὶ παγκάλας ἀπαιτήσεις δίκη νομίζουσιν. *Iſocr.*

ing them upon C, interferes not with *truth*: and so B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against *truth*, or that is wrong, in taking them: because he treats them as being *what they are*; as things, which come to him by the consent of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of *disposing* of them. Thus C gets the title *innocently*.

But in the case of *compact* the reason, on which this transaction stands, is more evident still. For the contractors are supposed to receive each from other the *equivalent* of that, which they part with, or at least what is equivalent *to them respectively*, or perhaps by each party *preferable*. Thus neither of them is hurt; perhaps both advantaged. And so each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being *what it is*: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happiness. Indeed he, who receives the *value* of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it still. His *property* is not diminished: the situation and matter of it is only alterd.

Mankind could not well subsist without *bartering* one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the privilege of this intercourse, is inconsistent with the *general good* of mankind, &c. If a man could find the *necessaries* of life without it, and by himself, he must at least want many of the *comforts* of it.

X. *There is then such a thing as Property, founded in nature and truth* (31): or, *there are things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his*: by prop. II, VIII, IX. (32).

XI. *Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are such, as he may part with) by compact or donation*; or (which must be understood) till they fail, or death extinguishes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Because no one can deprive him of them without his consent, but the *depriver* must use them as *his*, when they are *not his*, in contradiction to *truth*. For,

XII. *To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing of it are the same thing: they are equipollent expressions.* For when it is said, that P has the property, or that such a thing is proper to P, it is not said, that P and Q or P and others have the property (*proprium* limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is said to be *his*, it is not said that *part of it only* is his. P has therefore the *all* or allhood (33) of it, and consequently *all the use* of it. And then, since the *all* of it to him, or *all* that P can have of it is but the *use* and *disposal* of it, he who has this, has the thing itself, and it is his (34).

(31) Which must not give way to opinions of *fitness*, &c. The master was in the right, who corrected *Cyrus* for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος κριτής, but of *property*. (32) There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. *Sunt privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt.* &c. *Cic.* So in *Xenophon* it is said to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may possess them as their own, not ἀλλότρια. Sure this wants limitations. (35) *Allodium.* (34) *Qui te pascit ager, tuus est*, &c. *Horace*, alluding to this truth. Περὶ παντὸς, says *Plato*, ἐν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε δέ τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν· and then proceeds, μηδ' ἂν χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέλας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κτλ. In *Plutarch* the thing is

Laws indeed have introduced a way of ſpeaking, by which the *property* and the *uſufruct* are diſtinguiſhed; but in truth the uſufructuary has a *temporary*, or *limited* property; and the proprietary has a *perpetual* uſufruct, either at preſent, or in reverſion. Propriety without the *uſe* (if the uſe is never to come to the proprietary) is an empty name.

I have before upon ſome occaſions taken it as granted, that he, who uſes any thing as *his*, when it is *not his*, acts againſt *truth*, &c. but now I ſay further, that

XIII. *He who uſes or diſpoſes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his.* Becauſe this is all, that he, whoſe it *really* is, can do. *Borrowing* and *hiring* afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uſes the thing borrowed or hired, he uſes what *is his own* for the time allowd: and his doing ſo is only one of *thoſe ways*, in which the true proprietary diſpoſes of it.

XIV. *To uſurp or invade the property of another man is injuſtice*: or, more fully, *to take, detain, uſe, deſtroy, hurt, or meddle* (*) *with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of theſe, or aſſiſt them, who do, are acts of injuſtice. The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is juſtice.* Def.

XV. *He that would not violate truth, muſt avoid all injuſtice*: or, *all injuſtice is wrong and evil.* It interferes with the truths (35) here before laid down and perhaps more. It denies men to be *ſubjects* capable of diſtinct properties: in ſome caſes it denies them to have a property even in their own *bodies*, *life*, *fame*, and the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the *peace* and *happineſs* of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreaſonable *in his own caſe*, when the injury is done to himſelf: to take any thing from another only becauſe I think I want it, or becauſe I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title to it, is the higheſt pretence to *dominion*, and denial of our *natural equality*: it is ſetting up a right to *begin* to diſturb the happineſs of others: and laſtly, it is to deny there is any ſuch thing as *property*, contrary to *truth*.

In a word, if there be any thing, which P can truly and properly call *his*, then, if T takes or uſes it without the conſent of P, he declares it to be *his*, (for if it was *his*, he could do no more), when it is *not his*, and ſo acts a lie (36): in which conſiſts the *idea* and *formal ratio* of moral evil.

The very *attempting* any inſtance of injuſtice, or *aſſiſting* others in ſuch an attempt, ſince it is attempting and promoting what is *wrong*, is being in the wrong as much as one is *able* to be; or doing what one *can* to atchieve that which is *evil*: and to do this, by the terms, muſt be *wrong* and *evil*.

Even the *deſire* of obtaining any thing unjuſtly is evil: becauſe to deſire to do *evil*, by the terms again, is an *evil* or criminal *deſire*. If the act follows ſuch a deſire, it is the child and product of it: and the deſire, if any thing renders the fulfilling

is carried farther: where it is ſaid, that a man paſſing by anothers man's door ought μὴ βλέπειν εἴσω, κλ. according to a ſaying of *Xenocrates*, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. (*) *Furtum fit, — cum quis alienam rem invito domino* contrectat. *Juſt. inſt.* (35) On the contrary נעשה אמת — נעשה דין. A ſaying of ריב"ל. And *Cicero* more than once uſes *verum* for *juſtum*, and *veritas* for *bonitas* or *probitas*. (36) Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν, ἀλλότριον. *Epict*'s words. *Juſtitiæ primum munus eſt, ut ne cui quis noceat, niſi laceſſitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut ſuis*, Cic.

ing of it impracticable, is the act obstructed in the begining, and stifled in the womb. They are plainly of the same nature, and nearly related.

Let it be observed here by way of *scholion* concerning the thing called *Covetousness*, that there seem to be three sorts of it. One is this here mentiond: a desire of getting from others, tho it be *unjustly*. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense desire of heaping up what one can by just methods, but without any *reasonable end* proposed, and only in order to *keep*, and as it were *bury* it: and the more he accumulates, the more he craves (37). This also intrenches upon truth, and seems to be a vice. But to *covet* to obtain what is another man's, by *just means*, and with his consent, when it may contribute to the happiness of our selves or families, and perhaps of the other person too, has nothing surely, that looks *unfriendly* upon truth, or is blameable in it. This, if it may be called covetousness, is a *virtuous covetousness*.

XVI. *When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other men's sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call cruelty.* And *not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes, in which we are not concerned is unmercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these.*

XVII. *He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel.* Not to be affected with the *afflictions* of others, so far as we know them, and in proportion to the several degrees and circumstances of them, tho we are not the causes of them, is the same as to consider them as persons not in affliction; that is, as not being what they are, or (which is the same) as being what they are not: and this contradicts *matter of fact*.

One can scarce know the *sufferings* of another without having at least some image of them in his mind: nor can one have these images without being conscious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, so far as they fall within his cognizance, may be said to know and not to know; or at least to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conscience.

There is something in *human* nature (38) resulting from our very make and constitution, while it retains its genuine form, and is not *alterd* by vitious habits, not *perverted* by transports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or false philosophy (*), nor *opprest* by stupidity and neglecting to observe what happens to others: I say, there is *something*, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case. It is shocking to see any man, or even any animal whatever *tormented*. This *compassion* appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are justly reckond amongst *the best of men* (39): in some

(37) Of such it is, that *Diogenes* used to say, Ὁμοίους τοὺς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὑδρωπικοῖς, κλ. *Stob.* The *Mamsbilim*, mentiond in *Nabb. Ab.* compare them לצמא שישתה מהמים המלוחים כי כל עור שישתה יוסיף צמא. (38) Properly called *humanity*; because nothing of it appears in brutes. בהמה אינה מקפדת וחוששת בצער חברתה. *S. Hhas.* (*) When *Seneca* says, *Clementiam — omnes boni præstabunt, miserecordiam autem vitabunt*, he seems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this subject. That, *succurret* [*sapiens*] *alienis lacrymis, non accedet*, owns one use of tears: they obtain succour even from a *Stoic*. (39) Ἀγαθοὶ ἀειδάκρυες ἄνδρες.

ſome degree it appears in *almoſt* all; nay, even ſometimes, when they more cooly attend to things, in thoſe very *monſters* of cruelty themſelves, who ſeem to be tranſmuted into ſavages, or not to retain the leaſt tincture of humanity that can be. The *Pheræan* tyrant, who had never wept over any of thoſe murders he had cauſed among his own citizens, *wept*, when he ſaw a tragedy but acted in the theatre (40): the reaſon was, his attention was caught here, and he more obſerved the ſufferings of *Hecuba* and *Andromache*, than ever he had thoſe of the *Pheræans*; and more impartially, being no otherwiſe concerned in them but as a common ſpectator. In this caſe the principle of *compaſſion*, implanted in human nature, appeared, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrifaction, and would ſhew, that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to *nature* to be affected with the ſufferings of other people: and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural*.

Such are the *circumſtances* of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering *dangers* and ſuffering many *evils*: and therefore ſince it is for the good of ſuch, as are ſo expoſed or actually afflicted, to receive comfort and aſſiſtance from others, without which they muſt commonly remain afflicted and miſerable, or periſh, it is for the common good and welfare of the *majority at leaſt* of mankind, that they ſhould *compaſſionate* and *help* each other in their diſtreſs (*). The contrary doctrine muſt therefore be unnatural and *wrong* by prop. III. And beſide, it is by one's behaviour and actions to aſſert, that the circumſtances of men in this world are *not* what they are; or that peace, and health, and happineſs, and the like, are not what *they* are.

Let a man *ſubſtitute himſelf* into the room of ſome poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, diſtracted with difficulties, or groaning under the pangs of ſome diſeaſe, or the anguiſh of ſome hurt, or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In ſuch a caſe what reflexions can he imagine *he ſhould have*, if he found that every body neglected him, no body ſo much as pitying him, or vouchſafing to take notice of his calamitous and ſad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reaſonable or unreaſonable for others to do in reſpect of *him*, he muſt allow to be reaſonable or unreaſonable for him to do in reſpect of *them*, or deny a manifeſt *truth* in prop. IV.

If unmercifulneſs, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be ſpent in proving, that *cruelty* is ſo. For all, that is culpable in unmercifulneſs, is containd in cruelty with *additions* and *aggravations*. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the ſufferings of others, but *cauſes* them; or perhaps *delights* in them, and (which is the moſt inſolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a *jeſt* and ſubject of raillery. If the one be a *defect* of humanity, the other is *contrary* to it (41). If the one does *no good*, the other does *much evil*. And no man, how cruel ſoever in reality he was, has ever liked to be *reckond* a cruel man: ſuch a confeſſion of guilt in this caſe does nature extort; ſo univerſally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. *The practice of juſtice and mercy is juſt as right, as injuſtice, unmercifulneſs, and cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the nature of contraries. Beſide, not to be juſt to a man is to be not juſt, or unjuſt to him: and ſo not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here

(40) *Plut.* (*) A generous nature pities even an enemy in diſtreſs. Ἐ'τοιχτίρω Ν' νν Δύσνον ἔμπας, κἀπιτερ ὄσσα δυσμενῆ. *Soph.* (41) *Eſt hominum naturæ, quam ſequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.* Cic.

Here I might end this section: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. *From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the heinousness of all such crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own necessary defence does not require it* (it being not possible, that any thing should be more *his*, than *his own* person, life and limbs); *robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, and the like; with all the approaches and tendencies to them.* For these are not only comprised within the definition of injustice, and are therefore violations of those truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and some of them always, come within the definition of *cruelty* too. All which is evident at first sight with respect to murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, &c. especially if a man brings *himself* into the case, and views himself in his own imagination as renderd scandalous by calumniators and liers; stript by thieves, ruind in his fortunes, and undone by knaves; struggling to no purpose, convulsed agonizing under the knife of some truculent ruffian; or the like.

The same is altogether as plain in the case *of adultery*, when any one (42) insnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithstanding the protection it gains from false notions, great examples, and the commoness of the crime (43). For (the nature of *matrimony* being for the present supposed to be such, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the *property* a husband has in his wife by compact, the most express and sacred, that can possibly be made: he does that, which tends to subvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconsistent with the *order* and *tranquillity* of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think *reasonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the person wronged (45): briefly, he impudently treats a woman as *his own woman* (or *wife*) (44), who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *justice*, *truth* aud *fact* (46). Nor is this simple injustice only, but injustice, for which *no reparation* can be made, if the injured man thinks so; as he generally does (see sect. II. prop. I. obs. 4.) Again, it is, or may be the greatest *cruelty*; so complicated, as scarce any other can be. The *husband* is for ever robbed of all that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from the wife's fidelity and affection to him; presuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and sharer in all his fortunes (47): and into the room of them succeed painful and destructive passions. The poor *woman* herself, tho she may be deluded (48), and not see at present her guilt, or the consequences of it, usually pays dear for her security and want of guard, the husband becoming cold (49) and averse to her, and she full of fears and dread of his resentment. And their *affairs*, in this disjointed and distracted condition, are neglected; *innocent children*

(42) One of the *Subsessores alienorum matrimoniorum*, as they are called in *Val. Max.* (43) For hence follows impunity, &c. משרבו מנאפים פסקו מים המרים. *Mishn.* (44) אשתו, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα. (45) *Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit, — idem uxorem suam aspici non vult: & fidei acerrimus exactor, est perfidus:* & mendacia *persequitur, ipse perjurus.* Sen. (46) What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act agtinst all these, (to use *Seneca*'s words again) *satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est* [*uxor*]? (47) Marriage is κοινωνία παντὸς τοῦ βίου, — οἰκειοτέρα καὶ μείζων τῶν ἄλλων [κοινωνιῶν]. *Isocr.* (48) Ἔπεισας, ἐξέθωψας, says the penitent woman in *Soph. ap. Plut.* (49) ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα — Γυνὴ κακὴ ξυνεύνος. *Soph.*

children ſlighted, and left unprovided for, without ſo much as the comfort of certain relations to pity them, &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by ſuch impertinent *ſimile's* and rakiſh talk, as are commonly uſed upon this occaſion. When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of *what it is to him*, the proprietor: and the value muſt be ſet according to what *he* eſteems it to be, not what the injurer (who perhaps has loſt all ſenſe of virtuous pleaſures) may think it to be. Nor may theſe thefts be excuſed from their ſecrecy. For 1. the injuſtice of the fact is the *ſame in itſelf*, whether known, or not. In either caſe *truth* is denied: and a *lie* is as much a lie, when it is *whiſperd*, as when it is *proclaimed* at the market croſs. 2. It has been ſhewd, that the rectitude of our actions and way to happineſs are coincident; and that ſuch acts, as are diſagreeable to *truth*, and wrong in themſelves, tend to make men ultimately *unhappy* (50). Things are ſo orderd and diſpoſed by the Author of nature, or ſuch a conſtitution of things flows from Him, that it *muſt* be ſo. And ſince no *retreat* can be impervious to his eye, no *corner* ſo much out of the way, as not to be within His plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and *vitious* act a ſuitable degree of unhappineſs and *puniſhment* annext, which the criminal will be ſure to meet with *ſometime or other* (51). For his own ſake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkneſs of the deed. But *laſtly*, it can hardly be, but that it muſt be *diſcovered* (52). People generally *riſe* in vice, grow impudent and vain and careleſs, and diſcover themſelves: the opportunities contrived for it muſt be liable to *obſervation*: ſome *confidents* muſt be truſted, who may betray the ſecret, and upon any little diſtaſte probably *will* do it: and beſide, *love* is quick of apprehenſion (53).

It will be eaſily perceived from what has been ſaid, that if to *murder*, *rob*, &c. are unjuſt and crimes of a heinous nature, all thoſe things, which have any *tendency* toward them, or *affinity* with them, or any way *countenance* them, are in their degree criminal: becauſe they are of the ſame nature with that, which they tend to, tho not of the ſame growth, nor matured into the groſs act, or perhaps do not operate ſo preſently, apparently, or certainly. *Envy*, *malice*, and the like, are *conatus*'s toward the deſtruction or ruin of the perſon, who is the object of theſe unhappy paſſions. To *throw duſt* (54) upon a man's reputation by *innuendo's*, ironies, &c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when *dirt* is thrown, or *groſs* calumnies; yet it infects the air, and may deſtroy it by a lingring poiſon. To *expoſe* another by the ſtrength of a jeſting talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, tho it be in an *inviſible* place (55). Many freedoms and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and eſpecially gallantries (56), that proceed not to conſummate wickedneſs, nor perhaps are intended to be carried ſo far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper object, and debauch their *ſouls*. By *ſtories* or *inſinuations* to ſow the *ſeeds* of diſcord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them by another hand: and ſo on.

If

(50) *Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor*, &c. Juv. (51) Ἀναπόδραστος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος. *Plot.* (52) Καὶ γὰρ ἂν παρῇλθε κρύψας, ὕστερον ὀφθήσεται. *Iſocr.* (53) *Quid non ſentit amor?* Ov. (54) אבק לשון הרע. (55) המלבין פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעה"ב. *Maim. & ſim. paſſ.* (56) See how chaſt the Romans were once. *Quo matronale decus verecundiæ munimento tutius eſſet, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiſerunt, ut inviolata manûs alienæ tactu ſtola relinqueretur.* Val. M. And it is told of *P. Mænius*, that *triſti exemplo præcepit* [*filiæ ſuæ*], *ut non ſolum virginitatem illibatam, ſed etiam oſcula ad virum ſincera perferret.* Id.

If theſe things are ſo, how guilty muſt they be, who are deſignedly the *promoters* or *inſtruments* of injuſtice and wickedneſs; ſuch as mercenary ſwearers, and falſe witneſſes; traders in ſcandal; ſolicitors in vice; they who intend by their *converſation* to relax men's principles too much, and (as it ſeems) prepare them for knavery, lewdneſs, or any flagitious enterprize.

There are other crimes, ſuch as *infidelity* to friends, or them, who intruſt us with any thing, *ingratitude*, and the like, which might have been *mentiond* in the propoſition, being great inſtances of injuſtice: but becauſe they are *viſibly* ſuch, and their nature cannot be miſtaken, I compriſe them in the *et cæt.* there. Any one may ſee, that he, who acts *unfaithfully*, acts againſt his promiſes and ingagements, and therefore denies and ſins againſt *truth*; does what it can never be for the *good of the world* ſhould become an univerſal practice; does what he would not have *done to himſelf*; and *robs* the man, who depends upon him, of what he juſtly might expect. So the *ungrateful* man treats his benefactor as not being *what he is*, &c. All this is obvious (56).

Sect. VII. *Truths reſpecting particular* Societies *of Men, or* Governments.

I. *MAN is a ſocial creature: that is, a ſingle man, or family cannot ſubſiſt, or not well, alone out of all ſociety.* More things are neceſſary to *ſuſtain* life, or at leaſt to make it in any degree *comfortable*, than it is poſſible for any *one* man to make and provide for himſelf merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and houſe, and that frugal furniture which is abſolutely requiſite, with a little neceſſary phyſic, ſuppoſe *many* arts and trades, *many* heads, and *many* hands. If he could make a ſhift in time of *health* to live as a *ſavage* under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon ſuch fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as nature can afford, and may happen to preſent to him; yet what could he do in *ſickneſs*, or *old age*, when he would not be able to ſtir out, or receive her beneficence.

If he ſhould take from the *other ſex* ſuch a help, as nature prompts him to deſire, and he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet ſtill if the *hands* are doubled, the *wants* are doubled too: nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the *bearing* and *education* of children.

If we could ſuppoſe all theſe difficulties ſurmounted, and a family grown up, and doing what a *ſingle* family is capable of doing by itſelf; ſupporting themſelves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have ſome how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things; no ſhops to repair to for tools; no ſervant, or laborer to aſſiſt; nor any pub-

(56) *Omnes enim immemorem beneficij oderunt.* Cic.

lic invention, of which they might ſerve themſelves in the preparation of their grain, dreſſing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like); yet ſtill it is only the *cortex* of the man, which is provided for: what muſt become of the interior part, the *mind* of theſe people? How would they be fed, and improved? *Arts* and *ſciences*, ſo much of them as is neceſſary to teach men the uſe of their faculties, and unfold their reaſon, are not the growth of ſingle families ſo imployed. And yet for men to lay out all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, without any further views, or any regard to the *nobler* part of themſelves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for *rational* exerciſes.

If all the *exceptions* againſt this ſeparate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increaſes, the *little plots*, which the ſeveral families poſſeſs, and cultivate, muſt be inlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themſelves ſtraitend: and there would ſoon be a *colliſion* of intereſts, from whence diſputes and quarrels would enſue. Other things too might miniſter matter for theſe. And beſide all this, ſome men are *naturally* troubleſome, vitious, thieviſh, pugnacious, rabid; and theſe would always be diſturbing and flying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or ſuperiority in power, would not fail to make themſelves yet greater or ſtronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be *formidable* (57).

Under ſo many *wants*, and ſuch *apprehenſions*, or *preſent dangers*, neceſſity would bring ſome families into terms of friendſhip with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reaſon of it increaſed, would become ſtronger, introduce ſtricter ingagements, and *at laſt* bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to ſhelter themſelves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and ſo naturally giving way for theſe to aſcend, the ſeveral parts would at length *ſettle* into their places, according to their ſeveral weights and capacities with reſpect to the common concern. And thus ſome form of a *ſociety* muſt ariſe: men cannot ſubſiſt upon any other foot.

But if it was poſſible for a man to preſerve life by *himſelf*, or with his *petite family*: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely *better* for him to live in a ſociety, where men are ſerviceable to themſelves and their neighbours at the ſame time, by *exchanging* their money, or goods, for ſuch other things, as they want more; where they are capable of doing *good offices* each for other in time of need; where they may have the *protection* of laws, and a public ſecurity againſt cheats, robbers, aſſaſſines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or *army* is interpoſed between them and foreign invaders; and where they have the benefit of *diſcoveries* in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by *converſation* and innocent conflicts of reaſon, and (to ſpeak out) may be made *men*.

If, when we have the *privilege* of ſociety and laws, we can ſcarce preſerve our own, or be ſafe, what a woful condition ſhould we be in *without them*; expoſed to the inſults, rapines, and violence of unjuſt and mercileſs men, not having any *ſanctuary*, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithſtanding the help of *friends* and thoſe about us, and ſuch conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how *irkſome* would life be, if in ſickneſs or other trouble there was no body to adminiſter either *remedy* or *conſolation*?

Laſtly,

(57) *Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur.* Sen.

Laſtly, ſociety is what men generally *deſire*. And tho *much* company may be attended with much vanity, and occaſion many evils; yet it is certain, that abſolute and perpetual *ſolitude* has ſomething in it very diſagreeable and hideous. Thus the ſocial life is *natural* to man; or, what his nature and circumſtances require.

II. *The end of ſociety is the common welfare and good of the people aſſociated.* This appears from what has been ſaid already. For becauſe men cannot ſubſiſt *well*, or not ſo *well* ſeparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the *end* of their uniting is their better ſubſiſtence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by ſo much the more effectually is this *end* anſwerd.

III. *A ſociety, into which men enter for this end, ſuppoſes ſome Rules or Laws, according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to them as occaſion ſhall require.* A number of men met together without any *rules*, by which they ſubmit to be governed, can be nothing but an *irregular* multitude. Every one being ſtill *ſui juris*, and left intirely to his own private choice, by whatever kind of judgment or paſſion or caprice that happens to be determind, they muſt needs *interfere* one with another: nor can ſuch a concourſe of people be any thing different from an indigeſted *chaos* of diſſenting parts, which by their *confuſed* motions would damnify, and deſtroy each other. This muſt be true, if men *differ* in the ſize of their underſtandings, in their manner of thinking, and the ſeveral turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumſtances; if the greateſt part of them are under the direction of *bodily affections*: and if theſe *differ* as much as their ſhapes, their complexions, their conſtitutions do. Here then we find nothing but *confuſion* and *unhappineſs*.

Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their *common good* and *happineſs*, muſt be ſuch a one as, in the firſt place, may render them *compatible* one with another: which cannot be without *rules*, that may direct and adjuſt their ſeveral motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to ſome degree of *uniformity*, or at leaſt reſtrain ſuch *exurſions* and *enormities*, as would render their manner of living inconſiſtent. Then, there muſt be ſome expreſs declarations and *ſcita* to *aſcertain properties* and titles to things by common conſent: that ſo, when any altercations or diſputes ſhall happen concerning them (as be ſure many muſt in a world ſo unreaſonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their *own ſettlements*; and by the application of *a general undiſputed rule* to the *particular* caſe before them it may appear, on *which ſide* the obliquity lies, the controverſy may be *fairly* decided, and all mouths eternally ſtopped. And then again, that they may be protected, and perſevere in this agreeable life, and the injoyment of their reſpective properties be *ſecured* to them, ſeveral things muſt be forecaſted by way of precaution againſt foreign *invaſions*; puniſhments muſt be appointed for *offences* committed amongſt themſelves, which being known may deter men from committing them, &c. Theſe rules, methods, and appointments of puniſhments, being fairly drawn up, agreed to, and publiſhd, are the *mutual* compacts (58), under which the ſociety is confederated, and the *laws* of it.

If then to have the members of a ſociety capable of ſubſiſting *together*, if to have their reſpective properties *aſcertaind*, if to be *ſafe* and *quiet* in the poſſeſſion of them be for the *general good* of the ſociety, and theſe things cannot be had without *laws*; then a ſociety, whoſe foundation and cement is the public good, muſt have ſuch *laws*, or be ſuppoſed at leaſt to deſign ſuch.

(58) Πᾶς ἐστι νόμος — πόλεως συνθήκη κοινή. *Demoſth.*

As to the making of any *further* laws, when the public intereſt and welfare require them, that is but repeating the *ſame power* in other inſtances, which they made uſe of before in making their firſt laws: and as to *altering* or *repealing*, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are *equal*. Beſide, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this *end* is to be conſiderd at *one* time as much as at *another*; not only in their firſt conſtitution and ſettlement.

IV. *Theſe Laws and determinations muſt be ſuch, as are not inconſiſtent with natural juſtice and truth.* For 1. to ordain any thing, that interferes with truth, is the ſame as to ordain, that what is *true*, ſhall be *falſe*; or *v. v.* which is abſurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be *juſt*, which before and in itſelf was *unjuſt*, is the ſame with pretending to make that to be *true*, which is *falſe* (59): becauſe juſtice is founded in truth (as before), and every where the ſame (60). Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing, which is *naturally* unjuſt, is to enact that, which is morally *evil*; that, which denies the nature of right and wrong to be what it *immutably* is; and that, which is oppoſite to *thoſe laws*, by which it is manifeſtly the will of our Creator that we ſhould be governed (61). And to enact what is thus evil, muſt be *evil indeed*. *Laſtly*, to eſtabliſh injuſtice muſt be utterly *inconſiſtent* with the general good and happineſs of any ſociety; unleſs to be unjuſtly uſed, wronged, and abuſed can be happineſs (62). And if ſo, it is utterly inconſiſtent with the *end* of ſociety; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. *A ſociety limited by laws ſuppoſes Magiſtrates, and a ſubordination of powers: that is, it ſuppoſes a Government of ſome form or other.* Becauſe, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, ſome muſt of neceſſity be appointed *to judge*, when thoſe laws are tranſgreſt, and how far; to *decide* doubtful caſes, and the like: there muſt be ſome armed with authority *to execute* thoſe judgments, and to *puniſh* offenders: there muſt be perſons choſen not only to puniſh and *prevent* public evils, but alſo to do many other things, which will be required in *advancement* of the public good: and then the power of making *new laws*, and abrogating or mending *old ones*, as experience may direct, or the caſe at any time require; as alſo of providing preſently for the ſafety of the public in time of *ſudden danger* muſt be lodged ſome where.

If there are no *executors* of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if ſo, they are but a dead letter, and equal to *none*: and if the ſociety has none, it is indeed *no ſociety*, or not ſuch a one, as is the ſubject of this propoſition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the *vitals* of a ſociety, without which there can be no *circulation* of juſtice, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And ſince men can be but in one place at once, there muſt be *numbers* of theſe proportionable to the bigneſs and extent of it.

And further, ſince the concerns of a whole ſociety, and ſuch things, as may fall within the compaſs of a ſtatute book, are *various*, requiring ſeveral ſorts and ſizes of *abilities*,

(59) Νόμος ἐστὶ τῦ ὄντος ἔυρεσις. *Stob. è Plat.* (60) Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν· ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις κάει. *Ariſt.* (61) Even the Heathens believed, that above all human κηρύγματα there were ἄγραπτα κ' ἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα, which mortals ought not to tranſgreſs: κ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε ζῇ ταῦτα. *Soph.* (62) *Si tanta poteſtas eſt ſtultorum ſententijs atq; juſſis, ut eorum ſuffragijs rerum natura vertatur; cur non ſanciunt, ut, quæ mala perniciosaq; ſunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac ſalutaribus, &c.* Cic.

abilities, and lying one *above* another in nature; ſince not only private men want to be *inſpected*, but even magiſtrates and officers themſelves, who (tho they oft forget it) are ſtill *but men*; and ſince the whole ſociety is to be *one*, one compact body: I ſay, ſince the caſe is thus, there muſt be men to act in ſeveral *ſpheres* as well as *places*, of which the *inferior* ſort in their ſeveral quarters muſt act immediately under their reſpective *ſuperiors*; and ſo this claſs of ſuperiors in their ſeveral provinces under *others above them*: till at laſt the aſcent is terminated in ſome *head*, where the legiſlative power is depoſited, and from whence ſpirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An *army* may as well be ſuppoſed to be well diſciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either *general* or *officers*, as a ſociety to anſwer the end of its being without *governors* and their *ſubalterns*, or (which is the ſame) without *ſome form* of government.

VI. *A man may part with ſome of his natural rights, and put himſelf under the government of laws, and thoſe, who in their ſeveral ſtations are intruſted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a regular ſociety.* Becauſe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or rather *preferable* by much: and this he may do without acting againſt *any truth*. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are *his own*, and therefore no other man's property is *denied* by this: nor is the nature of happineſs *denied* to be what it is, ſince it is happineſs, which he *aims at* in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend againſt *truth*, and deny *happineſs* to be what it is, if he did not do it; eſpecially ſeeing, that here his *own* happineſs coincides with the *general* happineſs and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his *lot* falls, or his *choice* determins him to live.

If the queſtion ſhould be asked, *what* natural rights a man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them; the *general* anſwer, I think, may be this. Some things are *eſſential* to our being, and ſome it is *not in our power* to part with. As to the *reſt*, he may depart from them to ſuch a degree, as is conſiſtent with the *end*, for which he does this: not further, becauſe beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot *give away* the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to *preſerve* or *retain* that property: but he may conſent to contribute *part* of his eſtate, in order to preſerve the *reſt*, when otherwiſe it might *all* be loſt; to take his *ſhare* of danger in defence of his country, rather than *certainly* periſh, be inſlaved, or ruined by the hands of enemies; and the like.

VII. *Men may become members of a ſociety (i. e. do what is mentiond in the foregoing propoſition) by giving their conſent, either explicitly, or implicitly.* That a man may ſubject himſelf to laws, we have ſeen already. If he does this, he muſt do it either in *his own perſon*; or by ſome *proxy*, whom he ſubſtitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his conſent muſt be *collected* only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the ſociety, accepting the benefit of its conſtitution, and acquieſcing in the eſtabliſhed methods, and what is done by virtue of them. By the *two firſt* ways he declares himſelf *explicitly* and *directly*: nor can he after that behave himſelf as if he was no member of the ſociety, without acting as if he had *not done* what he *has done*. And this is the caſe not only of them, who have been concerned in the *firſt formation* of any government, but alſo of them, who have in the foreſaid manner given their conſent to any *ſubſequent* acts, by which they owned, confirmed, and came into what their anceſtors had done, or who have by *oaths* put themſelves under obligations to the public.

public. By the *laſt* of the three ways mentiond a man's conſent is given indeed implicitly, and leſs directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For ſuppoſe him to be *born* in ſome certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been *party* to any law, never to have taken any *oath* to the government, nor ever formally ingaged himſelf by any *other act*. In this caſe he cannot methinks but have ſome *love* and *ſympathy* for that place, which afforded him the firſt air he drew; ſome *gratitude* towards that conſtitution, which protected his parents, while they educated and provided for him; ſome *regard* to thoſe obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyed to him his very life.

If he *inherits* or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeaſible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to *get*, or *keep*, without the aid of laws and advantage of ſociety; then when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, *with* it he takes and owns the *laws*, which give it him.

Indeed ſince the *ſecurity* he has from the laws of the countrey in reſpect of his perſon, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general *equivalent* for his *ſubmiſſion* to them, he cannot accept *that* without being obliged in equity to pay *this*.

Nay, laſtly, his very *continuing* and *ſettling* in any place ſhews, that either he *likes* the conſtitution, or likes it *better* than any other, or at leaſt thinks it better in *his circumſtances* to ſubmit to it, than to ſeek any other: that is, he conſents to be comprehended in it (63).

VIII. *When a man is become member of a ſociety, if he would behave himſelf according to truth, he ought to do theſe things:* viz. to conſider *property* as founded not only in *nature*, but alſo in *law*; and men's *titles* to what they have, as ſtrengthend by that, and even by his *own conceſſion* and *covenants*, and therefore *by ſo much the more* inviolable and ſacred: inſtead of taking ſuch meaſures to do himſelf right, when he is moleſted, or injured, as his own prudence might ſuggeſt in a ſtate of nature, to confine himſelf to *ſuch ways*, as are with his own conſent markt out for him: and, in a word, to behave himſelf according to his *ſubordination* or place in the community, and to obſerve the laws of it. For it is containd in the *idea* of a law, that it is intended to be *obſerved*: and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or profeſſes himſelf member of a ſociety formed upon laws, cannot willingly tranſgreſs thoſe laws without denying laws to be *what they are*, or himſelf to be what he is ſuppoſed or profeſſes himſelf *to be*; and indeed without contradicting all or moſt of thoſe *truths* containd in the foregoing propoſitions.

IX. *In reſpect of thoſe things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or if they do take* cognizance of them, *the benefit of thoſe laws cannot be had,* (for ſo it may ſometimes happen. I ſay, in reſpect of ſuch things) *he, who is a member of a ſociety in other reſpects, retains his natural liberty, is ſtill as it were in a ſtate of nature, and muſt endeavour to act according to truth and his beſt prudence.* For in the *former* caſe there is nothing to limit him, by the ſuppoſition, but truth and nature. And in the *other* it is the ſame, as if there was nothing; ſince *in effect* there is no law, where no *effect* or benefit from it is to

(63) *Plato* ſays, when any man has ſeen our form of government, &c. and remains under it, ἢ φαμὲν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν

to be had. As, for example, if a man should be attacked by thieves or assassines, and has no *opportunity* or *power* to call the proper magistrate or officer to his assistance.

There is a *third* case, which perhaps may demand admission here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to *truth* and *natural justice*. For tho they may pass the usual forms, and be styled laws; yet since no such law can abrogate that law of nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make falshood to be truth: and two inconsistent laws cannot *both* oblige, or subsist together, one of them must give way: and it is easy to discern, *which* ought to do it (64).

There remains one *truth* more to be annexd here, which may be contradicted by the practice and pretences of Enthusiasts.

X. *The Societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themselves against other nations*: or, *war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the security of a society, its members and territories*. For if *one* man may in a state of nature have a right to defend himself (see sect. VI. prop. VII), *two* may, or *three*, and so on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At least, if the *right* be not *greater*, the *concern* is greater: and there will be more reason, that two, or three, or more should be *saved*, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more should *defend* themselves, rather than the one. And if this may be done by men in a state of nature, it may be done by them, when confederated among themselves: because with respect to other nations they are still in *that state*. I mean, so far as they have not limited themselves by *leagues* and *alliances*.

Beside, if a man may defend himself, he may defend himself by what *methods* he thinks most *proper*, provided he trespasses against no truth: and therefore, by getting the *aid* and assistance of others. Now when *war* is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be considerd as if *every particular man* was defending himself with the assistance of *all the rest*, and so be turned into the same case with that of a *single man*.

In truth the case seems to be the same between *nations*, as between *single persons*, when there is no law, or no benefit of law to be had: and what one man may do to another in *that case*, may be done by one nation or politic body with respect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what is said in sect. VI. the *justice* of foreign wars may be not untruly estimated.

Mutual defence is one of the great ends of society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence against *foreign enemies*. And whoever signalizes himself, when there is occasion for his service, merits the grateful acknowledgements and celebrations of his countrey-men: so far at least, as he acts generously and with a *public spirit*, and not in pursuance *only* of *private views*.

As to those *wars*, which are undertaken by men out of ambition, merely to inlarge empire, or to shew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to slay, how many slaves to make (65), how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in short, how much mischief and misery they are able to bring upon mankind;

(64) *Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia justa esse, quæ scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus. — Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententijs judicum, jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragijs aut scitis multitudinis probarentur.* Cic. (65) Some go to war ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγεσίαν ἀνθρώπων. *Plut.*

mankind; these are founded upon false notions of glory: *imbellished* indeed by servile wits and misplaced eloquence, but *condemned* by all true philosophy and religion.

Sect. VIII. *Truths concerning* Families *and* Relations.

THIS section shall begin as relation itself does, with *marriage*.

I. *The end of Marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself* (66). The difference of the *sexes*, with the strong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the other (67), is plainly ordained by the Author of nature for the *continuance* of the *species*, which without that must be soon extinguished. And tho people, when they marry, may have many times not so much the increase of their family in their design or wishes, as the *gratification* of an importunate appetite; yet since nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, *nature* (or rather its great Author) may be said to make this an end of the marriage, tho the *bridegroom* and *bride* themselves do not.

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the foresaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the *end itself* (68), the joint happiness of the *conjuges*, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself *unhappy*; no nor without a presumption of being *more happy*. For without an apprehension of some *degree* of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for such, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they *think* to better it. And indeed if their *circumstances* are such, as may inable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in *good earnest* resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and *reciprocally* to be helpful and loving each to other, *much* comfort and happiness (69), may justly be expected from this intimate union, the interchange of affections, and a conspiration of all their counsels and measures, the qualities and abilities of the one sex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For many things there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the *man*, and yet require the delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the *woman:* and so, *vicissim*, the *woman* cannot but want many things, which require the more robust and active powers or greater capacity of the *man* (70). Thus, in lower life, whilst the wheel,

(66) Οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον, κτλ. *Arist.* (67) Ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν. Id. (68) That sure is a hard law in *Plato*, which injoins ἀπέχεσθαι ἀφύρας θηλείας πάσης, ἐὰν ᾖ μὴ βούλοιτο ἄν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρέν. That mentiond in *S. Hhared.* says otherwise: מ"ע לקיים ארם עונתו ואף כשאשתו מעוברת וכו׳ (69) Καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. *Arist.* כאיש ואשה נוהגים כראוי שכינה ביניהם. *Resh. hhokm.* (70) Διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γυναικός. ὑπαρχοῦσιν ἂν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια *Arist.*

wheel, the needle, &c. imploy *her*, the plough or ſome trade perhaps demands the muſcles and hardineſs of *him*: and, more generally, if *ſhe* inſpects domeſtic affairs, and takes care, that every thing there be provided regularly, ſpent frugally, and injoyd with neatneſs and advantage, *he* is buſied in that profeſſion, or the conduct of thoſe affairs and that eſtate, which muſt ſuſtain the charge of all this; he preſides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preſerves diſcipline in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c. (71).

As then I founded the *greater ſocieties* of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together; ſo may I found this *leſs*, but *ſtricter alliance* between the man and the woman in their *joint-happineſs*. Nature has a *further view*, the preſervation of the kind.

II. *That Marriages are made by ſome ſolemn contract, vow, or oath (and theſe perhaps attended with ſome pledge, or nuptial rites)* (72), *by which the Parties mutually ingage to live together in love, and to be faithful, aſſiſting, and the like, each to other, in all circumſtances of health and fortune, till death parts them* (73), I take for granted. For all nations have ſome *form* or other upon theſe occaſions: and even private contracts cannot be made without ſome *words*, in which they are containd, nor perhaps without ſome kind of ſignificant, tho private *ceremony* between the lovers; which looſe nothing of force with reſpect to them by their being both *parties* and *witneſſes* themſelves. Something muſt paſs between them, that is *declarative* of their intentions, *expreſſes* their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of *man* and *wife* upon any other foot.

III. *That intimate union, by which the* Conjuges *become poſſeſt each of the other's perſon* (74), *the mixture of their fortunes* (75), *and the joint relation they have to their children* (76), *all ſtrengthen the bonds and obligations of Matrimony.* By every *act* done in purſuance of a covenant, ſuch as the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd, recognized, and as it were made *de integro*, and repeted.

Poſſeſſion is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title muſt needs be corroborated.

When *two* perſons throw their *all* into one ſtock as *joint-traders for life*, neither can conſiſtently with truth and honeſty take his ſhare out, and be gone (*i. e.* diſſolve the

(71) See the converſation between *Iſchomachus* and his wife in *Xenophon*. (72) Every one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, *confarreatione, coemptione, uſu*: of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the *legitimæ tabellæ*, or at leaſt conſent of friends, which could not be given without ſome ſolemnity, preceded all. Among the *Greeks* men and women were eſpouſed by mutual promiſes of fidelity: beſide which there were witneſſes, and dotal writings (προικῶα); at the wedding, ſacrifices to *Diana* and other deities, and the γαμήλιοι ὐχαὶ; and after that, perhaps the being ſhut up together, eating the κωδείνον, a formal λύσις ζώνης, &c. The קרושין of the *Jews* have been performed בכסף, or בשטר, or בביאה: the ceremonies accompanying which may be ſeen particularly in *R. Mo. Iſerles* (*Eben ez.*) And (to paſs by other nations) the form of ſolemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which perſons married give their *troth* each to other among us, are extant in our Public Offices: where they may be ſeen by ſuch, as ſeem to have forgot what they are. (73) *Connubio ſtabili.* Virg. (74) והיו לבשר אחר דכך דרכה לאתיחרא דכר ונוקבא בקירוב בשר — דלא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו׳. In *Reſh. hhokm.* (75) Αὕτη χοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμοῦσιν, ἵς μίαν οὐσίαν πάντα καταχεαμένοις χ) ἀναμίξασι, μὴ τὸ μέρος ἴδιον, χ) τὸ μέρος ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, χ) μηδὲν ἀλλότριον. *Plut.* (76) Σύνδεσμος τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶ). *Ariſt.*

partnership) without the *consent* of the other; and sometimes it may not be easie, perhaps possible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the present case, if the marriage be not altogether unfruitful, since *both the parents* are immediately related to the *same child*, that child is the *medium* of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the *same blood* with the child (77), they themselves come to be of the *same blood*: and so that *relation*, which at first was only moral and legal, becomes *natural*; a relation in nature, which can never cease, or be disannulled. It follows now that,

IV. *Marrying, when there is little or no prospect of true happiness from the match* (78); *after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preserve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friendship of a superior kind* (79), *and the like, are all wrong.* Because the party misbehaving acts, as if the *end* of marriage was not what it is; as if no such *covenant* had been made between the persons married, as has been made, *actually*, and *solemnly*, and is still *subsisting* between them; as if they were not *possest* each of the other; their *fortunes* not so interwoven; nor their children so equally related to them, as they are: and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to *truth*, is a sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the most *express* and *solemn* contracts, upon which persons, when they marry, do so far depend, as in confidence of their being *religiously* observed to *alter quite* their condition, begin a new *series* of life, and *risque* all their fortune and happiness: I say, if such sacred compacts as *these* are allowd to be broken, there is an end of all *faith*; the obligation of *oaths* (not more binding than *marriage vows*) ceases; no *justice* can be administerd; and then what a *direful influence* must this have upon the affairs of mankind upon *that*, and other accounts? (80).

Allowance, by sect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary failings. A person's age, health, estate, or other circumstances may be such, and without any *fault*, that he or she cannot do what they would; or perhaps instead of that one of them may come to want the *pity* and *assistance* of the other. In this case (which requires the philosophy and submission proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to *bear with*, but also to *comfort*, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happiness *proposed*, which consists not only in *positive* pleasures, but also in *lessening* pains and wants; whilst the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have designedly forborn to mention that *authority* of a husband over his wife, which is usually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; because I think it has been carried *much too high*. I would have them live so far upon the *level*, as (according to my constant lesson) to be governd *both* by reason (81). If the

(77) In respect of which that in *Plutarch* is particularly true, Ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι δὶα τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς, ἵν' ἐξ ἑκατέρων μερος λαβοῦσα, καὶ τυγχέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γενόμενον. (78) Socrates ab adolescentulo quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum eorum fecisset, acturum pænitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic hæres alienus excipiet: illic perpetua solicitudo, contextus querelarum, — incertus liberorum eventus. *Val. M.* (79) Χρόνῳ συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμενον. *Plut.* (80) *Fæcunda culpa sæcula nuptias Primum inquinavere, & genus, et domos. Hoc fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumq; fluxit.* Hor. (81) Κρατεῖν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικὸς οὐχ ὡς δεσπότην κτήματος, ἀλλ' ὡς

the *man*'s reaſon be ſtronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly ſuppoſed to be), the *woman* will be obliged upon that ſcore to pay a *deference*, and ſubmit to him (82).

Having now conſiderd the *man* and *woman* between themſelves, I proceed in the order of nature to conſider them as *parents*; and to ſee (in a few propoſitions, following) how things will be carried between *them* and their *children*, as alſo between other *relations*, ſpringing at firſt from the ſame bed, if *truth* and *matters of fact* (to be mentiond as occaſion requires) are not denied.

V. *Parents ought to educate their Children, take the beſt care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to aſſiſt them.* Becauſe otherwiſe they do not carry themſelves towards their children as being what they are, *children*, and *theirs*: they do not do what they would deſire to have done to *themſelves*, were they again to paſs through that feeble and tender ſtate; or perhaps what has been done to them (83): and beſide, they tranſgreſs the *law* eſtabliſhed by nature for the preſervation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a *law*, which is in force among all the other tribes of *animals*, ſo far as there is occaſion for it.

Not to do what is here required, is not *barely* to act againſt truth and nature, not *only* ſuch an omiſſion as is mentiond in ſec. I. pr. V. but a heinous inſtance of *cruelty*. If any one can deny this, let him better conſider the caſe of an *infant*, neglected, helpleſs, and having nothing ſo much as to ſolicite for him, but his *tears*, and his *innocence*: let him think what it would be, to turn a *child*, 'tho a little grown up, out of doors, deſtitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly (84), or what to do; and whether it is not the ſame thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elſe *hereafter*, or (in general) to conflict with *want* and *miſery*: let him reflect a while upon the circumſtances of poor *orphans* (85), left unprovided for, abuſed by every body (86), &c. and then let him ſay, whether it is *poſſible* for a *parent* to be ſo void of bowels, as not to be moved with theſe conſiderations; or what *epithet* he deſerves, if he is not. If any of them, who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have *done well*, thoſe inſtances ought to be placed among *particular providences*: as when a veſſel at ſea, without pilot or ſailer, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the *care*, but the *early care* of parents is required; leſt death ſhould prevent them; death, which skips none, and ſurprizes many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the moſt *certain* and *obvious* of all truths.

VI. *In order to the good of Children, their education, &c. there muſt be ſome authority over them lodged by nature in the parents*: I mean, *the nature of the caſe is ſuch, as neceſſarily requires there ſhould be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good.*

ὡς ψυχὴν σώματος, συμπαθοῦντα καὶ συμπεφυκότα τῇ εὐνοίᾳ. *Plut.* (A ſentence, which deſerves to be written in letters of gold.) Ὅπου σὺ Γάϊος, ἐγὼ Γαΐα· — ὅπου σὺ κύριος καὶ οἰκοδεσπότης, καὶ ἐγὼ κυρία καὶ οἰκοδέσποινα *Ap. eund.* (82) Κατὰ φύσιν οἱ ἄῤῥενες οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουσι. *Plato ap. Diog. L.* (83) Πολυπλέθρους δέ σοι γείας Λείψω. πατρὸς γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐδεξάμην πάρα. Eur. *Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (ſi quis eſt pudor) alligaverunt.* V. M. (84) *Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi ſiſtere detur*, in the Poet's language. (85) See that moving deſcription of the Ἦμαρ ὀρφανικὸν in *Homer.* (86) I could never think of that *Arabic* ſaying without pity, *The barber* [אלחגאם] *learns to ſhave upon the head of an* Orphan.

At firſt if ſome body did not nurſe, feed, clothe, and take care of *children*, the interval between their firſt and laſt breath would be very ſhort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their *parents*: to do this is their duty by the foregoing propoſition. But then they muſt do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainly an act of *authority*, to order and diſpoſe of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the *beſt* of one's judgement.

As the child *grows up*, the caſe is ſtill the ſame in ſome degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond *mature*; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himſelf, but what *path* to chooſe he knows not; cannot diſtinguiſh his ſafety and his danger, his advantages and diſadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he muſt be warned, and directed, and watched ſtill by his *parents*, or ſome body intruſted by them, or elſe it might have been poſſibly much better for him to have *expired* under the midwife's hands, and prevented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himſelf capable of *governing himſelf*, by how much the *more* he thinks himſelf capable, by ſo much the *leſs* capable may he be, and the *more* may he want to be governed. The avenues of *ſenſe* are opened: but the *judgment*, and *intellectual faculties* are not ripened but with time and much practice. The *world* is not eaſily known by perſons of *adult* abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it, yet they find things in it ſo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for *them* to reſolve, what meaſures and ſteps are fitteſt to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, paſt their *nuts*, cannot be ſuppoſed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themſelves, any thing elſe but a *prey* to the villain, who firſt ſeizes upon them. Inſtead of judgment and experience we find *commonly* in youth ſuch things, as are remoteſt from them, childiſh appetites, irregular paſſions, peeviſh and obſtinate humors; which require to be *ſubdued*, and taught to give way to wholſom counſels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their *own* humors and follies, but alſo to thoſe of their *companions*. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers miſconduct: and thus folly is as it were *drawn into* folly, and *multiplied* prodigiouſly. The judgment therefore of the *parents* muſt ſtill interpoſe, and preſide, and *guide* through all theſe *ſtages* of infancy, childhood, and youth; *according to their power* improving the minds of their children, breaking the ſtrength of their inordinate paſſions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and ſhewing them the way, which they *ought* to be found in.

The things here deliverd are ſo in *fact*, and a *parent* cannot diſcharge his duty (mentiond in the preceding propoſition), if he acts ſo as to *deny* them: but then he cannot act ſo as *not to deny* them (*that is*, ſo as to ſubdue the paſſions of the child, break his ſtomach, and cauſe him to mind his inſtructions) without ſome ſort of *diſcipline*, and a proper ſeverity; at leaſt very rarely.

To all this and much more, that might be urged to this purpoſe, may be added, that the *fortunes* of children, and their manner of ſetting out in the world depending (commonly) upon their parents, their parents muſt upon this account be their *directors*, and *govern* their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premiſſes, that even *parents* have not properly a *dominion* over their *children*, ſuch as intended ſect. VI. prop. V. from which this *parental*

authority

authority is a very different thing. This only respects the *good* of the children, and reaches not beyond the means, which the *parents*, acting according to the best of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find most conducive to *that end*: but dominion only respects the *will* of the lord, and is of the same extent with his *pleasure*. Parents may not by virtue of this authority command their children to do any thing, which is in itself *evil*: and if they do, the children ought not to obey (87). Nor may they do *any thing*, what they please, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expose them (88): and when they come to be *men* or *women*, and are possest of estates, which either their parents have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the same *properties* in these with respect to *their parents*, which they have with respect to *other people*: the parents have no right to take them by force from them, any more than the rest of the world (89). So that what has been laid down in the place above-mentiond, remains *firm*, notwithstanding any thing, that may be objected from the case of *parents* and *children*. And moreover,

N. 2. They, who found *Monarchy* in paternal authority, gain little advantage with respect to *despotic* or *absolute* power. A power to be exercised for the *good* of subjects (like that of parents for the *good* of their children), and that principally, where they are *incapable* of helping themselves, can only be derived from hence. The *father* of his countrey cannot by this way of reasoning be demonstrated to be the *absolute lord* of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to dispose of them as he *pleases* (90). The authority of parents goes *not this length*. Beside, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the *eldest son* should have the same authority, be it what it will, over his *brothers* and *sisters*: and much less, that the *heir* of the *first parent* should in succeeding generations have it over all the *collaterals*. The very *relation* between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in effect to nothing, and this *notion* with it.

VII. *As Parents are obliged to educate to their children, &c. so children ought to consider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the first and great Cause* (91) *of their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born.* I know children are apt (not very respectfully, or prudently) to say; that their parents did not beget them for *their sakes*, whom they could not know, before they were born, but for their *own pleasure*. But they, who make this a pretext for their disobedience, or disregard, have not sufficiently considerd, what *pain*, what *trouble*, how many *frights* and *cares* (92), what *charges*, and what *self-denials* parents undergo upon the score of their children: and that all these, if parents only rushed into pleasure, and consulted *nothing else*, might easily be avoided, by *neglecting* them and their welfare (93). For as to those parents, who do this, let them speak for themselves: I shall not be *their* advocate.

VIII. *A*

(87) Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπειθοῦντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις οὐ πείθονται. *Hierocl.* (88) The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practised by the *Persians*, *Greeks*, &c: *Romulus*'s law only restraind it, but did not abolish it. For it injoind his citizens only ἅπασαν ἄῤῥενα γενεὰν ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ θυγατέρων τὰς πρωτογόνους· ἀποκτιννύναι δὲ μηδὲν τῶν γενομένων νεώτερον τριετοῦς, πλὴν εἴ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. *Dion. Hal.* And beside, ἅπασαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἔδωκεν ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ καθ' ὑοῦ, καὶ παρὰ πάντα τὸν τοῦ βίου χρόνον, κλ. *Id.* (89) Ῥωμαίοις οὐθὲν ἴδιόν ἐστι κτῆμα ζώντων ἔτι τῶν πατέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν παίδων ὅ, τι βούλονται διατιθέναι τοῖς πατράσιν ἀποδέδοται. *Id.* These are instances of such laws, as should not be, by prop. 4. sect. 7. (90)

Ὡς

VIII. *A great submission and many grateful acknowledgments, much respect and piety are due from Children to their Parents.* For if there is an authority in parents (as before), this must be answerd by a proportionable submission on the other side: since an authority, to which *no obedience* is due, is equal to *no authority.*

If the thought of *annihilation* be generally disagreeable, as it seems to be, then to be conscious merely of *existence* must have in it something desirable (94). And if so, our parents must be considerd as the authors, or at least the instruments of *that good* to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unless they are treated with *distinction* and great regard, being to us what no other *is*, or *ever can be.*

God, as the first cause of all beings, is often styled metaphorically, or in a large sense of the word, the *Father* of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our selves towards Him as *being such*, we cannot (according to what has been said already) but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*, tho in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring there seems to be in the case between *parents* and *their children.* If that requires *divine worship*, this will demand a great *respect* and reverence (95). Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his *parent*, can have any disposition to worship his *Creator* (96). That precept of *honoring parents*, to be found in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiment: for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worshiping the Deity.* In laying children under this obligation they have all conspired, tho scarce in any thing else (97).

The *admonitions* of a parent must be of the greatest weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occasions to *consider things*, and *observe events*; hath *cooler passions*, as he advances in years, and sees things more *truly* as they are; is able in a manner to predict what *they themselves* will desire to have done, when they shall arrive at his age; may upon these accounts, ordinarily, be presumed to be a more competent *judge* than themselves (98); and lastly, from his relation to them must be more *sincerely* inclined to tell them truth, than *any other person* in the world can be supposed to be. I say, if young people reflect well on these things, they cannot in *prudence*, or even kindness to *themselves*, but pay the utmost *deference* to the advertisements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if *parents* want the assistance of their *children*, especially in the declension of their age, and when they verge towards a *helpless* condition again, they cannot deny or withhold it, but they must at the same time *deny* to requite the care and tenderness shewd by their parents towards them in *their* helpless and dangerous years;

Ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον. *Arr.* (91) שלשתן שותפין ביצירתם. *S. Hhared.* (92) Utinam oculos in pectora possent Inserere, et patrias intus deprendere curas. (93) I confess, in *Seneca's* words, *minimum esse beneficium patris matrisq; concubitum, nisi accesserint alia, quæ prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, & alijs officijs hoc ratum facerent.* (94) Τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό· φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωή. *Arist.* The sense of life (of being alive) seems to be something more than what *Seneca* calls *muscarum ac vermium bonum.* (95) Οἱ πάλαιοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων νόμοι, κλ. — οἱ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότεροι τοσοῦτον τοὺς γονέας ἐσέφθησαν, ὡς καὶ θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁρμῆσαι καλεῖν. *Simpl.* (96) *Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum.* Cic. The same author reckons among those things, that are laudable, *parentem vereri ut* deum (*neque enim multo secus parens liberis*). (97) *Prima igitur & optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra*, &c. *Val. M.* (98) Ὁ χρόνος, τἄλλα πάντ' ἀφαιρῶν, τῷ γήρᾳ προστίθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. *Plut.*

years; that is, without being *ungrateful*; and that is, without being *unjust*, if there be injustice in ingratitude (99). Nor (which is more still) can they do this without denying what they may *in their turn* require of *their* children (1). In effect they do thus by their actions *deny* that to have been, which has been; and those things to be possible, which may be hereafter.

Not only *bodily* infirmities of parents, but such decays of their *minds* as may happen, ought to be pitied, their little hastinesses and mistakes dissembled, and their defects supplied, *decently*.

IX. That στοργὴ *or Affection on both sides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and* vicissim (2), *ought to be observed and followd, when there is no reason to the contrary.*

We have seen before, and it is evident from the terms, that *sense* ought to govern, when *reason* does not interpose, *i. e.* when there is *no reason*, why it should not. If then this στοργὴ or mutual affection be an inward *sense* of the case between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is *felt* by them, and sits upon their natures, it may be comprised in prop. 14. and 15. of sect. III. But whether it is or not, the same may be said (which must be repeted in another place) of every *affection*, passion, inclination in general. For when there is no reason, why we should not comply with them, their own very solicitation, and the agreeableness we apprehend to be in complying, are *preponderating* arguments. This must be true, if *something* out weighs, or is more than *nothing*; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reason to deny. So that if this στοργὴ be only taken as a kind of *attraction*, or *tendence*, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet still this physical motion or *sympathy* ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a *good* reason for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a *suggestion* of nature, which ought always to be regarded, when it is not superseded by something *superior*; that is, by *reason*. And further, in this case, where reason does not gainsay, by its silence it *consents*, and so comes in to abet and inforce the thing; as it were *transferring* its power of commanding to that not unreasonable inclination: and not to act *according to this* is not to act according to reason, and to deny that to be, which is.

X. *The same is true of that affection, which other Relations naturally have, in some proportion or other, each for other.* To this they ought to accommodate themselves, where reason does not prohibit. The proof of this assertion is much the same with that of the foregoing *mut. mutand.*

The foundation of all *natural relation* is laid in *marriage* (3). For the *husband* and *wife* having solemnly attached themselves each to other, having the same children, interests, &c. become so intimately related as to be reckond united, *one flesh*, and in the laws of nations many times *one person* (4). Certainly they are such with respect to their posterity, who proceed from them jointly (5). The *children* of this couple are

(99) Δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι· — καὶ τιμὴν δὲ καθάπερ θεοῖς. *Arist.* Among the ancients θρεπτήρια and τροφεῖα were reckond *due*. And he, who doth not requite to his parents הטובה שגמלוהו, is called κατ' ἐξοχὴν רשע in *S. Hhar.* (1) Τοιοῦτος γίνου περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς, οἵους ἂν εὔξαιο περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι τοὺς σαυτοῦ παῖδας. *Isocr.* (2) *Posita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint.* Sen. (3) *Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis*, &c. Cic. (4) *Mulier conjuncta viro concessit in* unum. *Lucr.* כתר גופא חשיבי. *Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. & pass.*

(5) H

are related between themſelves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the *ſame blood* with their common parents, they are all of the ſame blood (truly *conſanguinei*), the relations, which they reſpectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their *center*. This is the *neareſt* relation, that can be (6) *next* to thoſe of man and wife, parents and their children, who are *immediately* related, by contact, or rather continuity of blood, if one may ſpeak ſo. The relation between the children of theſe children grows more *remote* and *dilute*, and in time wears out. For at every *remove* the natural tincture or ſympathy may be ſuppoſed to be weakend; if for no other reaſon, yet for this. Every *remove* takes off *half* the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the ſon of A and B, D the ſon of C, E of D, F of E: and let the *relation* of C to A and B be as 1: then the *relation* of D to A and B will be but $\frac{1}{2}$; becauſe C is but one of the parents of D, and ſo the *relation* of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the ſame manner it will be found, that the *relation* of E to A and B is $\frac{1}{4}$ (or half of the half), of F $\frac{1}{8}$: and ſo on. So that the *relation*, which *deſcendents* in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, *decreaſing* thus in geometrical proportion (7), the *relation* between them of *collateral* lines, which paſſes and is made out through the grand parents, muſt ſoon be reduced to an inconſiderable matter (8).

If then we ſuppoſe this *affection* or ſympathy, when it is permitted to act regularly and according to nature, no reaſon intervening to exalt or abate it, to operate with a ſtrength nearly *proportionable* to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly diſcern the *degrees* of that obligation, which perſons related lie under, to aſſiſt each other, *from this motive*.

But there are many circumſtances and incidents in life capable of affecting this *obligation*, and altering the degrees of it. A man muſt weigh the wants of *himſelf* and his own *family* againſt thoſe of his *relations*: he muſt conſider their *ſex*, their *age*, their *abilities* and opportunities, how *capable* they are of good offices, how they will take them, what uſe they will make of them, and the like. He who deſigns to act agreeably to *truth*, may find many ſuch things demanding his regard; ſome juſtly moving him to compaſſion, others holding back his hand. But howevet this may in general be taken as evident, that *next after* our parents and own offſpring nature directs us to be helpful, in the *firſt place* to brothers and ſiſters, and *then* to other relations according to their reſpective diſtances in the genealogy of the family, *preferably* to all foreigners (9). And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants ſhould be but little; yet we ought to preſerve our affection towards them, and an inclination to ſerve them, as far as we *honeſtly* and *prudently* can, and whenever the proper opportunity ſhall preſent itſelf. This *nature* and *truth* require.

Sect.

(5) Ἡ συγγενικὴ [φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι. καὶ ὑπάρχειν πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ φέρουσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα· τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. — Ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀλλήλους [φιλοῦσι] τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γεγονέναι. — Ἀνάψυξις δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς — τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι· οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κτλ. *Ariſt.*
(6) Quàm copioſæ ſuavitatis illa recordatio eſt! In eodem domicilio, antequam naſcerer, habitavi: in iiſdem incunabulis infantiæ tempora peregi: eoſdem appellavi parentes, &c. *Val. M.*
(7) There is no name for any deſcendent, who is more than *trinepos*. (8) It becomes ἀμυδρά. *Andr. Rhod.* (9) Μηδὲ κρατιγνήτῳ ἴσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον. *Heſ.*

Sect. IX. Truths *belonging to a* Private Man, *and reſpecting (directly) only himſelf.*

I. *Every man knows (or may know) beſt, what his own faculties, and perſonal circumſtances are, and conſequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himſelf.* Becauſe he only of all mankind has the *internal* knowledge of himſelf, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by *reflexion* and *experiments* of himſelf to find, what his own abilities, paſſions, &c. truly are.

II. *He, that well examins himſelf, I ſuppoſe, will find theſe things to be true* (10).

1. That there are *ſome* things *common* to him not only *with ſenſitive animals* and *vegetables*, but alſo with *inanimate matter*: as, that his body is ſubject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being ſeparated, or diſlocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impreſſions of violence.

2. That there are *other* things *common* to him with *vegetables* and *ſenſitive animals*: as, that he comes from a ſeed (ſuch the original *animalculum* may be taken to be); grows, and is preſerved by a proper aliment, taken in and diſtributed through a ſet of veſſels; ripens, flouriſhes, withers, decays, dies; is ſubject to diſeaſes, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nouriſhment, a proper ſituation to live in, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has *other* properties *common* only to *him* and the *ſenſitive tribe*: as, that he receives by his ſenſes the notice of many external objects, and things; feels many affections of his body; is ſuſceptive of pleaſure from ſome cauſes, and obnoxious to pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himſelf, and acting: that is, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diſeaſes, and the cauſes of death, but alſo feels them (11); and is not only capable of nouriſhment, and many other proviſions made for him, but alſo injoys them.

4. That *beſides theſe* he has *other faculties*, which he doth not find either in the inert maſs of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the ſenſitive kind, at leaſt in any conſiderable degree; by the help of which he inveſtigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner ſet down in ſect. III. or, in a word, that he is *animal rationale*.

5. That he is conſcious of a *liberty* in himſelf to act or not to act; and that therefore he is *ſuch a being*, as is deſcribed ſect. I. prop. I. a being, whoſe acts may be *morally good* or *evil*. Further,

6. That there are in him many *inclinations* and *averſions*; from whence flow ſuch affections, as deſire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, ſorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which *prompt* him to act this or that way.

(10) *Illud γνῶθι σεαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam ſolum eſſe dictum, verùm etiam ut bona noſtra norimus.* Cic. ad. Qu. fr. (11) *Non ſentire mala ſua non eſt hominis: et non ferre non eſt viri.* Sen. who condeſcends here to be ſomething like other men. And ſo, when he ſays, *Alia ſunt, quæ ſapientem feriunt, etiamſi non pervertunt; ut* dolor capitis, &c. *Hæc non nego ſentire ſapientem*, &c.

7. That he is ſenſible of *great defects* and *limitations* in the uſe of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occaſions: as alſo, that his paſſions are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceſſive. In other words, that he is in many reſpects fallible, and infirm (12).

Laſtly, that he deſires *to be happy*: as every thing muſt, which underſtands what is meant by that word.

III. *If he doth find theſe things to be ſo, then if he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to* truth *and* fact), *he muſt do ſuch things as theſe.*

1. *He muſt ſubject his ſenſual inclinations, his bodily paſſions, and the motions of all his members* (13) *to Reaſon; and try every thing by it.* For in the *climax* ſet down he cannot but obſerve, that as the principle of *vegetation* is ſomething above the *inertia* of mere matter, and *ſenſe* ſomething above that again; ſo *reaſon* muſt be ſomething above all theſe: or, that his uppermoſt faculty is *reaſon.* And from hence it follows, that he is ſuch a being as is ſuppoſed ſect. III. prop. XI. and that the great *law* impoſed upon him is to be *governed by reaſon.*

Any man may prove this to himſelf by experiment, if he pleaſes. Becauſe he cannot (at leaſt without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reaſon againſt the doing of it, than for it. When men do err againſt reaſon, it is either, becauſe they do not (perhaps *will not*) advert, and uſe their reaſon, or *not enough*; or becauſe their faculties are defective.

And further, by ſect III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right reaſon and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the ſame thing. We cannot do the one, but we muſt do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or ſo as *not to deny any truth*, and that is we cannot act *right*, unleſs we endeavour to act according to *right reaſon*, and are governed by it.

Therefore not to ſubject one's *ſenſitive* inclinations and paſſions to *reaſon* is to *deny*, either that he is rational, or that reaſon is the ſupreme and governing faculty in his nature: and that is to deſert mankind (14), and to *deny* himſelf to be what he knows himſelf by experience and in his own conſcience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body ſhould ſay he was not.

If a *beaſt* could be ſuppoſed to give up his *ſenſe* and activity, neglect the calls of hunger, and thoſe appetites, by which he (according to *his nature*) is to be governed; and refuſing to uſe the powers, with which he is indued, in order to get his food, and preſerve his life, lie ſtill in ſome place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a *plant*; this would be much the ſame caſe, only not ſo bad, as when a *man* cancels his *reaſon*, and as it were ſtrives to metamorphize himſelf into a *brute*. And yet this he does, who purſues only ſenſual objects, and gives himſelf up to be guided by appetite and paſſion. For as in that caſe the *brute* neglects the law of *his nature*, and effects that of the order *below* him: ſo doth the *man* diſobey the law of *his nature*, and put himſelf under that of the *lower* animals.

If

(12) טבע החומר ויצר הרע are in Jewiſh language שאור בעיסה. (13) The Author of *S. Hbared.* reckons *eight*, the right uſe of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, noſe, ear, hand, foot, and ראש הגויה. The duties reſpecting theſe are the ſubject of that (not bad) book. (14) *Abjecto homine in ſylveſtre animal tranſire.* Sen. Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ πάνυ χωλεύομεν; τῶν θηείων. — Ὅρα ὅπως μὴ τι πῶς ὡς θηείον ποιήσῃς. Arr. *Pertinet ad omnem officij quæſtionem ſemper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquiſq; belluis antecedat.* Cic.

If this be so, how wretchedly do they violate the *order* of nature, and trangress against *truth*, who not only *reject* the conduct of reason to follow sense and passion, but even make it *subservient* to them (15): who use it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends, but never apply it to the consideration of those ends, or the nature of those means, whether they are just or unjust, *right* or *wrong*. This is not only to *deviate* from the path of nature, but to *invert* it, and to become something *more* than brutish; *brutes with reason*, which must be the most enormous and worst of all brutes. When the *brute* is governed by sense and bodily appetites, he observes *his proper* rule; when a *man* is governed after that manner in defiance of reason, he *violates* his: but when he makes his rational powers to *serve* the brutish part, to assist and promote it, he hightens and increases the *brutality*, inlarges its sphere, makes it to act with greater force and effect (16), and becomes a *monster*.

His duty then, who is *conscious* to himself of the truth of those things recounted under the foregoing proposition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to see that he complies with no *corporeal* inclination at the expense of his *reason*; but that all his *affections*, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such *objects*, and in such *measure*, *time* and *place*, as that allows. Every word (17) and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by *reason* (18). This is the foundation and indeed the sum of all virtue.

2. *He must take care not to bring upon himself* (19) *want, diseases, trouble; but, on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth* (20) (that is, without denying *matters of fact*, and such propositions, as have been already or will in the sequel here be shewn to be true, concerning *God*, *property*, the superiority of *reason*, &c.) To explain this limitation: if a man should consider himself as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diseases, *and the rest*; then, to supply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at last, in vindication of himself, say, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxious "to hunger, &c. and therefore I act according to truth," this would not be sufficient to justify him. The *grand rule* requires, that what he does, should *interfere with no*

(15) A thing too often done. *Quæ enim libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine — ratione perficitur?* Cotta ap. Cic. (16) This makes *Cotta* say, *Satius fuit nullam omnino nobis à dijs immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam:* with other bitter things. Tho an answer to this may be given in the words, which follow afterward: *A deo tantum rationem habemus, si modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis.* (17) This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or a modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue, that *Aristotle* banishes it out of the commonwealth. Ὅλως μὲν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλό τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁποῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς. (18) True, manly reason: which is a very different thing from that superstitious precise ess, which carries things too far. As, v. g. when the Jews, not contented to condemn דבור נבלה, or נבלות הפה, and every where to express גודל האסור, go so far as to comprehend under it אפי' שיחה קלה שאדם משיח עם אשתו; and to add, מוציא מלה לבטלה כמוציא זרע לבטלה וכו'. There are other sayings of this kind to be seen, many of them among those, which, *R. El de Vidas* has collected: as that particularly, כן ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציאו לבטלה וכ'. What *Ælian* reports of *Anaxagoras* and others, belongs to this place; *that they never laughed:* with many other unnecessary austerities, which might be added. (19) אם אין אני לי מי לי. *P. Ab.* (20) Προσδεῖται τούτων [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος· κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. *Arist.*

truth: but what he does in this caſe, interferes with *ſeveral*. For by taking that, which (by the ſuppoſition) is *his neighbour's*, he acts as if it was not *his neighbour's*, but *his own*; and therefore plainly contradicts *fact*, and thoſe *truths* in ſect. VI, VII. reſpecting property: when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny himſelf to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of ſupplying his wants, which are conſiſtent with *property* and *all truth*: and he can only be ſaid to deny himſelf to be *what he is*, by *omitting* to provide againſt his wants, when he omits to provide againſt them by ſome of *thoſe ways*; and then indeed he, doth do it. (See p. 20. Anſ. to Obj. 3.)

So again, when a man does any thing *to avoid* preſent ſuffering or dangers *contrary* to the expreſs dictates of reaſon, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he acts as a *ſenſitive* being only, not as being what he *really is*, *ſenſitivo-rationalis*. But when there is no good argument *againſt* his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or better his condition of life, he may then look upon himſelf *only* as a being, who wants that, which is to be obtaind by doing it: and *in that caſe* he would be falſe to himſelf, and deny the circumſtances of his own nature, if he did not, not only accept it, but even ſeek and purſue it diligently.

Certainly when a man may *without tranſgreſſing* the limits preſcribed conſult his own ſafety, ſupport, and reaſonable ſatisfaction, and does not; and eſpecially when he acts contrary to them, and expoſes himſelf (21), he forgets many of the foregoing *truths*, and treats himſelf as *not being* what he is. This is true with reſpect to *futurity*, as well as the *preſent time*: and indeed by how much future time is more than the preſent, by ſo much the more perhaps ought *that* to be regarded. At leaſt injoyments ought to be taken and adjuſted in ſuch a manner that no one ſhould preclude, or ſpoil *more*, or *greater* to come.

It may eaſily be underſtood here, that *thoſe evils*, which it is not in a man's power to prevent, he muſt endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently*, i. e. as ſuch; and moreover, ſuch as are made by this means *lighter* (22): for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the *effect* muſt be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; eſpecially the *laſt*, *great* one (23).

3. *He muſt conſider even bodily and ſenſual affections, paſſions and inclinations as intimations, which* many times *he not only may, but ought to hearken to.* What is ſaid before of the ſubjection of paſſions and appetites to *reaſon* muſt always be rememberd. They are not to proceed from unjuſtifiable cauſes, or terminate in wrong objects; not be unreaſonable or immoderate. Being *thus regulated*, ſet to a true biaſs, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become *ſuch as are here intended*; a gentle ferment working in our breaſts, without which we ſhould ſettle in inactivity, and what I think may be taken as juſt *motives* and *good* arguments to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has *not only* a ſuperior faculty, but *alſo* an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propenſions and averſions, *theſe* cannot be denied *to be* any more than *that*; tho they muſt be taken indeed for what they *really are*, and not *more*. When they are checked by reaſon and truth, or there lies a *reaſon*

(21) *Ne offeramus nos periculis ſine cauſa: quo nihil poteſt eſſe ſtultius. — In tranquillo tempeſtatem adverſam optare dementis eſt.* Cic. (22) *Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere eſt nefas.* Hor. (23) Μελέτη θανάτου was a great man's definition of *philoſophy*.

reaſon againſt them (as there always will, when they are not under the foreſaid regulations), they muſt be taken *as clogd* with this circumſtance, as things *overruled* and *diſabled*: but when they are under no prohibition from the *ſuperior powers* and *truth*, then they are to be conſidered as unfetterd and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obſerved upon a particular occaſion before p. 119.) when there is *no reaſon againſt* the complying with our ſenſes, there is always *one for* it by prop. XIX. ſect. III. the inclination itſelf, being controlled by nothing above, is in this caſe *uppermoſt*, and in courſe takes the commanding poſt: and then a man muſt act as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II.

The *ſprings* of all human actions are in fact, either a ſenſe of *duty*, or a proſpect of ſome *pleaſure* or *profit* to be obtaind, ſome *evil* or *danger* to be avoided; that is, either the reaſonableneſs of what is done, or the manner, in which ſomething doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded either in *reaſon* or *paſſion* and *inclination*. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being fact, what ſhould hinder, when *reaſon* does not work, but that the *inferior ſprings* ſhould retain their nature, and act.

Bodily inclinations and paſſions, when they obſerve their due *ſubordination* to reaſon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were aſſeſſors to it upon the throne, are of admirable uſe in life, and tend *many times* to noble ends. This is applicable to the iraſcible, as well as the concupiſcible affections, and the whole animal ſyſtem. *Love* of that, which is amiable, *compaſſion* (24) toward the miſerable and helpleſs, a natural *abhorrence* and reſentment (25) of that, which is villainous, vitious, or baſe, *fear* (26) of evils, are things, which *duly* regulated, have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well ſubſiſt. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed theſe *conatus*'s, theſe tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to diſpoſe us for action, when there are no arguments of a *higher nature* to move us. So far are they, *rightly managed*, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the *philoſopher*, who pretends to abſolute *apathy*, maims nature, and ſets up for a half-man, or I *don't know what*.

I muſt confeſs however, that our *paſſions* are ſo *very apt* to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an *exact diſcipline*, that by way of prevention or caution it is adviſable rather to affect a *degree* of apathy, or to recede *more* from the worſe extreme (27). This very propoſition itſelf, which, when *reaſon* is abſent, places *ſenſe* and *inclination* in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our paſſions, or give them their full carreer; becauſe if we do, they may (and will) carry

us

(24) When the Stoics ſay, that a wiſe man may relieve one, who wants his help, without *pitying* him; I own indeed he *may*, but I very much doubt whether he *would*. If he had not ſome compaſſion, and in ſome meaſure felt the ails or wants of the other, I ſcarce know how he ſhould come to take him for an object of his charity. (25) Ὀ μὲν ἐφ' ὅις δεῖ, καὶ ὅις δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅσε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. *Ariſt.* (26) Φοβούμεθα δυλονότι τὰ φοβερά. — φοβούμεθα δὲ πάντα τὰ κακά. οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον. — ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ καλόν. τὸ δὲ μὴ, αἰσχρὸν, κ.λ. *Id.* (27) Δεῖ τὸν σχαζόμενον τῷ μᾶλλον ἀποχωρεῖν τῆς μᾶλλον ἐναντίας. — τῶν γὰρ ἁμαρτιῶν, τὸ μὲν ἧττον ἁμαρτωλότερον· τὸ δὲ ἧττον. *Ariſt.* — In the ſame chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but ſet down here. Σκοπεῖν δεῖ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροι ἐσμεν· — εἰς τοὐναντίον δ' ἑαυτὸν ἀφέλκειν· — ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. And after, Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδύ, καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· ὃ γὰρ οὐ δίκαιοι κείνομεν αὐτήν.

us into ſuch *exceſſes*, ſuch *dangers* and *miſchiefs*, as may ſadly affect the ſenſitive part of us: that part itſelf, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examined; if *reaſon* is on their ſide, or ſtands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I ſay): in *other caſes* we muſt be deaf to their applications, ſtrongly guard againſt their emotions, and *in due time* prevent their rebelling againſt the ſovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I ſhall tire you with repetitions, that, from what is ſaid here and juſt before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like beſt, among preſent injoyments, meats, drinks, &c. ſo far as they are *innocent*; but all thoſe *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to ſecure to themſelves a comfortable and pleaſant being, may be juſtified.

If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with *reaſon* and *truth*, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to *deny* it: but if it is not, to uſe it as it is, is to conſider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this muſt be to *comply* with it. The humoring of *ſuch appetites*, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reaſon, ſeems to be the *very means*, by which the Author of nature intended to *ſweeten* the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well muffle himſelf up againſt ſunſhine and blew sky, and expoſe himſelf bare to rains and ſtorms and cold, as debar himſelf of the *innocent delights* of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

4. *He muſt uſe what means he can, to cure his own defects, or at leaſt to prevent the effects of them; to watch againſt temptations* (28); *even to mortify, where mortification is neceſſary* (29); *and alway to carry about him the ſenſe of his being but a man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himſelf to the *ſeventh* particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be *true*, which he is ſuppoſed to have found *true* in himſelf); denies a *defect* to be what it is, to be ſomething, which requires to be ſupplied, or amended; and is guilty of an *omiſſion*, that will fall under ſect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention ſome kinds and degrees of *mortification* or *ſelf-denial*, which men will commonly find to be neceſſary. But I ſhall not *preſcribe*; leaving them, who beſt know their own infirmities and diſeaſes, to ſelect for themſelves the proper *remedies*.

I ſhall only take notice, that ſince the *ſelf-denial* here recommended can only reſpect things in themſelves *lawful* and not unreaſonable, and in favor of ſuch our bare *inclinations* have been allowd to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to *deny ones ſelf* or *inclinations* inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow thoſe inclinations might *otherwiſe* be right; yet in *theſe circumſtances* and under this view there ariſes a good reaſon againſt it, and they, according to the *eſtabliſhed rule*, muſt therefore give way: which is all, that is intended.

5. *He*

(28) Ἀγεσιλάῳ μέχρι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν προσελθὼν ὁ ἔρως, ἐνταῦθα ἔστη ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς ψυχῆς. *Max. Tyr.* — To appoint things, as the *Jewiſh* Doctors have done, to be סייג לתורה, or כדי להרחיק את האדם מן העבירה, would be right, if they were judiciouſly choſen, and not ſo very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly juſt: as that, לא יסתכל אדם באשת איש ובשאר עריות פן ינקש בם. *Paſſim.* (29) *What ſhould a man do to live?* ימית עצמו. *Miſhn.*

5. *He ought to examine* (30) *his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has tranſgreſſed, repent.* That is, when the nature of the crime admits, to make *reparation*, or at leaſt as far as he can: in other caſes, when that, which is done, cannot be *recalled*, or *repaird*, to live however under a ſenſe of his fault, and by ſuch acts as are proper prove, that he deſires *forgiveneſs*, and heartily wiſhes it undone; which is as it were an effort toward the *undoing* of it (31), and all that now can be (32): and laſtly, to uſe all poſſible care and precaution not to *relapſe*. All this is involved in the *idea*, of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it preſents itſelf to a rational mind. For ſuch a mind cannot approve what is unreaſonable, and repugnant to truth; that is, what is *wrong*, or a *fault*: nay more, it cannot but diſapprove it, deteſt it. No *rational* animal therefore can act according to *truth*, the *true* nature of himſelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it: and, when committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leaſt be *penitent*.

If when a man is *criminal*, he doth not behave himſelf *as ſuch*; or, which is the ſame, behaves himſelf as being *not ſuch*, he oppoſes *truth* confidently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is ſuppoſed to find himſelf *to be*, is to act as one, who is in danger of *relapſing*: which is to be upon his guard for the future.

6. *He muſt labor to improve his Rational faculties by ſuch means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and conſiſtent with his circumſtances.* If it be a diſadvantage to be obnoxious to *error*, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know ſuch *truths*, as may prevent this: if ſo, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing *more* ſuch truths: and then again, not to endeavour to improve thoſe faculties, by which *truth* is apprehended, is to ſhut it out, and deny the nature of it.

And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become *more rational*; that is, we advance our natures (33): and conſequently we become more ſuſceptive of *rational injoyments*.

The *ordinary* means indeed of improving our minds are the inſtruction of able men, reading, obſervation, meditation: but every man has not proper *opportunities*, or *capacity* for theſe, or but in ſome low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by ſect. IV. prop. II). Therefore that reſtriction is added *by ſuch means &c.*

Beſide *health*, a comfortable and ſuitable proviſion of *externals* is ſo neceſſary to the well-being of the *whole man*, that without it the rational part cannot dwell eaſy, all purſuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) imperfect (34). And ſo *reaſon* itſelf (which cannot betray its own intereſt) muſt for its own ſake concurr in ſeeking and promoting that, which tends to the preſervation and happineſs of the *whole*. But the doing of this ingroſſes time and induſtry; and before that, which is ſought, can be obtaind (if it is ever obtaind), probably the

(30) Πῇ παρέζην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη; *Aur. carm.* (31) *Quem pœnitet peccaſſe, pœnè eſt innocens.* Sen. (32) Even a *Jew* ſays, שקולה כנגד כל הקרבנות [תשובה]. *S. Hhaſid.* (33) *Ariſtotle* being asked, *what he got by philoſophy*, anſwerd, Τὸ ἀνεπτάκτως ποιεῖν ἃ πνες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσιν. And another time, *how the learned differd from the unlearned*, ſaid, Ὅσῳ οἱ ζῶντες τῶν τεθνηκότων. τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγεν ὁ μὲν εὐτυχίας εἶ) κόσμον, ὁ δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας καταφυγήν. *D. Laert.* (34) Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ ὁ ῥᾴδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα· πολλὰ μὲν γὰ πράττεται καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, κτλ. *Ariſt.*

the *uſe* of it is loſt: except where men live by the profeſſion of ſome part of learning.

And as to them, who are *more free* from worldly cares, or whoſe buſineſs and imployment brings them into a ſtricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (ſuch is the great variety of human circumſtances in *other reſpects*) they muſt be contented with ſeveral *degrees* and *portions* of knowledge. Some are bleſt with clean and ſtrong conſtitutions, early inſtructions and other helps, ſucceeding incouragements, uſeful acquaintance, a proper ſituation, and freedom from diſturbance: whilſt others, under an ill ſtate of body, and other diſadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can.

But notwithſtanding all this, every man may *in ſome degree or other* endeavour to cultivate his nature, and poſſeſs himſelf of uſeful truths. And not to do this is to caſt off *reaſon* (which never can be *reaſonable*), deny his nature, apoſtatize from humanity, and introduce the barbarous and brutal life.

7. *He muſt attend to inſtruction* (35), *and even ask advice; eſpecially in matters of conſequence.* Not to do this is to *deny*, that his faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible (which is *contrary* to that, which he is preſumed to be conſcious of); and perhaps, that it is poſſible for another to *know* what he *doth* not.

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the *more* doth truth preſs him to ſubmit to the counſel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only *capable*, but every one *wants* upon ſome occaſions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs muſt the *ſcholar* take the *ruſtic* for his maſter? In how many other men of buſineſs, *traders*, and *mechanics?* And on the other ſide, in reſpect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are *learned* and *honeſt?*

There is or ſhould be a *commerce* or interchange of counſel and knowledge, as well as of other things: and where men have not theſe of their *own growth*, they ſhould thankfully receive any *ſupply* from other quarters.

I do not mean, that a man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the opinion of another (36) (this other being *fallible* too, as well as himſelf), unleſs he has *in himſelf* a good reaſon ſo to do, which many times happens; but by the aſſiſtance of another and hearing what he has to ſay, to *find out* more certainly, on which ſide *reaſon*, *truth*, and *happineſs* (which always keep cloſe together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's *own reaſon* at laſt, which governs.

He, who is governed by what *another* ſays (or does), without underſtanding it and making the reaſon of it his own, is not governed by his *own reaſon*, and that is, by *no reaſon that he has.* To ſay any one is led by the noſe (as we commonly ſpeak (*) gives immediately the idea of a brute (37).

Laſtly, *He muſt labor to clear his mind of thoſe incumbrances and fetters, which hang about it, and hinder him from reaſoning freely, and judging impartially.* We ſet out in life from

(35) The effect, which *Xenocrates*'s lecture had upon *Polemo*, is remarkable: *unius orationis ſaluberrima medicina ſanatus, ex infami ganeone maximus philoſophus evaſit.* Val. M. (36) Like them, who ſubmit to their *Hhakamim*, אפילו יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל וכו׳. In *S. Iqqar.* Many more inſtances might eaſily be given. (*) Not only we. Τῆς ἵππου ἔλκεσθαι was uſed in the ſame ſenſe by the *Greeks.* (37) *Nihil magis præſtandum eſt, quam ne, pecorum ritu, ſequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum eſt, ſed qua itur.* Sen.

from ſuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under ſuch remains of ſuperſtition and ignorance, ſuch influences of company and faſhion, ſuch inſinuations of pleaſure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in *one way*; that theſe habits in time grow rigid and confirmed; and ſo their minds come to be overcaſt with thick *prejudices*, ſcarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reaſon. He therefore, who would uſe his rational faculties, muſt in the firſt place diſentangle them, and render them *fit* to be uſed: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to uſe them: that is, he proclaims himſelf *irrational*, contrary to truth, if ſuppoſition the fourth be *true*.

The ſum of all is this: it is the duty of every *man*, if that word expreſſes ſuch a being as is before deſcribed, to behave himſelf in all reſpects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reaſon. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. *Every man is obliged to live virtuouſly and pioufly.* Becauſe to live after that manner is to *practice reaſon* (38) and *truth* (39). For from what occurs in the foregoing ſections, it is apparent, that one cannot practice reaſon (or act according to truth) without behaving himſelf *reverently* and *dutifully* toward that Almighty Being, on whom he depends; nor without *juſtice* and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unleſs his injoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harmleſs. And as to thoſe virtues, which reſpect a *mans ſelf*, the ſame thing will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by ſome of the *principal* ones.

Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but chooſing and uſing the moſt reaſonable means to obtain ſome end, that is reaſonable. This is therefore *directly* the exerciſe of reaſon.

Temperance, permits us to take meat and drink not only as phyſic for hunger and thirſt, but alſo as an *innocent cordial* and fortifier againſt the evils of life, or even ſometimes, reaſon conſenting, merely as matter of *pleaſure*. It only confines us to ſuch *kinds*, *quantities*, and *ſeaſons*, as may beſt conſiſt with our health, the uſe of our faculties (40), our fortune, &c. and ſhew, that we do not think our ſelves made *only* to eat and drink here (41); that is, ſuch as ſpeak us to be *what we are*.

Chaſtity does not pretend to *extinguiſh* our tender paſſions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not indulge them againſt *reaſon* and *truth* (*); not give up the *man* to humor the *brute*; nor hurt *others* to pleaſe *our ſelves*; to divert our inclinations by buſineſs, or ſome honeſt amuſement, till we can gratify them *lawfully*, *conveniently*, *regularly*; and even then to participate of the myſteries of love with *modeſty*, as within a veil or ſacred incloſure, not with beſtial impudence (42).

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only conſiders the man *himſelf*, but compaſſionates his *family*; knows, that, when the exacteſt computation is

(38) *Ipſa virtus breviſſimè recta ratio dici poteſt.* Cic. *Quæ non aliud eſt quàm recta ratio.* Sen. (39) *Idem eſſe dicebat Socrates veritatem et virtutem.* Id. (40) *Corpus onuſtum Heſternis vitijs animum quoq; prægravat una, &c.* Hor. (41) *Quibus in ſolo vivendi cauſa palato eſt.* Juv. *Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos cænaturi* (Leonid. ap, Val. M.) may be turned to a general *memento*, no man knowing, how near his death may be. (*) Τί ἔιδης; — γαλήν; Ἐπαγε τὴν γαῦλον *Arr.* (42) Not as *Crates* and *Hipparchia* (of whom ſee *Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.*), and indeed the *Cynics* in general are ſaid to have done: *quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit.* Lactant. Of whom therefore *Cicero* ſays with good reaſon, *Cynicorum ratio* [al. *natio*] *tota eſt ejicienda. Eſt enim inimica verecundiæ, ſine qua nihil rectum eſſe poteſt, nihil honeſtum.* אל אשתו יבא [איש] בצנעא. *S. Hbas.*

made that can be beforehand, there will ſtill be found many unforeſeen *deſiderata* in the catalogue of our wants; is *apprehenſive* of the world, and accidents, and new occaſions, that may ariſe, tho they are not *yet* in nature; and therefore endeavours wiſely to lay in as much, as may give him ſome kind of ſecurity againſt *future* wants and caſualties, without which proviſion no man, whoſe ſenſe is not quite loſt, or circumſcribed within the preſent minute, can be very eaſy (43). To this end it not only cuts off all *profuſion* and *extravagance*, but even deducts ſomething from that, which according to the preſent appearance may be *afforded*; and chooſes rather to live upon half allowance now, than be expoſed to the danger of ſtarving hereafter, when full meals and former plenty ſhall make *poverty* and *faſting* more inſupportable. But ſtill it forbids no inſtance of *generoſity*, or even *magnificence*, which is agreeable to a man's ſtation and circumſtances, or (which is the ſame) to the *truth* of his caſe.

After the ſame manner I might proceed upon other *particular* virtues. But my notion of them muſt by this time be ſufficiently underſtood: and therefore I ſhall only give this *general* advice. That you may take the truer proſpect of any act, place your ſelf in your imagination *beyond it*, (beyond it in time), and ſuppoſe it *already done*, and then ſee how it appears; always remembering, that a *long repentance* is a diſproportionate price for a *ſhort injoyment*. And further, as to thoſe *virtues*, which are ſaid to conſiſt in the mean, it may be ſometimes ſafer to incline a *little more* to one of the *extremes*, than to the other: as, rather to ſtingineſs, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a *degree* of ill nature, than to dangerous complaiſance, or eaſineſs in reſpect of vice, and ſuch things as may be hurtful; and ſo on.

Since then to live *virtuouſly* is to practice *reaſon* and act conformably to *truth*, it follows from what has been ſaid before, that he, who lives ſo, muſt be *ultimately happy*: and that therefore not only the commands of reaſon, but even the deſire of happineſs (a motive, that cannot but work ſtrongly upon all, who *think*) will oblige a man to live ſo.

Even from *experience* it appears, that the *virtuous life* compared with the *contrary*, if one looks no further than the preſent ſtate, is the *happier life* (44); or (which is the ſame) that the virtuous pleaſures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer (45). Who ſees not, that the *vitious* life is attended with dangers and ſolicitudes, and uſually ends ill; perhaps in rottenneſs and rags, or at leaſt in a peeviſh and deſpicable repentance?

I am not of opinion, that *virtue* can make a man happy upon a rack (46), under a violent fit of the ſtone, or the like (47); or that *virtue* and *prudence* can always exempt him from wants and ſufferings, mend a ſtrait fortune, or rectify an ill conſtitution: amidſt ſo many enemies to virtue, ſo many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but

(43) *Simonides* was wont to ſay, Βυλόιμην ἂν ἀποδυκνὺς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μᾶλλον ἀπολιπεῖν, ἢ ζῶν δεῖσθαι τῶν φίλων. *Stob.* (44) Even *Epicurus* himſelf ἀχώρειτον φησὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην· and διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι. *Diog. L.* (45) *Iſocrates* gives one reaſon for this, where he compares vitious pleaſures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡδόμενοι, ὕστερον ἀλυπήσομεν· ἐντεῦθα δὲ μετὰ τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἕξομεν. (46) For who can bear ſuch rants as that, *Epicurus ait, ſapientem, ſi in Phalaridis tauro perunatur, exclamaturum, Dulce eſt, & ad me nihil pertinet?* Sen. *Tully* reports the ſame. (47) It is in the power of very few to act like him, *qui dum varices exſecandas præberet, legere librum perſeveravit*: or him, *qui non deſiit videre, cum ob hoc ipſum irati tortores omnia inſtrumenta crudelitatis experirentur.* Sen.

but be *sometimes affected*. But I say, that the *natural* and *usual* effect of virtue is happiness; and if a virtuous man should in some respects be unhappy, yet still his virtue will make him *less unhappy*: for at least he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breast conscious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which *naturally* tends to *happiness*, tho it may be disturbed; or that, which *naturally* tends to *unhappiness*? In a word, *virtue* will make a man *here*, in any given circumstances, as happy, as a man can be in those circumstances: or however it will make him happy *hereafter* in some other state: for ultimately, all taken together, happy he *must be*.

Some may possibly wonder, why among virtues I have not so much as once named one of the *cardinal*, and the only one perhaps, which they pretend to: I mean *fortitude*. That that, by which so many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greatest, *death* itself; that, which distinguishes nations, raises empires, has been the grand theme of almost all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and assumes the name of *virtue* by way of excellence; that this should be forgot!

To attone for this omission I will make this *appendix* to the foregoing brief account of the virtues. If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage (*i. e.* strength, activity, plenty of spirits, and a contempt of dangers, resulting from these) this is constitution and the *gift of God* (48), not any *virtue* in us: because if it be *our* virtue, it must consist in something, which *we* produce, or do our selves (49). The case is the same with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or strong walls, which may indeed be *great advantages*, but were never called *virtues*. To *have these* is not virtue; but to *use them rightly*, or according to reason, if we have them.

That this is justly said, may perhaps appear from what is to be said on the *other side*. It may be a man's *misfortune*, that he has not more courage, a greater stock of spirits, firmer health, and stronger limbs, if he has a just occasion to use them; but it never can be reckond a *vice* or fault not to *use* what he *has not*: for otherwise it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thousand pound weight, or outrun a cannon ball.

Fortitude considerd as a *virtue* consists in standing and endeavouring to overcome such dangers and oppositions, as cannot be avoided without the violation of *reason* and *truth*. Here it is, that he, who is indowed with natural bravery, a healthful constitution, good bones and muscles, ought to *use* them, and be *thankful* to the *Donor*: and he who is not so favord, must yet do *what he can*: if he cannot conquer, he must endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwise infirm, *may* have as much, or more of the *virtue* of fortitude, than the *hero* himself; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or *possibly* may find pleasure in a scene of dangerous action.

If a man can *prevent*, or *escape* any danger or trouble, *salvâ veritate*, he ought to do it: otherwise he neither considers *himself*, nor *them* as being what they are; them not as *unnecessary*, himself not as capable of *being hurt* by them; and so dashes against truth on that side. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his *abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the success to the Divine providence. This is the true *virtue* of *fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly and honestly

(48) Εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐσσι, θεός πυ σοὶ τόγ' ἔδωκεν. *Hom.* (49) *Propter virtutem jure laudamur, & in virtutè rectè gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id* donum à deo, non à nobis *haberemus*. Cic.

neſtly to act as *truth requires*; and therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its *object* not only adverſaries, dangerous animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the *evils of life*; which a man muſt labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done, to bear with reſignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjuſtment of all events in *a future ſtate*: the belief, of which I am now going to prove, *in my manner*, to be no vain or groundleſs conceit.

V. *Every one, that finds himſelf as before in prop.* I. *finds in himſelf at the ſame time a conſciouſneſs of his own exiſtence and acts* (which is life), *with a power of apprehending, thinking, reaſoning, willing, begining and ſtopping many kinds and degrees of motion in his own members, &c.* (50). He, who has not theſe powers, has no power to diſpute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any diſpute here, unleſs it be concerning the power of *begining motion*. For they, who ſay there is always the ſame quantity of motion in the world, muſt not allow the production of any *new*; and therefore muſt ſuppoſe the animal ſpirits not to be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive from it their *directions* into theſe or thoſe canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be anſwerd, that, if the mind can upon occaſion give theſe *new directions* and turns to the ſpirits, this ſerves my purpoſe as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it And beſides, it could not do this, if it could not excite thoſe ſpirits being at reſt.

It is plain I can *move* my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faſter or ſlower or not at all, or ſtop it when it is in motion, *juſt as I will*. Now if my hand and thoſe parts and ſpirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already impreſt upon them, the effects would be *determined* by rules of mechaniſm, and be *neceſſary*: the motion or reſt of my hand would not attend upon *my will*, and be alterable upon a thought at *my pleaſure*. If then I have (as I am ſenſible I have) a *power of moving* my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by thoſe laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitation would obſerve, this motion depends ſolely upon *my will*, and *begins* there.

VI. *That, which in man is the ſubject or* ſuppoſitum *of ſelf-conſciouſneſs, thinks, and has the foreſaid faculties, muſt be ſomething different from his body or carcaſs.*

For, firſt, he doth not I ſuppoſe find himſelf to think, ſee, hear, &c. *all over*, in any part of his body: but the ſeat of cogitation and reflexion he finds in his *head* (51): and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are conveyed to him, *all* tend to the ſame place. It is plainly ſomething, which reſides *there*, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of theſe nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by ſo many reins, or wires) (*), feels what is done to it, ſees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c. (52).

Upon

(50) *Qui ſe ipſe norit, primùm aliquid ſentiet ſe habere divinum, &c.* Cic. (51) Which, ὡς εἰποῖν, οἰκὸς ὅτι τῶν αἰσθήσεων. *Artem.* (*) Τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἄλογά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ, πάντα τέτακται καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει. *Plut.* (52) *Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quæ videmus: neq; enim eſt ullus ſenſus in corpore, ſed — via quaſi quædam ſunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à ſede animi perforata. Itaq; ſæpe aut*

Upon amputation of a limb (53) it is not found to be *diminished*, nor any of its faculties *lost*. Its *sphere* of acting, while it is yet confined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its *instrument* lost. It cannot make use of that, which is not, or which it has not.

If the *eyes* be shut, or the *ears* stopt, it cannot then see, or hear: but remove the obstruction, and it instantly appears, that the *faculty*, by which it apprehends the impressions made upon the organs of sensation, remaind all that while intire; and that so it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had *never* been opend again; or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite disabled. This shews in general, that, when any *sense* or *faculty* seems to be impaird or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pass because it is *the body*, that perceives, and has these faculties in itself; but because it loses its *instrumentality*, and gives that, which is the *true subject* of these faculties, no *opportunity* of exerting them, or of exerting them *well*: tho it *retains* them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut (54). Thus distinct are it (whatever it is) and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the *soul*.

Again, as a man peruses and *considers* his own *body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be some hing different from the *considerer*? And when he uses this expression *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by *me*, or what *my* relates to? It cannot be the *body* itself: that cannot say of itself, *it is my body*, or *the body of me*. And yet this way of speaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual sense of our selves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A *man* being supposed a *person* consisting of *two* parts soul and body, the *whole person* may say of this or that part of him, *the soul of me*, or *the body of me*: but if he was either *all soul*, or *all body*, and nothing else, he could not then speak in this manner: because it would be the same as to say *the soul of the soul*, or *the body of the body*, or *the I of me*. This pronoun therefore must stand for something else, to which the body belongs (55); or at least for something, of which it is only a part, *viz.* the person of the *whole man* (56). And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not *body*.

It is plain there are two *different interests* in men (57), on the one side reason, on the other passion: which, being many times directly *opposite*, must belong to *different subjects*. There are upon many occasions contests, and as it were wars between the *mind* and the *body*: so far are they from being the *same* thing.

Lastly, there is we may perceive *something within us*, which supports the body (keeps it up), directs its motions for the better preservation of it, when any hurts or evils befall

aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atq; integris & oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facilè intelligi possit, animum et videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, et adsit. Cic. (53) Or even *detracto corpore multo*, as *Lucretius* speaks. (54) Therefore *Aristotle* says, if an old man had a young man's eye, βλέποι ἂν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. Ὥστε τὸ γῆρας, οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν πεπονθέναι τι, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις, κτλ. (55) *Hierocles* (with others) accounts the soul to be the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ἡ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ σῶμα σόν. (56) So *Plato* uses Αὐτὸς for the *whole* of the man; by which the soul, as one part of it, is called κτῆμα. (57) Φαίνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ μάχεταί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. *Arist.*

befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The *body* therefore muſt be conſiderd as being under the *direction* and *tuition* of ſome other thing, which is (or ſhould be) the governor of it, and conſequently upon this account muſt be concluded to be *different* from it.

VII. *The ſoul cannot be mere matter.* For if it is, then either *all matter* muſt think; or the difference muſt ariſe from the different *modification*, *magnitude*, *figure*, or *motion* (58) of ſome parcels of matter in reſpect of others; or a faculty of thinking muſt be *ſuperadded* to ſome ſyſtems of it, which is not ſuperadded to others. But,

In the firſt place, that poſition, which makes *all matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehenſions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can it be true, unleſs our ſenſes and faculties be contrived only to *deceive* us. We perceive not the leaſt ſymptom of *cogitation*, or *ſenſe* in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the ſcene of thinking lie in our *heads*, and all the inſtruments of ſenſation make their reports to ſomething *there*, if *all* matter be apprehenſive, and cogitative? For in that caſe there would be as much thought and underſtanding in our *heels*, and every where elſe, as in our *heads*.

If *all matter* be cogitative, then it muſt be ſo *quatenus matter*, and thinking muſt be of the eſſence and definition of it: whereas by *matter* no more is meant but a ſubſtance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And ſince, for this reaſon, it cannot be *neceſſary* for matter to think (becauſe it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as *matter only*.

If it did, we ſhould not only *continue* to think always, till the matter, of which we conſiſt, is annihilated, and ſo the aſſerter of this doctrine would ſtumble upon *immortality* unawares; but we muſt alſo have thought always *in times paſt*, ever ſince that matter was in being; nor could there be any the leaſt intermiſſion of *actual thinking*, which does not appear to be our caſe.

If thinking, ſelf-conſciouſneſs, &c. were *eſſential* to matter, *every part* of it muſt have them: and then no *ſyſtem* could have them. For a ſyſtem of material parts would be a ſyſtem of things conſcious *every one by itſelf* of its own exiſtence and individuality, and conſequently thinking *by itſelf*: but there could be no *one act* of ſelf-conſciouſneſs or thought common to the *whole*. Juxta-poſition in this caſe could ſignify nothing: the diſtinction and individuation of the ſeveral particles would be as much retaind in their vicinity, as if they were ſeparated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot ariſe from the *ſize*, *figure*, *texture*, or *motion* of it: becauſe bodies by the alteration of theſe become greater, or leſs; round or ſquare, &c. rare, or denſe, tranſlated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: and all theſe *ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no relation* between them. Theſe modifications and affections of matter are ſo far from being *principles* or *cauſes* of thinking and acting, that they are themſelves but *effects*, proceeding from the action of ſome other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paſſivity, deadneſs, and utter incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to ſenſe.

They,

(58) Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human ſoul, ſeems to be much ſuch another queſtion as that in one of *Seneca's* epiſtles, *An juſtitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraq; virtutes, animalia ſint.*

They, who place the essence of the soul in a certain *motion* given to some matter (if any such men there really be), should consider, among many other things, that to *move* the body spontaneously is one of the faculties of the soul (59): and that this or (which is the same) the *power of begining motion* cannot come from *motion already begun*, and imprest *ab extrâ*.

Let the materialist examine well, whether he does not feel something within himself, that acts from an *internal principle*: whether he doth not experience some *liberty*, some power of *governing* himself, and *choosing*: whether he does not injoy a kind of *invisible empire*, in which he commands his own thoughts, sends them to this or that place, imploys them about this or that business (60) forms such and such designs and schemes; and whether there is any thing like this in *bare matter* (61), however fashiond, or proportiond; which, if nothing should protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place, where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can such an *active* being as the *soul* is (62), the subject of *so many powers*, be itself nothing but an *accident*?

When I begin to *move* my self, I do it for some *reason*, and with respect to some *end*, the *means* to effect which I have, if there be occasion for it, concerted within my self: and this doth not at all look like motion *merely material* (or in which *matter* is only concerned), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine *matter* to be moved by *arguments*, or ever placed *syllogisms* and *demonstrations* among leavers and pullies?

We not only *move* our selves upon reasons, which we find in our selves, but upon reasons imparted by *words* or *writing* from others, or perhaps merely at their desire or bare suggestion. In which case, again, no body sure can imagine, that the *words* spoken or written (the sound in the air, or the strokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical *efficience* cause the reader or hearer to *move* in any determinate manner (or at all). The reason, request, or friendly admonition, which is the true *motive*, can make no impression upon *matter*. It must be some *other kind* of being, that apprehends the force and sense of them.

Do not we see in conversation, how a pleasant thing said makes people break out into *laughter*, a rude thing into *passion*, and so on? These affections cannot be the *physical effects* of the words spoken: because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood, or not. And this is further demonstrable from hence that tho the *words* do really contain *nothing*, which is either pleasant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be spoken, which are not spoken; yet if they are *apprehended* to do this, or the sound to be otherwise than it was, the effect will be the *same*. It is therefore the *sense* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the *understanding* and causing that, which is the subject of the intellectual

(59) That the soul is the principle of motion, or that which *begins* it in us, is (tho it wants no testimony) often said by the Ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι, καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν. *Arist.* Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἔνδοθεν κινοῦν τὰ σώματα, καὶ αὐτοκίνητον. *Simpl.* Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. *Plotin.* (60) Ἡ ψυχὴ περίεισι πᾶσαν γῆν, ὁκ γῆς ἐπ' οὐρανὸν, κλ. *Max. T.* (61) What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in *Lucretius*? *Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeâ naturâ animum constare, animamq;?* If nothing can move *the body* but another body, what moves this? *The body* might as well move itself, as he moved by one that does. (62) Τάχιστον νοῦς· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τρέχει. *Thal. ap. Diog. L.*

lectual faculties to influence the body, produces these *motions* in the spirits, blood, muscles.

They, who can fancy, that *matter* may come to live, think, and act spontaneously, by being reduced to a certain *magnitude*, or having its parts placed after a certain *manner*, or being invested with such a *figure*, or excited by such a particular *motion*: they, I say, would do well to discover to us that *degree* of fineness, that *alteration* in the situation of its parts, &c. at which matter may *begin* to find itself alive and cogitative; and which is the *critical minute*, that introduces these important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any *particular crisis*, it is a sign they have no good reason for what they say. For if they have no reason to charge this change upon any *particular degree* or *difference*, one more than another, they have no reason to charge it upon *any* degree or difference *at all*; and then they have no reason, by which they can prove that such a change is made *at all*. Besides all which, since magnitude, figure, motion are but *accidents* of matter, not *matter*, and only the *substance* is truly matter; and since the *substance* of any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* matter can be by nature cogitative, *all* must be so. But of this see before.

So then in conclusion, if there is any such thing as *matter, that thinks*, &c. this must be a particular *privilege* granted to it: that is, a *faculty of thinking* must be *superadded* to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, must inferr the existence of some Being capable of conferring this faculty, who, when the ineptness of matter has been well considerd, can not appear to be less than *omnipotent*, or God. But the truth is, matter seems not to be *susceptive* of such a faculty, not *capable* of being made to think. For we have seen, that it is not of the *essence* of matter, and therefore it cannot be *made to be so* without making matter *another kind* of substance from what it is. Nor can it *be made* to arise from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in respect of what else can any matter *be made to* differ from other matter.

The *accidents* of matter are so far from being made *by any power* to produce cogitation, that some *even of them* shew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking superadded. The very *divisibility* of it does this. For that, which is made to think, must either be *one* part, or more *parts* joind together. But there is no such thing as a part of matter purely *one* (or indivisible). It may indeed have pleased the Author of nature, that there should be *atoms*, whose parts are *actually* indiscerpible, and which may be the *principles* of other bodies: but still they consist of *parts*, tho firmly adhering together. And if the seat of cogitation be in *more* parts than one (whether they lie close together, or are loose, or in a state of fluidity, it is the same thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there must be so many several minds, or *thinking substances*, as there are *parts* (for thus the same case, already mentiond, returns again); or else, that there must be *something else* superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thought to be *one*? And then what can this be, but some other *substance*, which is purely *one*?

Matter by itself is not capable of *abstracted* and *general ideas*, such as many in our minds are (63). For could it reflect upon itself, and what passes within it, it could possibly find there nothing but *material* and *particular* impressions: abstractions and metaphysical

(63) *Diogenes*, tho he could see the *table*, and the *pot*, could not by his eyes see *Plato's* τραπεζότης, & κυαθότης. *Diog. L.*

taphyſical ideas could print nothing upon it, nor ever be found there (64). How could one abſtract *from matter*, who is himſelf nothing *but matter?* And then as to *material* images themſelves, which are uſually ſuppoſed to be impreſt upon the brain (or ſome part of it), and do furniſh the *phantaſy* and *memory*, that, which contemplates the impreſſions and traces there (or any where), muſt be ſomething diſtinct from the *brain*, or *that*, upon which theſe impreſſions are made: otherwiſe it muſt be both *contemplator* and *object*, both *reader* and *book*. And this other diſtinct contemplating *being* cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a ſoul. For ſuch a corporeal being muſt require *ſenſe*, and ſuitable *organs*, to perceive and read theſe characters and *veſtigia* of things; and ſo *another* organized body would be introduced, and the ſame queſtions and difficulties would return upon us concerning the ſoul of that body and its faculties.

If my *ſoul* was mere matter, external viſible objects could only be perceived within me according to the *impreſſions* they make upon matter, and not otherwiſe. Ex. gr. the image of a *cube* in my mind (or my idea of a cube) muſt be always under ſome particular *proſpect*, and conform to the laws of *perſpective*; nor could I otherwiſe repreſent it to my ſelf: whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is *in itſelf*, and almoſt view all its *hedræ* at once, as it were incompaſſing it with my mind.

I can within my ſelf *correct* the external appearances and impreſſions of objects; and advance upon the reports and hints received by my ſenſes to form ideas of things, that are *not extant* in matter. By ſeeing a *material circle* I may learn to form the idea of a *circle*, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occaſions, I can conclude there is no *exact* material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raiſed from the hints I received *from without*, but is *not truly* to be found there. If I ſee a *tower* at a great diſtance, which according to the impreſſions made upon my material organs ſeems *little* and *round*, I do not therefore conclude it to be *either*: there is ſomething within, that reaſons upon the circumſtances of the appearance, and as it were controlls my ſenſe, and corrects the impreſſion: and this muſt be ſomething ſuperior to matter, ſince a *material ſoul* is no otherwiſe impreſſible itſelf, but as *material organs* are. Inſtances of this kind are endleſs.

If we know any thing of *matter*, we know, that *by itſelf* it is a lifeleſs thing, inert, and paſſive only; acts *neceſſarily* (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This paſſiveneſs ſeems to be *eſſential* to it. And if we know any thing of *our ſelves*, we know, that we are conſcious of our own exiſtence and acts (*i. e.* that we *live*); that we have a degree of *freedom*; that we can move our ſelves *ſpontaneouſly*; and in ſhort, that we can, in many inſtances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impreſs new motions upon our ſpirits (or give them new directions), *only by a thought*. Therefore to make *mere matter* do all this is to change the *nature* of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, neceſſity into liberty. And to ſay, that God may *ſuperadd* a faculty of thinking, moving itſelf, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the *ſuppoſitum* of theſe faculties (that ſubſtance, in which they inhere), is the ſame in effect as to ſay, that God may ſuperadd a faculty of *thinking* to *incogitativity*, of acting *freely* to *neceſſity*, and

(64) *Plato*, & οἱ σοφοὶ (more generally) ſay, that the ſoul indeed perceives objects of ſenſe by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητὰ, which it doth καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐνδυμεῖσθαι. *Id.*

ſo on. What ſenſe is there in this? And yet ſo it muſt be, while matter continues to be matter.

That *faculty of thinking*, ſo much talked of by ſome as ſuperadded to certain *ſyſtems* of matter, fitly diſpoſed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be ſo called, muſt *in reality* amount to the ſame thing as another *ſubſtance* with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking *alone* will not make up the idea of a human *ſoul*, which is indued with *many faculties*; apprehending, reflecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reaſoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its preſence, and giving life; and therefore, *whatever it is* that is ſuperadded, it muſt be *ſomething*, which is indued with all thoſe other faculties. And whether that can be a *faculty of thinking*, and ſo theſe other faculties be only *faculties of a faculty* (65); or whether they muſt not all be rather the faculties of ſome *ſubſtance* (66), which, being (by their own conceſſion) *ſuperadded* to matter, muſt be *different* from it, I leave to the unprejudiced to determine.

If men would but ſeriouſly look into themſelves, I am perſuaded the *ſoul* would not appear to them as a *faculty* of the body, or kind of *appurtenance* to it; but rather as ſome *ſubſtance*, properly placed in it, not only to uſe it as an inſtrument, and act by it, but alſo to *govern* it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.) according to its own reaſon. For I think it is plain enough, that the *mind*, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many inſtances *govern* the body *arbitrarily*: and it is monſtrous to ſuppoſe this governor to be nothing but ſome fit *diſpoſition* or *accident* (ſuperadded) of that matter, which is governed. A *ſhip* it is true would not be fit for *navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a *ſyſtem* of materials fitly diſpoſed, it is not this *diſpoſition*, that *governs* it. It is the *man*, that other ſubſtance, who ſits at the helm, and they, who manage the ſails and tackle, that do this. So *our veſſels* without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted, as they are: but ſtill it is not the ſhape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The *capacity* of being governed or uſed can never be the *governor*, applying and uſing (67) that capacity. No there muſt be at the helm *ſomething diſtinct*, that ſteers the body, without which it would run adrift, or rather ſink.

For the foregoing reaſons it ſeems to me, that *matter* cannot think, cannot *be made* to think. But if a *faculty of thinking* can be ſuperadded to a ſyſtem of matter, without uniting an immaterial ſubſtance to it (68); I ſay, if this *can be*, yet a *human body* is not

(65) This is worſe than ψυχὴ ψυχῆς in *Max. Tyr.* The Author of the *Eſſay conc. Hum. Underſt.* has himſelf exploded it, or what is very like it. *To ask*, ſays he, *whether the Will has freedom, is to ask, whether one Power has another power, one Ability another ability; a queſtion at firſt ſight too groſly abſurd to make a diſpute, or need an anſwer. For who is it that ſees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and are attributes only of ſubſtances, and not of Powers themſelves?* There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another paſſage ſome where in the ſame book as much (or more) to my purpoſe: but at preſent I cannot find it. (66) If the ſoul is only an accident (or attribute) of the *body*, how comes this accident to have (or be the ſupport of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we ſay, נפש חכמה ונפש סכלה וכו'. *S. Haemun.* (67) Ἕτερον δὲ ποτὲ χρώμενον καὶ ὃ χρᾶται. *Plato.* (68) Or, *if to a thinking ſubſtance can be ſuperadded the modification of ſolidity.* Which way of ſpeaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth it ſeem to differ much from the other, yet would pleaſe me better.

not ſuch a ſyſtem, being plainly void of thought, and organized in ſuch a manner as to tranſmit the impreſſions of ſenſible objects up to the brain, where the *percipient*, and that, which *reflects* upon them, certainly reſides: and therefore that, which *there* apprehends, thinks, and wills, muſt be *that ſyſtem of matter*, to which a faculty of thinking is ſuperadded. All the premiſſes then well conſiderd, judge I beſeech you, whether inſtead of ſaying, that this *inhabitant* of our heads (the *ſoul*) is a ſyſtem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is ſuperadded, it might not be more reaſonable to ſay, it is *a thinking ſubſtance intimately united to ſome fine material vehicle, which has its reſidence in the brain.* Tho I underſtand not perfectly the manner, how a *cogitative* and *ſpiritual* ſubſtance can be thus cloſely united to ſuch a *material* vehicle; yet I can underſtand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itſelf cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be ſuperadded to matter: and beſide, ſeveral *phænomena* may more eaſily be ſolved by this *hypotheſis*; which (tho I ſhall not pertinaciouſly maintain it) in ſhort is this, *viz.* that the human *ſoul* is a *cogitative* ſubſtance, clothed in a *material* vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inſeparably* mixt (I had almoſt ſaid *incorporated*) with it (69): that theſe act in *conjunction*, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the *ſoul* is detaind in the *body* (the head or brain) by ſome *ſympathy* or *attraction* between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is ſpoiled, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an averſion, that makes it fly off), by ſome hurt, or diſeaſe, or by the decays or ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the *interim* by means of this vehicle motions and impreſſions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps ſomething more by and by.

VIII. *The ſoul of man ſubſiſts after the diſſolution of his body*: or, *is immortal.* For,

1. If it is *immaterial*, it is *indiſcerpible*, and therefore *incapable* of being diſſolved or demoliſhed, as bodies are (70). Such a being can only periſh by *annihilation*: that is, it will continue to ſubſiſt and live, if ſome other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular act *annihilate* it. And if there is any reaſon to believe, that at the death of every man there is always ſuch a particular annihilation, let him, that knows it, produce it. Certainly to reduce any *ſubſtance* into *nothing* requires juſt the ſame power as to convert *nothing* into *ſomething*: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the ſoul, will be cautious, how they admit any ſuch power.

2. If the ſoul *could be* material; that is, if there could be any *matter*, that might be the ſubject of thoſe faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet ſtill, ſince we cannot but be ſenſible, that all theſe are faculties of the *ſelf-ſame thing* and all the ſeveral acts of the mind are acts of the *ſame thing*, each of them *individual* and truly *one*: I ſay, ſince it is ſo, this matter muſt be ſo *perfectly united* in itſelf, ſo abſolutely *one*, as no matter, that falls under our cognizance, can be. And then the *leaſt*, that can be allowd in

(69) *It is worth our conſideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive power of Matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit*, viz. *God, is only active; pure matter is only paſſive; thoſe Beings, that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both.* Hum. Underſt. (70) This is *Socrates's* argument in *Plato.* The ſoul is altogether ἀδιάλυτος, and therefore ἀνώλεθρος. Which *Cicero* interprets thus: *nec diſcerpi, nec diſtrahi poteſt; nec interire igitur.*

this caſe, is, that it ſhould be truly ſolid, and not *actually diviſible*; that is, ſuch as no *natural cauſe* could deſtroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or (which is the ſame) a *thinking matter* is to introduce matter with a new and oppoſite property, and that is to introduce a *new ſpecies* of matter (71), which will differ as eſſentially from the other common *unthinking* kind, as any ſpecies whatſoever doth from its oppoſite in *ſcala prædicamentali*, even as *body* doth from *ſpirit*. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if ſo, this *thinking matter* muſt always continue to think, till either it is *annihilated*, or there is a *tranſmutation* of one ſpecies into another: and to take refuge in either of theſe expectations is at leaſt to expect omnipotence ſhould interpoſe to help out a bad cauſe.

If any one ſhould ſay, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence ſuperadd to certain parcels of matter a *fourth dimenſion*, I ſhould not perhaps diſpute the Divine power: but I might ſay, that ſuch matter, exiſting under four dimenſions, would *eſſentially* differ from that, which cannot exiſt under four, or which can exiſt but *only under three*; and that this four-dimenſiond matter muſt *always* remain ſuch, becauſe no ſubſtance can be changed into or become another, eſſentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the courſe of nature ceaſes totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument ſhall proceed by way of *objection* and *anſwer*. Becauſe a removal of the principal objection *againſt* any thing is a good argument *for it*. *Obj.* It ſeems as if *thinking* was not eſſential to the ſoul, but rather a *capacity of thinking* under certain circumſtances. For it doth *not think*, when it lies conceald *in animalculo*, in the womb, perhaps in the beginings of infancy, in ſleep, in a ſwoon: and the reaſon of this ſeems to lie in the circumſtances of the *body*, which either is not ſufficiently expanded, and prepared; or for a time imploys the ſpirits wholly in the digeſtion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal oeconomy; or by ſome heterogeneous matter got into it, or other preternatural affection, hath its parts diſordered, and motions obſtructed; or ſomething like this. And therefore the queſtion to be reſolved is not, whether the ſoul is *material* or *immaterial*; and much leſs, whether it will be *annihilated* at death; but whether that ſoul (be it what it will), which ceaſes to think, when the body is *not fitly diſpoſed* for it, can think at all; when the body is *quite diſſolved*, and leaves the ſoul no opportunity of actuating it any more, or operating by it (72). *Anſ.* If this objection cannot be fully anſwerd, till we know more of the nature of *ſpiritual* beings, and of that *vinculum*, by which the ſoul and body are connected, than we do at preſent, it muſt not therefore be looked upon as certainly *unanſwerable* in itſelf; and much leſs, if only it cannot be anſwerd *by me*. It may perhaps be poſſible to turn it even into an argument *for the immortality of the ſoul*.

The Soul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts *under limitations*: theſe limitations at different times are *different*, its activity and faculties being

(71) *Lucretius* ſeems to be aware of this. *Jam triplex animi eſt natura reperta: Nec tamen hæc ſat ſunt ad ſenſum cuncta creandum, &c. Quarta quoq; his igitur* quædam natura *neceſſe eſt Attribuatur: ea eſt omnino* nominis expers. (72) If *Lucan* by *ſenſus* means all manner of apprehenſion and knowledge, there is no room for that diſjunction: *Aut nihil eſt ſenſûs animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipſa nihil.* For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

ing more obſtructed and clogged at *one time* than *another*, and moſt of all in ſleep, or a *deliquium*: as theſe obſtructions are removed, it acts more *clearly* and *freely*: and therefore if the ſtate of the ſoul in the body (its confinement there) may be conſiderd as one *general* and *great limitation*, why when this limitation ſhall be taken off (this great obſtruction removed), may it (73) not be allowd to act with ſtill *greater* freedom and clearneſs; the *greateſt* it is capable of? Whilſt it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a *few apertures*; that is, receive the notices of many things by thoſe nerves and organs, which are the inſtruments of *ſenſation*: but if any of thoſe avenues to it be ſtopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If thoſe tracks in the brain, or thoſe *marks*, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our *memory* and *images* of things ſeem to depend, are filled up, or overcaſt by any vapor, or otherwiſe darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is removed. (For it cannot *read* what is not *legible*, and indeed for the preſent not there.) And ſince even in *abſtracted reflexions* the mind is obliged to make uſe of *words* (74), or ſome kind of ſigns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and ſtable enough to be peruſed, compared, &c. and this kind of *language* depends upon *memory*, whilſt this is intermitted, the uſe of the other is taken away, with all, that depends upon it. This is the *preſent ſtate* of the ſoul: and from hence the reaſon appears in ſome meaſure, why we do not think in ſound *ſleep*, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the ſoul cannot ſubſiſt and act under *more inlarged circumſtances*. That, which being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the opportunities this affords, can now perceive viſible objects only with *two eyes* (at two windows), becauſe there *are no more*, might doubtleſs ſee with *four*, if there were ſo many properly placed and diſpoſed: or if its habitation were *all eye* (window all round), might ſee all round. And ſo, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impreſſions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our preſent organs, and in this *ſituation* and *incloſure* can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be *looſed* out of that priſon, know them *immediately*, or by ſome *other medium*. That, which is now forced to make ſhift with *words* and *ſigns* of things in its reaſonings, may, when it ſhall be ſet at liberty and can come at them, reaſon upon the intuition of *things themſelves*, or uſe a language more *ſpiritual* or *ideal*. I ſay, it is not *impoſſible*, that this ſhould be the caſe; and therefore no one can ſay, *with reaſon*, that it is not: eſpecially, ſince we find by experience, that the ſoul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of ſpirit to determine, how theſe limitations are effected; and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be extended, or taken off. This ſuffices to *remove the force* of the objection. But further,

A man, when he *wakes*, or *comes to himſelf* (which phraſe implies what I am going to ſay), immediately knows this, and knows himſelf to be the *ſame ſoul*, that he was before his ſleep or *deliquium*. I will ſuppoſe, that he is alſo conſcious to himſelf, that in thoſe intervals he thought *not at all* (which is the ſame the objector muſt ſuppoſe): that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or moulderd to duſt, he could not have thought *leſs*:

(73) *Velut è diutino carcere emiſſus* [*animus*]. Sen. (74) Thoſe kinds of animals, which do not *ſpeak*, do not *reaſon*: but thoſe, which do the one, do the other. Therefore רוח מדבר (or *Arab.* ناطق) is a *rational animal*: and λόγος ſignifies both *ſpeech* and *reaſon*, as going together.

leſs: for there is no thinking leſs than thinking *not at all* From hence then I gather, that the ſoul *preſerves* a capacity of thinking, &c. under thoſe circumſtances and indiſpoſitions of the body, in which it thinks *no more*, than if the body was *deſtroyed*; and that therefore it may, and will *preſerve* it, when the body is deſtroyd. And if ſo, what can this *capacity* be preſerved for? Certainly *not*, that it may *never* be exerted. The Author of nature doth not uſe to act after *that manner*. So that here is this *dilemma* to be oppoſed to the objection. In ſleep and ſwoonings the ſoul doth either *think*, or *not*. If it *does*, the objection has no foundation: and if it *doth not*, then all that will follow, which I have juſt now ſaid.

'If we ſhould ſuppoſe the *ſoul* to be a being by nature made to inform ſome *body*, and that it cannot exiſt and act in a ſtate of *total ſeparation* from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, muſt therefore reduce it to a ſtate of abſolute *inſenſibility* and *inactivity*, which to it would be equal to *non-exiſtence*. For that *body* which is ſo neceſſary to it, may be ſome *fine vehicle*, that dwells with it in the brain (according to the *hypotheſis* but juſt now mentiond), and goes off with it at death. Neither the anſwers to the objection, nor the caſe after death will be much alterd by ſuch a *ſuppoſition*. And ſince I confeſs I ſee no abſurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are ſenſible of many *material* impreſſions (impreſſions made upon us by material cauſes, or bodies): this we are ſure of. Therefore there muſt be *ſome matter* within us, which being moved or preſſed upon, the ſoul apprehends it *immediately*. And therefore, again, there muſt be *ſome matter* to which it is *immediately* and *intimately united*, and *related* in ſuch a manner, as it is *not related* to any other. Let us now ſuppoſe this ſaid *matter* to be ſome refined and ſpirituous *vehicle* (75), which the ſoul doth immediately inform; with which it ſympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is *vitally* and *inſeparably* united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the *brain*, among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppoſe we alſo, that when any *impreſſions* are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the nerves up to their fountain, and the place, where the ſoul in its vehicle is, and there communicate their ſeveral motions or tremors to this material *vehicle* (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, preſs upon it); ſo that the *ſoul*, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly poſſeſt of it, ſhall be apprehenſive of theſe motions or preſſures: and further, that this *vehicle* in its preſent ſituation, ſo *guarded* and *incompaſſed* by the body as it is, can be *come at* or *moved* by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves, nor the *ſoul*, by conſequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correſpondence with them, any *other* way. And as we ſuppoſe

(75) So *Hierocles* diſtinguiſhes τὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὃ δὴ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα, from that, which he calls τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σῶμα, and to which the former communicates life. Τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἡμῶν σώματι προσὸν σῶμα ὑπὲρ ὄν. *Id.* This fine body he calls alſo ψυχικὸν σῶμα, and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα. In *Niſhm. bhaiy.* there is much concerning that *fine body*, in which the ſoul is clothed, and from which it is never to be ſeparated, according to an old tradition. *Men: b. Iſr.* gives us the ſum of it in ſuch words as theſe. יש גוף רק עור מאוד בו מחלבש הנשמה הנשמות המה בכריאתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים רקים: and afterward, שרם ביאה לעולם רוחניים מהשבע השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות. והנשמות לא יזדרדו מאותם הגשמים הרקים הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קדים באותם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרי הפרדם ממנו. *Saadias* long before him joins to the ſoul עצם רק; which he ſays is, מן [יותר זך] רק הגלגלים, &c.

ſuppoſe the *ſoul* to receive notices of things from without in this manner, ſo let us ſuppoſe, on the other ſide, that by moving its own *vehicle* it may produce motion in the contiguous *ſpirits* and *nerves*, and ſo move the body: I mean, when they are not obſtructed, or ſome way renderd unfit to be moved. Let us ſuppoſe further, that the *ſoul* by means of this *vehicle* feels or finds thoſe prints and portraits, or thoſe *effects* and *remains* left by objects on the mind in ſome manner or other, which cauſe the *remembrance* of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obſcured by any thing; or, when there are any ſuch to be felt. And laſtly, let us ſuppoſe, that if the *ſoul* in its more *abſtracted* and *purer* reaſonings, or more ſpiritual acts, has any occaſion for *matter*, to ſerve it, the matter of this *vehicle* is that, which it actuates, and uſes, as opportunity is granted. All which it is eaſy to underſtand, and perhaps not very difficult to ſuppoſe. On the contrary, by many ſymptoms it appears moſt probable, that *that* matter, to which the mind is *immediately* preſent, and in which is its true *ſhechinah*, is not the whole groſs body, but ſome *ſubtile body*, placed (as I have ſaid) in the region of the brain. For *there* all the conveyances of ſenſible *ſpecies* conſpire to meet, and *there* in reflexion we find our ſelves: when a limb is loſt, the ſoul loſes an *opportunity* of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of uſing it, but perceives no loſs *in itſelf*: and tho the *body*, many parts of it at leaſt, are in a perpetual flux, and continually altering, yet I know, that that ſubſtance, which *thinks* within me *now* (or rather, which is I), is, notwithſtanding all the changes my body has undergone, the *very ſame*, which *thought* above fifty years ago. If you would permit me to uſe a ſchool term, I would ſay the *egoity* (76) remains. Now to *anſwer* the objection, and apply all this to our purpoſe. Why do we not perceive external objects in our *ſleep* or *a ſwoon*? Becauſe the *paſſages* are become impracticable, the *windows* ſhut, and the *nerves*, being obſtructed, or ſome how renderd for the time uſeleſs, can tranſmit no information to it. Why however does it not reaſon and think about *ſomething or other*? Becauſe all the *marks*, by which things are rememberd, being for the preſent choked up, or diſorderd, the remembrance of thoſe *objects*, about which it is wont to imploy itſelf, and even of the *words* (or other ſigns), in which it uſes to reaſon, and to preſerve the deductions and concluſions it makes, is all ſuſpended, and loſt for the time; and ſo its tables being coverd, its books cloſed, and its tools locked up, the requiſites for reaſoning are wanting, and no ſubject offers itſelf, to exerciſe its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to take in *higher objects* and more *refined matter* for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one ſhould imagin, that the *ſoul* may think, perceive, act *after death*, when it doth not do this *in ſleep*, the anſwer is; becauſe thoſe *incloſures* and *impediments* which occaſiond the forementiond intermiſſions, and great limitations at all times, will be *removed* with its inlargement out of the body. When it ſhall in its *proper* vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then lie bare to the *immediate* impreſſions of objects: and why ſhould not thoſe impreſſions, which affected the *nerves*, that moved and affected the vehicle and ſoul in it, *affect the vehicle immediately*, when they are *immediately* made upon it without the interpoſition of the nerves? The *hand*, which feels an object at the end of a *ſtaff*, may certainly be allowd to feel the ſame much better by *immediate contact*, without the ſtaff. Nay, why ſhould we not think, that it may be ſuſceptive of *more* objects and knowledge of things, than it is now; ſince

(76) *Tully* has *Lentulitas*, and *Appietas*; in the ſame form, tho not juſt the like ſenſe.

ſince it may lie open *all round* to the impreſſions or influences of them; not moved only by viſible objects juſt at the extremities of the *optic* nerves, by ſounds at the ends of the *auditory*, &c. but being as it were *all eye* to viſible objects, *all ear* to audible, and ſo on? And why ſhould we not think this the rather, becauſe then the *ſoul* may be perceptive of *finer* impreſſions and *ethereal* contacts, and conſequently of *more kinds* of objects, ſuch as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being the caſe, why ſhould we not preſage, that *other indowments*, as faculties of reaſoning, communicating thoughts, and the like will be *proportionable* to ſuch noble opportunities of knowledge? There ſeems to be nothing in this account *impoſſible*; and therefore nothing, but what *may be*.

If we do but conſider (what we ſee every where before us), that *many* things are by ways, which we *do not*, nor *can* underſtand, and that therefore *more* may be, tho we know not *how*, we muſt be convinced, that the objection before us, tho we could not ſolve the *difficulties* in it, and what is ſuppoſed here, ſhould be all rejected as *chimerical*; yet this ought to be no prejudice againſt the belief of the immortality of the ſoul, if there is *any* (but *one*) good reaſon for it.

But if we can in any *tolerable* manner (which in our preſent circumſtances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and thoſe the *greateſt* belonging to this matter, and ſhew how it is *poſſible*, that they may conſiſt with immortality, this removal of them will greatly *corroborate* the arguments for it, if not be one *itſelf*. This I hope is done: or if I have not ſpoke directly to *every part* of the objection, from what has been ſaid, that defect may eaſily be ſupplied.

4. We may conclude the ſouls of men to be immortal from the *nature of God*. For if he is (which ſure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as ſuch, can do nothing inconſiſtent with *perfect* or *right reaſon*. And if ſo, no *being*, nor *circumſtance* of any being, can come from Him as its cauſe, which it is not agreeable to *ſuch reaſon* ſhould be: or (which is the ſame), He cannot but deal *reaſonably* with all His dependents. And then again, if we are of this number, and the mortality of the human ſoul does not conſiſt with reaſon, we may be ſure it is *immortal*: as ſure as we can be of any thing by the uſe of our faculties; and that is, as ſure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore it doth *conſiſt* with reaſon, or *not*, is to be inquired.

To produce a Being into a ſtate of *clear happineſs*, in any degree, can be no injury to it: or into a ſtate of *mixt happineſs*, provided the happineſs certainly *over balances* the contrary, and the unhappy or ſuffering part be not greater, than what that being would *chooſe* in order to obtain the happineſs, or rather than loſe it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being *ſubject* to more miſery than happineſs, if that being hath it in *his own power* to avoid the miſery, or ſo much of it, as may leave the remainder of miſery not greater, than what he would *chooſe*,, rather than miſs the proportion of happineſs. The only caſe then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is *neceſſarily* and *irremediably* to be *miſerable*, without any recompenſe, or balance of that miſery (77): and this indeed is a caſe ſo grievous, ſo utterly irreconcileable to all *reaſon*, that the heart of a reaſoning and conſidering man can ſcarce bear the thought of it. So much every one muſt underſtand

(77) That paſſage in *S. Iqqar.* imports much the ſame thing, that has been ſaid here: הוא מבואר שהרבר שמציאותו שוב ראוי שימצא והדבר שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצא ומה שמציאותו מעורב מן השוב והרע אם השוב הוא הגובר ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא הגובר אין ראוי שימצא.

ſtand of the nature of reaſon and juſtice as to allow theſe things for truths inconteſtable.

Now then he, who ſays the *ſoul* of man is *mortal*, muſt ſay one of theſe *two* things: either that God is an unreaſonable, unjuſt, cruel Being; or that no man, in reſpect of this life (which according to him is *all*), has a greater ſhare of miſery, *unavoidable* than of happineſs. To ſay the *former* is to contradict that, which I preſume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow ſuch an unworthy, blaſphemous notion of the *Supreme being*, as one would not entertain without caution even of the *worſt of men*; ſuch a one, as creates *horror*; ſuch a one, as even the perſon himſelf, who ſays this, muſt know to be *falſe*. For he cannot but ſee, and muſt own many inſtances of the *reaſonableneſs* and *beneficence* of the Deity; not *one* of which could be, if cruelty and unreaſonableneſs were natural to Him: ſince He has power to execute His own inclinations *thoroughly*, and is a Being *uniform* in His nature. Then to ſay the *latter* is to contradict the *whole ſtory* of mankind, and even *ones own ſenſes*. Conſider well the dreadful effects of many *wars*, and all thoſe barbarous deſolations, which we read of: what cruel *tyrants* there are, and have been in the world, who (at leaſt in their fits) *divert themſelves* with the pangs and convulſions of their fellow-creatures (78): what *ſlavery* is (79), and *how* men have been brought into that lamentable ſtate: how many have been ruined by *accidents* unforeſeen: how many have ſuffered or been undone by *unjuſt* laws, judges, witneſſes, &c. (80) how many have brought *incurable diſeaſes*, or the *cauſes* of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, ſuch bodily infirmities and diſadvantages, as have renderd their *whole lives* uneaſy: how many are born in ſuch circumſtances, as make their whole inheritance to be *invincible poverty* and *trouble*? Inſtances are endleſs: but, for a *little taſt* of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that ſtory related by *Strabo* (from *Polybius*) and *Plutarch*, where, even by order of the *Roman* ſenate, *P. Æmylius*, one of the beſt of them too, at one prefixt hour ſacked and deſtroyd *ſeventy* cities, unawares, and drove *fifteen myriads* of innocent perſons into *captivity*; to be ſold, only to raiſe pay for the mercileſs ſoldiers and their own executioners.

(78) C. *Cæſar*— *Senatores et Equites — cecidit, torſit, non quæſtionis, ſed* animi causâ. *Deinde quoſdam ex illis — ad lucernam decollabat. — Torſerat per omnia, quæ in rerum natura triſtiſſima ſunt, fidiculis, &c.* Sen. *Homo, ſacra res, jam per* luſum *et* jocum *occiditur.* Id. (79) Slaves were reckond among beaſts of old. Οὔτε γὰρ γυνὴ πίφυκας, οὔτ' ἐκ ἀνδρὸς σύγ' ἶ. *Eurip.* And ſometimes as mere inſtruments and tools. Ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον· τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. *Ariſt.* Their ſad condition I will ſet down in *Plato's* words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἔτι τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδου πάνυ, ᾧ κρεῖττον τεθνάναι ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν· ὃστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος, μὴ δύναται ἑαυτὸν ἀμύνασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλῳ ὅ ἂν κήδηται. (80) Thoſe ἄῤῥητοι καὶ ἄπυστοι δυσχέιαι, which the τελῶναι had brought upon the cities of *Aſia*, are too many to be tranſcribed: but ſome account of them is to be ſeen in *Plut. v. Luc.* which may ſerve for one inſtance out of thouſands. It may be reckond madneſs indeed *maximas virtutes, quaſi graviſſima delicta, punire*; as *Val. M.* ſays, ſpeaking of *Phocion's* caſe: but ſuch madneſs has been very common, and men have ſufferd even for their virtue. *Ochus* cruelly put to death *Ocham ſororem —, et patruum cum centum amplius filijs ac nepotibus —, nulla injuria laceſſitus, ſed quòd in his maximam apud Perſas* probitatis *et fortitudinis laudem conſiſtere videbat.* Id. And *Seneca* having recommended the example of *Græcinus Julius* (*Julius Græcinus, ap. Tacit.* the father of *Julius Agricola*), adds, *quem C. Cæſar occidit ob hoc unum, quòd melior vir erat, quàm eſſe quemquam tyranno expediret.*

tioners. Peruse that account of the Gold works in the confines of *Egypt* given by *Diodorus*: and think over the circumstances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even such as *calumny*, or *unjust* power had doomed (perhaps for being *too good*) to that place of torment; many times with all their relations and poor children (81). Or, once for all, take a view of *servitude*, as it is described by *Pignorius*. To pass over the *Sicilian* tyrants, him of *Pheræ*, *Apollodorus* (82), and the like, of which history supplies plenty; consider the reigns of most of the *Roman emperors*, more bloody than *Lybic* lion, or *Hyrcanian* tiger, even some of the *Christian* emperors not excepted. Read the direful and unjust executions reported by *Amm. Marcellinus*: among hundreds of others that of *Eusebius* (83). Every *whisper* in those times or *light suspicion* brought upon men the question and tortures inconceivable. Men's very *dreams* were once interpreted to be treason; and they durst scarce own, that they had ever slept (84). What inhuman punishments were used among the *Persians* (85), in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concernd (86). But instead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, σκαφισμὸς, &c., I choose to refer you to those authors, who have designedly treated of the *torments* and *questions* of the ancients. Look into the history of the *Christian church*, and her martyrologies: examine the prisons of the *Inquisition*, the *groans* of which those walls are conscious, and upon what *slight* occasions men are racked and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finish this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as fast as I can, consider the many massacres, persecutions, and miseries consequent upon them, which *false religion* has caused, authorized, sanctified. Indeed the *history* of mankind is little else but the history of uncomfortable, dreadful passages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is scarcely to be red by a *good-natured* man without amazement, horror, tears. One can scarce look into a *news-paper*, or out at his *window*, but hardships and sufferings present themselves, in one shape or other. Now among all *those millions*, who have suffered *eminently*, can it be imagind, that there have not been *multitudes*, whose griefs and pangs have *far out weighed* all their injoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their prudence, or any power in them, to escape that *bitter draught*, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the *justice* and *reasonableness* of that Being, upon whom these poor creatures depend, and who leaves them such great losers by their existence, if there be no *future state*, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable issue: if the *soul* of man is not *immortal*, either there is *no God*, upon whom we depend; or He is an *unreasonable Being*; or there never has been *any man*, whose sufferings in this world have exceeded his injoyments, with-

(81) Οἱ ἀδίκοις διαβολαῖς περιπεσόντες, καὶ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοὶ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πάσης συγγενείας. (82) Mentiond by *Cicero* with *Phalaris*. He was tyrant of *Cassandria*, and is represented (out of *Polyænus*) as φονικώτατος καὶ ὠμότατος πάντων, ὅσοι παρ' Ἕλλησιν ἢ παρὰ Βαρβάροις ἐτυράννησαν. Yet *Ælian* says, Ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου ὑπαναφλεγόμενος καὶ ὑπεξαπτόμενος, ἐγίνετο φονικώτερος, κλ. (83) *Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans cælo justitiam, torvum renidens fundato pectore mansit immobilis*, &c. In the reign of *Constantius*. (84) *Mærebantq; docti quidam, quòd apud Atlanteos nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri.* (85) *V. Plut. in v. Artox.* (86) *Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit.* Amm. Marc.

without his being the cauſe of it himſelf: but ſurely *no one* of theſe three things can be ſaid. *Ergo*---.

That, which aggravates the *hard caſe* of the poor ſufferers mentiond above, if there be no *future ſtate*, in which their paſt ſufferings may be brought into the account, and recompenſed, is, that many times their *perſecutors* and *tormentors* paſs their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the *innocent* have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreaſonable part of mankind, but the *guilty* have that, which belongs rather to the innocent (87). Such a *tranſpoſition* of rewards and puniſhments, ending in itſelf, without any reſpect to ſomething, which is to follow hereafter, can never conſiſt with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much *below* rational: a thought, which *God forbid* any one ſhould entertain of Him. To ſuppoſe the *virtuous* and *wiſe* left ultimately but in the ſame ſtate with the unjuſt and profligate is to ſuppoſe ſuch a *conſtitution* of nature, as can never flow from a principle of reaſon, a God of *truth* and *equity*: and therefore ſuch a conſtitution, as leaves the former in a *worſe* condition than the other, can *much leſs* be ſuppoſed.

Obj. It hath been ſaid, that *virtue* tends to make men's lives happy even here: and how then can the virtuous be ſuppoſed ever to be ſo *very miſerable?* *Anſ.* In ordinary caſes *virtue* doth produce happineſs: at leaſt it has indeed a *natural tendency* to it; is the mean, by which it is moſt likely to be attaind; and is therefore the way, which a wiſe man would chooſe for his own ſake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no *perturbations* in human affairs; no caſes, in which the uſual effect of virtue may be *overpowerd* by diſeaſes, violence, dyſaſters. It doth not render men *invulnerable*; cannot command the *ſeaſons*; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice muſt fall *undiſtinguiſhed*. (There may be a *direct road* to a place, and ſuch a one, as he, who ſets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is poſſible he may meet with *robbers* or *accidents* in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other ſide, *vice* and *wickedneſs* may be ſo circumſtantiated as to be attended with much greater *pleaſure* than *pain*, contrary to the tendency of its nature: that is, a *wicked man* may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a ſtrong conſtitution, an ample fortune, happy ſituation, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive *pleaſures*, which ſhall exceed the preſent *inconveniences* and *ſufferings* naturally following from his vices.

Men's *circumſtances* have a natural influence with reſpect to the preſent pleaſures or ſufferings, as well as their *virtue* or *vice*. No body ſure ever ſaid, that *all* depends *only* upon theſe: nor, when the natural tendence of *them* is aſſerted, is the natural tendence or effect of the *other* denied. Therefore indeed, when it is ſaid that virtue *naturally* tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in *proportion* to their circumſtances; and vice does the *contrary*. It is naturally productive of that part of happineſs, which is in our *own power*, and depends upon *our ſelves*; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumſtances are, than they could be *without it*; and *commonly* tends to mend their worldly circumſtances too: but it is not aſſerted, that virtue can *always intirely* correct them, or make men

(87) *Dies deficiet, ſi velim numerare, quibus bonis malè evenerit: nec minùs, ſi commemorem, quibus improbis optimè, Cic.* This is juſtly ſaid; tho I account his inſtances not the moſt appoſite.

ſo *completely* happy in this life, as that their injoyments ſhall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of ſome particular men, tho they bereave them of many ſolid pleaſures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from being greater than their preſent ſufferings. Not only our *being*, but our *place*, with the *time*, and *manner* of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the ſcheme: the manner of *behaving our ſelves* in our ſtation (according to our indowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has ſo ordered things on purpoſe, that from the *various compoſitions* of men's circumſtances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many *inequalities* ariſing thence, they might ſee the *neceſſity* and *certainty* of another ſtate: and that for this reaſon there ſhould always be ſome remarkable inſtances of *oppreſt innocence* and *flouriſhing wickedneſs*.

The upſhot is, that upon comparing *thoſe pleaſures*, which are the natural effects of virtue with *thoſe ſufferings*, which are the natural effects of ill conſtitution or other circumſtances, *theſe* are many, very many times found to exceed: and *è contrario*, upon balancing *thoſe evils*, which are the genuine effects of vice, againſt the *advantages* reſulting from fortunate circumſtances, *theſe* may often be found to outdo the other. *Both contrary to reaſon*, if all end's with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only ſome *few*, nay but *one* inſtance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and proſperous wickedneſs), it would be to me a ſufficient argument for a *future ſtate*: becauſe God cannot be unjuſt or unreaſonable in any *one* inſtance. It muſt not be forgot here, that many times men of *great vices* have alſo *great virtues*, and the natural effect of theſe may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumſtances may help to turn the ſcale.

If there is no other beſide the preſent being, the *general* and *uſual* ſtate of mankind is ſcarce conſiſtent with the idea of a *reaſonable* Cauſe. Let us conſider it a little (88). Not to mention what we muſt ſuffer from the *very ſettlement* and *condition* of this world, by hunger, thirſt, heat, cold, and indiſpoſitions; like *leaves* one generation drops, and another ſprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten (89). As we come into the world with the labor of our *mothers*, we ſoon go out of it with *our own*. *Childhood* and *youth* are much of them loſt in inſenſibility or trifling, vanity and rudeneſs; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are ſpent in the beſt manner, are attended with *labor* and *diſcipline*. When we arrive at that *ſtage of life*, which uſually takes us from our neareſt relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper *imployments* and ſtations found for us? When we are *got out*, and left to ſcramble for our ſelves, how many *hardſhips* and *tricks* are put upon us, before we learn the ſagacity and dexterity to ſave our ſelves? How many *chances* do we ſtand? How troubleſom is *buſineſs* made by unreaſonableneſs, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the perſons, whom we deal with? How do we find our ſelves inſtantly ſurrounded with *ſnares* from deſigning men, knaves, enemies (of which the beſt men have ſome), oppoſite intereſts, factions, and many times from a miſchievous breed, whoſe *childiſh* or *diabolical* humor finds pleaſure in the uneaſineſs of other people? Even in many of thoſe *injoyments*, which men principally propoſe to themſelves, they find themſelves greatly *diſappointed*, and experience ſhews, how unlike

(88) *Et valet annales* noſtrorum *audire laborum*. For, as *Seneca* ſays, *Nulli contigit impunè naſci*. (89) Οἵηπερ φύλλων γενεὴ, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν. — ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. *Hom.*

like they are to the antecedent images of them. The *apparatus* to moſt pleaſures is too operoſe: the completion of them ſeldom depends upon *our ſelves alone*, but upon a combination of things, which rarely hit *all* right (90): they are generally not only leſs in practice, than in theory, but die almoſt as ſoon as they are; it may be leave an ill flavor behind them; and in their conſequences turn to repentance. To go on with the hiſtory of *human life*: tho affairs go proſperouſly, yet ſtill perhaps a *family* is increaſing, and with it new occaſions of *ſoliciude* are introduced, accompanied with many *fears* and *tender apprehenſions*. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at *old age*, then he finds moſt commonly his *preſſures* rather increaſed, than diminiſhed, and himſelf *leſs able* to ſupport them (91). The buſineſs he has to do, grows *urgent* upon him, and calls for *diſpatch*: moſt of his *faculties* and active powers begin now to fail him apace: *relations* and *friends*, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Conſort of all his joys, and all his cares) (92) leave him, *never to return more*: wants and *pains* all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this *additional load* he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either ſtumbles upon ſomething, which throws him into the grave (93), or fainting falls of himſelf. And muſt he *end here?* Is this the *period* of his being? Is this *all*? Did he come into the world only to *make his way* through the preſs, amidſt many juſtlings and hard ſtruggles, mixt at beſt only with a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleaſures, and ſo *go out of it* again? Can this be an end worthy a firſt Cauſe *perfectly reaſonable?* Would even any *man*, of common ſenſe and good nature, ſend another upon a *difficult journey*, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little ſmooth way, get an interval for reſt and contemplation, or be entertaind with ſome verdures and the ſmiles of a few daiſies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he muſt travel through much dirt, take many wearisom ſteps, be continually inquiring after ſome clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent *viaticum* and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being loſt in deep waters, and beſide forced all the while to fence againſt weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I ſay, would any one ſend a man upon *ſuch a journey* as this, *only* that he might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts periſh; that is, either for *no end* at all, or for the *puniſhment* of one, whom I ſuppoſe never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common ſize of *men?*

I am apt to think, th t even among thoſe, whoſe ſtate is beheld with envy, there are *many*, who, if at the end of their courſe they were put to their *option*, whether, without any reſpect to a *future ſtate*, they would repeat all the pleaſures they have had in life, *upon condition* to go over again alſo all the ſame diſappointments, the ſame vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the ſame ſecret pangs and tedious hours, the ſame labors of body and mind, the ſame pains and ſickneſſes, would be *far from accepting* them at that price (94).

But

(90) Senſible of this, *Socrates* uſed to ſay, δεῖν τὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ παρ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμῶν περᾶσθαι. *Stob.* (91) *Senex, et leviſſimis quoq; curis impar*: as *Seneca*, of himſelf, in *Tac.* (92) *Rogus aſpiciendus amatæ Conjugis, &c.* Juv. (93) Σμικρὰ παλαιὰ σώματ' ἰυνάζει ξοπή. *Soph.* (94) *Non mehercule quiſquam accepiſſet* [vitam], *niſi daretur inſcijs.* Sen.

But here the case, as I have put it, only respects them, who may be reckond among the *more fortunate* passengers: and for *one*, that makes his voyage so well, *thousands* are tost in tempests, and lost. How many never attain any comfortable settlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various misfortunes? What melancholy, what distractions are caused in families by barbarous or vitious husbands, false or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy children, and the like? How many are forced by necessity upon drudging and very shocking imployments for a poor livelihood? How many subsist upon begging, borrowing, and other shifts, nor can do otherwise? How many meet with sad accidents, or fall into deplorable diseases? Are not all companies, and the very streets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful stories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may ascribe their deaths to want and dejection. In a word, the *present state* of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not some connection with *another*, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it (95).

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruses the story and face of the world, what appears to *prevail* in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at least? Are not debauching, getting *per fas aut nefus*, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other, propagating empty and senseless opinions with bawling and fury the great business of *this world*? And are not all these contrary to *reason*? Can any one then with reason imagine, that *reason* should be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguished*? May we not rather conclude, that there must be *some world*, where *reason* will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of *reason* to come (96)?

5. In the last place, that *great expectation*, which men have, of continuing to live in another state, *beyond the grave*, has I suppose been commonly admitted as one proof, that they *shall live*; and does seem indeed to me to add some weight to what has been said. That they generally have had such an *expectation*, can scarce be denied. The histories of mankind, their deifications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a *hades*, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c. all testify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the *souls* of men *survived* their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the seats and circumstances of the departed has begot many *errors* and *superstitions*; and these have been multiplied by licentious *poets* and idle *visionairs*: but this, being no more than what is usual in the like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the *fundamental opinion itself*.

Cicero (97), tho he owns there were different opinions among the *Greek* philosophers about this matter; that, *quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos*; that *Pythagoras* and his school confirmed this opinion; that *Plato* was the man, who brought a reason for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, *naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare*; that *nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium*; that *permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium*; and more to this purpose. Now if this consent was only the effect of some *tradition*,

(95) העולם הזה דומה לפרוזדור בפני העולם הבא. *P. Aboth.* (96) Beside, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities, when our faculties shall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ θέας τοῦ ὄντος οὐδεὶς ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἐρώντων ἐνέπλησεν ἑαυτὸν ἱκανῶς, κτλ. *Plut.* (97) *In Tusc. disp.*

tradition, handed from parents to their children; yet ſince we meet with it in *all the quarters* of the world (where there is *any* civility or ſenſe), and in *all ages*, it ſeems to be *coeval* to mankind itſelf, and born with it. And this is ſufficient to give a great *authority* to this opinion of the ſoul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is ſupported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reaſonings and ſymptoms which we may find within our ſelves. All which, put together, may at leaſt *juſtify* an expectation of a future ſtate; that is, render it a juſt or reaſonable expectation: and then this *reaſonable expectation* grows, by being ſuch, into a further argument, that there *will be* ſuch a ſtate.

Fancy a man walking in ſome *retired field*, far from noiſe, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himſelf: and then judge, whether ſuch *meditations* as theſe would not be reaſonable. "I think I may be ſure, that neither *lifeleſs matter*, nor "the *vegetative tribe*, that ſtone, that flower, that tree have any reflex thoughts: nor "do the *ſenſitive animals*, that ſheep, that ox ſeem to have any ſuch thing, or but in "the loweſt degree, and in reſpect of preſent objects only. They do not *reaſon* nor "*diſcourſe*. I may therefore certainly pretend to be ſomething *much above* all theſe "things. I not only apprehend and conſider theſe *external objects* acting at preſent "upon my nerves, but have *ideas* raiſed within my ſelf of a higher order, and many: "I can, not only repreſent to my ſelf things, that *are*, or *have been*, but *deduce* many "other from them, make excurſions into *futurity*, and foreſee much of what will be, "or at leaſt may be; by ſtrict thinking, I had almoſt ſaid, get into *another world* be"fore-hand: and, whether I ſhall live in ſome other ſtate after death, or not, I am "certainly *a being* capable of ſuch an *expectation*, and cannot but be ſolicitous about "it: none of which things can be ſaid of theſe *clods* or thoſe *brutes*. Can I then be "deſigned for *nothing further*, than juſt to eat, drink, ſleep, walk about, and act up"on this earth (98); that is, to have no further being, than what theſe brutes "have, ſo far beneath me? Can I be made capable of ſuch *great expectations*, which "thoſe animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I am, if we "muſt die *alike*), only to be *diſappointed at laſt*? Thus placed, juſt upon the confines "of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, and injoying "it, only to make a *ſhort appearance* here, and then to be *ſhut out*, and *totally ſunk*? "Muſt I then, when I bid my laſt farewell to theſe walks, when I cloſe theſe lids, "and yonder blew regions and all this ſcene darken upon me and go out, muſt I *then* "only ſerve to furniſh duſt to be mingled with the aſhes of theſe *herds* and *plants*, or "with this *dirt* under my feet? Have I been ſet *ſo far above them* in life, only to be "*leveld with them* at death?"

This argument grows *ſtronger* in the apprehenſion of one, who is conſcious of abilities and *intellectual improvements*, which he has had no opportunity here of ſhewing and uſing, through want of health, want of confidence, want of proper place, want of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge conſequent upon them, cannot ultimately reſpect *this ſtate*: they can be only an inlargement, and *preparation* for another. That is all they *can be*: and if they are not that, they are *nothing*. And therefore he may be ſuppoſed thus, further, to argue within himſelf. "Can the Author "of my *reaſoning* faculties be Himſelf ſo *unreaſonable* as to give me them, either not "to imploy them, or only to weary my ſelf with *uſeleſs* purſuits, and then drop me?

"Can

(98) *Brevis eſt hic fructus homullis*, may be juſtly ſaid for all *Lucretius*.

" Can He, who is privy to all my *circumſtances*, and to theſe very *thoughts* of mine, " be ſo inſenſible of my caſe, as to have *no regard* to it, and not provide for it? "

It grows *ſtronger ſtill* upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cauſe he has given for it, the pains and ſecret uneaſineſſes he has felt upon that ſcore, together with many other ſufferings, which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a *ſilent, humble appeal* to that Being, who is his *laſt* and *true refuge*, and who he muſt believe will not *deſert him thus.*

Laſtly, it is *ſtrongeſt of all* to one, who, beſides all this, *endeavours* in the conduct of his life to obſerve the laws of *reaſon*; that is, of *his nature*; and that is of the *Author of nature*, upon whom he depends: laments, and labors againſt his own *infirmities*: implores the Divine *mercy*, prays for ſome *better ſtate* hereafter, acts and lives in the *hopes* of one, and *denies* himſelf many things upon that view: one, who by the exaltation of his *reaſon* and upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effect of real and uſeful philoſophy, the practice of *virtue*, is ſtill approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taſt ſomething ſpiritual and above this world. To ſuch a one there muſt be a ſtrong expectation *indeed*, and the argument built upon it muſt be proportionable. For can he be indowed with ſuch capacities, and have as it were *overtures* of immortality made him, it after all there is no ſuch thing? Muſt his *private* acts and *conceald* exerciſes of religion be all loſt (99)? Can a Perfect Being have ſo little regard to one, who however inferior and *nothing* to Him, yet regards Him according to *his beſt abilities* in the government of himſelf?

Are ſuch *meditations* and reflexions as theſe well founded, or not? If they are, it muſt be reaſonable to think, that God will ſatisfy a *reaſonable expectation.*

There are *other arguments* for the immortality of the ſoul, *two* of which I will leave with you, to be at your leiſure ponderd well. The *one* is, that, if the *ſouls* of men are *mortal* (extinguiſhed at death), the caſe of *brutes* is by much preferable to that of *men.* The *pleaſures* of brutes, tho but ſenſual, are more ſincere, being palled or diminiſhed by no diverting conſideration: they go *wholly* into them, and when they have them not, they ſeem leſs to want them, not thinking of them. Their *ſufferings* are attended with no reflexion (1), but ſuch as they are ſaid to be p. 24. obſ. 8. They are void of *cares*; never fatigue themſelves with vain inquiries, hunting after *knowledge*, which muſt periſh with them; are not anxious about their *future ſtate* (2), nor can be diſappointed of any hopes or expectations, &c.

The *other* is, that the ſoul is a *principle of life*: that, which brings vitality to the body. For how ſhould that, which has been proved to be a ſubſtance, and at the ſame time is alſo a principle of life, and *as ſuch* (as being what it is) is *alive*; I ſay, how can that *die*, unleſs it is annihilated?

Here I begin to be very ſenſible how much I want a *guide*. But as the religion of *nature* is my theme, I muſt at preſent content my ſelf with that light, which *nature* affords; my buſineſs being, as it ſeems, only to ſhew, what a Heathen *philoſopher*, without any other help, and almoſt αὐτοδίδακτος, may be ſuppoſed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elſe containd in this *Delineation*, can be the leaſt prejudice to any other *true* religion. Whatever is immediately *revealed from God*,

(99) Hic pietatis honos? (1) *Fera pericula, quæ vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, ſecura ſunt, &c.* Sen. (2) לא יצטערו בהיותם משערים שסופם למות כאדם וכו׳ *S. Iqqar.*

God, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being *what it is*: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, *believed* and *obeyd*. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my song, is so far from undermining true *reveald religion*, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And so returning to my *Philosopher*, I cannot imagin but that *even he* would have at least some such general thoughts as these, which make up almost the remainder of this last section.

IX. *The soul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat, or state, agreeable to the nature of it.* Every species of beings must belong to *some* region, or state. Because nothing can be, but it must be *some where*, and *some how*: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of subsisting in the universe, and the natures of the things, that are to exist in them, being also different, there will be a greater *congruity* between some of these *natures* and some *places*, or *states*, than there is between them and others; and indeed such a one, that out of those perhaps they cannot subsist, or not *naturally*. To those therefore must be their respective *tendencies*: to those they are *adjudged* by the course of nature, and constitution of things, or rather by the Author of them (3).

While the Soul is in the body, it has some powers and opportunities of moving it spontaneously, or otherwise than it would be moved by the mere laws of gravitation and mechanism. This is evident. But yet, notwithstanding this, the weight of that *body*, to which at present it is limited (among other causes) constrains it to act for a while upon *this stage*. That general law, to which bodies are subjected, makes it sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself; keeps it down; and so determines the seat of it, and of the Soul in it, to be upon the surface of this *earth*, where, or in whose neighbourhood it was first produced. But then, when the Soul shall be disengaged from the gross matter, which now incloses and incumbers it, and either become *naked spirit*, or be only veild in its own fine and obsequious *vehicle*, it must at the same time be either freed from the *laws* of bodies, and fall under *some other*, which will carry it to some *proper* mansion, or state (4); or at least by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of these regions into some *medium* more suitable, and (if the Philosopher may say so) equilibrious. Thus much as to the *general state* of souls after death. But then,

X. *In this new state, or place of abode, there may be different stations befitting the differences of particular souls among themselves, as they are more or less perfect in their kind.* We see even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, figures, impulses, &c. settle into some *order* among themselves, agreeable to these *differences*. And so by the same universal rule in nature (*viz.* that differences in things are attended with answerable relations and effects) *souls* must also take their situations in *some kind* of order according to *their* differences.

XI. *The great difference of human souls, with respect to perfection and imperfection, lies in their different degrees and habits* (5) *of reasonableness, or unreasonableness* (6). That is to say,

(3) Χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. *Hierocl.* (4) *Ex humili atq; depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu.* Sen. Ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀποβολὴ, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινων, ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸν τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν

say, not only in men's different *improvements*, or neglects and abuse of their rational faculties, but also in the greater or less influence of these upon their actions, and by consequence in their different degrees of *virtue*, or *vice*. For a man is accounted a *reasonable* man, when he reasons rightly, and follows his reason: in which expression virtue must be included, being (as p. 129, *& al.*) nothing but the *practice of reason and truth*.

That men are reasonable, or the contrary in *different degrees*, is plain. Some reason well upon *some* subjects, but in respect of *others*, to which they have not been accustomed, are dim and confused: or they are partial to their vices and passions, their old impressions and parties; and so their reason is not *general*, nor has its due *extent*, or *influence*. Others have virtuous inclinations; but their reason is uncultivated, and weak, and they many times fall into *superstition* and *absurdities*: the reason they have, is prepossest, over-awed, and yields to a set of *phrases* and *grave non-sense*. Some are virtuous and wise in some respects, but indulgent to their lusts and loose in others. Many, if not the most, seem to have scarce any *notion* of reason or virtue *at all*, but act fortuitously, or as they see other folks act: moved either by bodily propensions, or by example. Some *few* there are, who *endeavour* to improve their faculties, to discover what is agreeable to reason, and to fix their *opinions*, and conduct their *lives* accordingly. And in all these *several kinds* there are various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immersion in vice and ignorance, and new differences arising endlessly. All this is visible.

Now the Soul, reflecting, finds in itself *two* general faculties: *one*, by which it understands, and judges, and reasons (all which I comprehend under the term *rational faculties*, or *reason*); and *another*, by which it wills, or determins to act, according to the judgments and conclusions made in the upper part of it. And the more *perfectly* it performs these operations (*i. e.* the more *truly* it reasons, and the more *readily* it wills and executes the decisions of reason), the more *perfect* certainly it must be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accomplishments therefore and *perfections* of human souls, and the *contrary* must be in proportion to the forementiond *differences*.

XII. *According to these differences then it is reasonable to think the Souls of men will find their stations in the future world* (7). This is but a corollary from what goes before.

Obj. Why should we think, that God causes things to be in such a manner, as that in the *future state* men shall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progress they have made in reason and virtue, when we see the case to be widely different *in this*? *Ans.* It must be rememberd, that this is one of those very *reasons*, on which the belief of the soul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reasonable to believe there is a future state, because things are dealt *unequally* now, upon that very score it will be reasonable to think, that they are dealt *equally* (8) in the other state. Here

καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐζωΐαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *Hierocl.* (5) The Jews, who generally say, that by the practice of religion the soul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay such a stress upon *habits* of piety, that *R. Albo* makes the effect of giving 1000 *zuzin* in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one *zuz* and repeating it 1000 times. התמדת עשיית פעל אחר כל עושה מצות הבורא יתברך (6) בעצמו יקנה מדרגה יותר גדולה מעשיית חפעל ההוא פעם אחת ימצא שכל טוב — והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל האמיתי הוא השארת הנפש אחר כלות הגוף והדבקו בשכל הפועל והיותו קים לעד. *Is. Lev.* (7) Τόπους προσήκοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ. *Plato.* (8) With an equal or impartial regard to every mans deserts: equitably.

Here *bodily* wants and affections, and ſuch things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound *merit* with *demerit*, *knowledge* with *ignorance*: and hence it comes to paſs many times, that bad men injoy much, and good men ſuffer, and both are, if there is no other ſtate, in their wrong places. But, when the *corporeal cauſes* of miſplacing ſhall be removed, *ſpirits* (or ſpirits and their σώματα πνευματικὰ) may be ſuppoſed more regularly to take their *due* poſts and privileges: the impudent and vitious will have no ſuch *opportunities* of getting into circumſtances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find ſuch *obſtructions* to keep them down in circumſtances unworthy of them. Be ſure the more advanced and pure any ſtate is, the more *properly* will the inhabitants be ranged, and the *juſter* and more *natural* will the ſubordination of its members be.

Even *here* we commonly find men in that kind of buſineſs, for which they are educated and *prepared*; men of the ſame profeſſions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reaſonable *deſiring* to be (tho they not always can be) with *their like*; and the vitious (as they ſcarcely cannot be) with *theirs*. And why ſhould we not think, that an *aſſociation* and *communion* of ſouls with thoſe of their own ſize, diſpoſition, and habits may be more *univerſal* and *compleat*, when thoſe things, which in great meaſure hinderd it here, ſhall be no more? If we may think this, certainly thoſe fields or ſtates, in which the *virtuous* and *wiſe* ſhall meet, muſt be different from thoſe, in which the *fooliſh* and *wicked* ſhall herd together (9). The very difference of the *company* will itſelf create a vaſt difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. *The ſtations and conditions of the virtuous and reaſoning part muſt be proportionably better than thoſe of the fooliſh and vitious.* The propoſition cannot be inverted, or the caſe be otherwiſe, if the conſtitution of things depends upon a reaſonable Cauſe: as I have endeavourd to ſhew it does.

Cor. Hence it follows, that *the practice of reaſon* (in its juſt extent) *is the great preparative for Death, and the means of advancing our happineſs through all our ſubſequent duration.* But moreover,

XIV. *In the future ſtate reſpect will be had not only to men's reaſon, and virtues, or the contrary, but alſo to their injoyments and ſufferings here.* Becauſe the forementiond *inequalities* of this world can by no means be redreſt, unleſs men's injoyments and ſufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I ſay, *taken together*: becauſe no reaſon can be aſſigned, why a vitious man ſhould be recompenſed for the pains and miſchiefs and troubles, which he *brings upon himſelf* by his vices, as the natural conſequences of them; nor, on the other ſide, why any deductions ſhould be made from the future happineſs of a good man upon the ſcore of thoſe *innocent* injoyments, which are the genuine fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and ſound reaſoning.

Cor. Wicked men will not only be leſs happy than the wiſe and virtuous, *but be really unhappy in that ſtate to come.* For when all the happineſs, that anſwers to thoſe degrees of virtue, which they had, and thoſe ſufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedneſs; I ſay, when that is ſubtracted, what remains upon the account will be ſomething below no-happineſs: which muſt be ſome quantity of *poſitive unhappineſs*, or miſery.

(9) Τελευτήσαντας αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν παιδαγωγὸς τόπος οὐ λήξει, οὐδὲ λ' ἂν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξει, κακὸς κακοῖς συνόντες. *Plato.*

Thus there will be *rewards*, and *punishments* hereafter: and men will be *happy*, or *unhappy* according to their behaviour, injoyments, and sufferings in this present life. But,

XV. *If the Immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot* (10). To say, when a *house* is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an *inhabitant*, and that he is escaped out of it, and lives in some other place, can involve no contradiction, or absurdity. And,

XVI. *If the Immortality of the soul should be considerd only as a probability, or even as a chance possible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contrary.* For if the soul be *mortal*, and all perception perishes for ever at our death, what in this case does a good man *lose* by his virtue? Very rarely more than some acts of *devotion*, and instances of *mortification*, which too by custom grow habitual and easy (11), and it may be *pleasant* by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man *gain*? Only such injoyments, as a virtuous man *leaves*: and those are such, as most commonly owe their being to a vitiated tast; grow insipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off disagreeably; are followd many times by sharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear (*); and at best after a short time end in nothing, *as if they had never been.* This is all (12). But then if the soul prove to be *immortal* (as we have all the reason in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous man *gain*? His present pleasures (if not so many) are more *sincere* (13) and *natural* (14); and the effect of his self-denials and submission to reason, in order to prepare himself for a future state, is the happiness of that state: which, without pretending to describe it, may be presumed to be *immortal*, because the soul is so; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (*i. e. truer*, and *greater*) than any of these low injoyments here, because that state is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man *lose*? That happiness, which the virtuous gain *as such*; and he sinks, beside, into some degree of the *unhappiness* of that future state: of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappiness or sufferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above those of this.

In

(10) Sure those arguments in *Lucretius* can convince no body. *Nunc quoniam, quassatis undiq; vasis, Diffluere humorem, & laticem discedere cernis; Crede animam quoq; diffundi, &c.* And *Praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore & unà Crescere sentimus, pariterq; senescere mentem,* &c. *Quare animum quoq; dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi.* Nor those in *Pliny* (N. H. 7. 56): if there really are any at all. For to plead the *antegenitale experimentum* is to beg the question; which may be put thus, Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence, than we were before we were born. And if *Dicaarchus's Lesbiaci* were extant, I believe we should find nothing stronger in them. The truth seems to be, Οὐ βούλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν: but he comforts himself with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον ἀδύνεια ἑαυτοῦ will prevent future sufferings. This is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγή. *Hierocl.* (11) Μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος δίμας ἐπ' αὐτὴν [ἀρετὴν], Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, Ῥηΐδιη δ' ἤπειτα πέλει. *Hes.* (*) *Isocrates*, comparing vitious pleasures with virtue, observes rightly, Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσθέντες, ὕστερον ἐλυπήθημεν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ μετὰ τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν. (12) *Cælo praefertur Adonis.* (13) Ὁ ἀρετῇ διαπρέπων καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτους καρποῦται. *Hierocl.* (14) If the Soul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ οἰκεῖον καρπούμενος ἀγαθὸν, εὐδαίμων ὄντως ϛι καὶ μακάριος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. *Simpl.*

In a ſtate, that is *ſpiritual* and clear, every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and ſtrongly, and (if the expreſſion may be tolerated) *with more ſpirit*: there will be fewer obſtructions to either happineſs or unhappineſs: the ſoul will lie *more open*, and have more *immediate* and acute perceptions of either: ſo that each of them in their kind will be more *intenſe*, the one nearer to pure or mere happineſs, the other to the contrary (15). But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my *Philoſopher*.

I ſhall only add, that the *reaſoning* and *virtuous* man has at leaſt this advantage over the *fooliſh* and *profligate*, that, tho his wiſdom and virtue cannot *always* rectify that, which is amiſs in himſelf or his circumſtances, they will find means to *alleviate* his preſſures and diſadvantages, and ſupport him with *comforts*, of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of *felicity hereafter*, ſincere and durable (16).

XVII. *He therefore, who would act according to truth, muſt*, in the laſt place, *not only conſider what he is, and how circumſtantiated in this preſent ſtate, and provide accordingly; but, further, muſt conſider himſelf alſo as one, whoſe exiſtence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too.* How *I think* this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.

For a *concluſion* of the whole matter; let our converſation in this world, ſo far as we are concernd, and able, be ſuch as acknowledges every thing to be *what it is* (what it is in *itſelf*, and what with regard to *us*, to other *beings*, to *cauſes*, *circumſtances*, *conſequences*): that is, let us by no act *deny* any thing to be *true*, which is *true* (17): that is, let us act according to *reaſon*: and that is, let us act according to *the law of our nature*. By *honeſtly endeavouring* to do this we ſhall expreſs our duty to *Him*, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the ſame time proſecute our own *proper* happineſs (the happineſs of *rational* beings): we ſhall do what tends to make us eaſy here, and be qualifying our ſelves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great *revolution*, which at the fartheſt, cannot be very far off.

And now, *Sir*, the trouble is almoſt over, not properly which I have given you, but which you have brought upon yourſelf, theſe being the *Thoughts*, which you *deſired*: unleſs I have any where miſrepreſented myſelf through *inadvertence*; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in ſome places ſubjoind a *few little* ſtrictures principally of *antiquity*, after the manner of annotations: ſuch as, when I came to reviſe theſe ſheets, I could recollect upon the ſudden; having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any ſuch thing before that time. They may ſerve perhaps ſometimes a little to explain the text; and ſometimes to add weight; but chiefly to *divert* you, who know very well how to improve any the *leaſt hint* out of the Ancients, and I fear will *want* to be diverted. I have alſo printed a few copies of this *Sketch*, not with any deſign to make it public, but

(15) Ὥστε μὴ μόνον τῶ καλῶ περιεῖναι τὸν σπουδαῖον τοῦ φαύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾶν, δι' ἣν μόνην δοκεῖ εἰς κακίαν ὁ φαῦλος ὑπάγεσθαι. *Hier.* (16) Οἱ γὰρ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐλπίσι γε σπουδαίαις ὑπερέχουσιν. *Iſocr.* (17) Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὅμοιον, ἔφη, ἐὰν ἀληθεύωσι. *Stob.*

but merely to save the trouble of *transcribing*; being minded, since I have made it, to leave it not only with *you*, but perhaps also with two or three other *friends*: or however, with my *Family*, as a *private monument* of one that meant well.

N. N.

מכ"א ות"ל.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

ERRATA.

Page.	Line.	Read,
1		φύσησις for φύσις.
4	39	πρόσθη
11	42	ἀεῖδος.
12	37	dependence
25	36	וכו'
33	8	Reaſon muſt be underſtood, when it is aſcribed to God,
38	31	he who diſſents from the reſt is only
40	42	*cognoſci*
41	29	nor have
49	29	*Ibn* (without the point after it)
55	12	five times as firm as braſs,
61	29	former and architect
67	14	thouſands
71	30	reclaimd : ſome
73	4	(as of *men*, for inſtance),
75	14	*foreknowledge* of that truth
	39	man)
76	4	was to be asked,
	14	and the neglects of others
77	41	ἡμᾶς
78		*antepen.* as has been hinted already
80	3	laſtly,
	6	matter. This
	11	knowledge and power
81	44	*improbis*
82	19	by ſome larger
85	17	we to propoſe
87		*ult.* *Vulg.*
89	33	which (particles, &c.)
90	7	ingenuouſly
	40	והובים
91	19	preſerved)
93	21	no more title than D,
103	7	*of another man, &c. with*
	14	convulſed and agonizing
116		*ult.* as is intended

Page.	Line.	Read,
117	28	*and great Cauſe*)
121	25	injoys them ; and, beſide, may contribute much himſelf to both his injoyments and ſufferings. — *Dele the former* and *in the foregoing line*
	39	As alſo, *for* And ſo
122	38	affects
	41	(in Jewiſh language)
124	16, 17	accept what he wanted, but
	40	faculty of reaſon,
127	13	at leaſt ſhew himſelf to be
129	32	not hurt
133	18	ſomething
139	15	this. *Viz.* that
142	29	there they communicate
144	19	poſſible
146	7, 8	conſider thoſe terrible proſcriptions among the *Romans*, with the reigns of moſt of their emperors,

Blot Out.

15	20	and
18	42	him
140	31	for it
143	13	it
144	15	this (*the* ; *preceding ſhould be*,)

Add.

25	6	(73) *after* may be
76	13	(*) *after the word* caſe. *And let this Note belong to it.* The caſe here put may perhaps furniſh an anſwer to that which is ſaid in *Miſhn. maſs. Berak.* הצועה לשעבר הרי זו חכפלת שוא וכו'.

If any one happens to caſt his eye upon theſe papers, he is deſired further to correct the *pointing*, which many times is either defective or wrong (as p. 5 : l. 30. 7 : 29. 18 : 27. 23 : 47, 48. 24 : 2, 4, 6. 40 : 34. 52 : 27. 48 : 1. 52 : 27, 47. 53 : 45. 61 : 30. 68 : 17. 70 : 16, 17. 71 : 39 (*there ſhould be a colon after* afterward). 78 : 21. 81 : 4. 92 : 32. 111 : 7. 140 : 31, 34 ; and elſe where) : alſo the *Greek accents*, which are ſometimes miſtaken, or omitted : and ſuch other errors, as may occur, tho not mentiond here.

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ERRATA.